The U.S. in late May eased but did not remove sanctions against Myanmar -- sending a signal that summed up the view among many Western governments of the situation in the once closed and repressive country. Myanmar has made progress toward democratizing in recent years, including electing its first civilian government since 1962 in November last year, when the National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, stormed to power by winning absolute majorities in both chambers of Myanmar's parliament.

But on some other measures the country has been slipping backward. On humanitarian issues, the move toward democracy has been accompanied not by an opening of society and increased rights and protections for all the citizens of the country, but quite the contrary. As the majority of the population is finding its political voice after decades of repression, radical nationalists from the Buddhist majority are using that voice to abuse the country's minorities -- particularly the Muslim Rohingya, who account for an estimated 1 million to 1.3 million people of the total population of 53 million or more.

How are we in the West to make sense of this conundrum? How can we approach a country where an increase in democracy does not correlate with an increase in the other social values we hold dear, but where humanitarian concerns and democracy are pulling in different directions? And how can we approach sanctions policy in these circumstances?

Myanmar is perhaps one of the toughest nuts to crack in international diplomacy. Since it gained independence from Britain in 1948, it has largely withdrawn from the international community. Between 1962 and 2011 it was governed by a reclusive, xenophobic military establishment -- so much so that its closest allies during this time were China and North Korea.

But in the last decade, things have changed dramatically. Growing unrest in the country in 2007, topped off by the government's disastrous response to Cyclone Nargis, which killed an estimated 140,000 people in 2008, have seriously undermined the position of the once all-powerful military establishment. From this came the country's bold step toward the democratic civilian administration it has today.

This movement toward democracy has been matched by increasing rapprochement with the international community, not least with the U.S., the European Union and the U.K. Long-standing sanctions have been eased, new trade and investment deals have been struck, U.S. President Barack Obama visited the country in 2012 and 2014, while British Prime Minister David Cameron called for the lifting of sanctions against Myanmar as early as 2012.

Clearly we want to encourage Myanmar to continue to make progress on this metric. We want it to become a full member of the international community, and we want its citizens to become full citizens of the world. And we want to trade with them and help the country develop economically, as well as politically.

But as things stand, it is difficult to figure out how to reward the progress they have made, without also seeming to tolerate the human rights abuses in the country. In this regard, even Suu Kyi is making things much more difficult for us than they should be.

Stateless Rohingya

The Rohingya, the people at the center of this problem, are a Muslim minority in a country that is Buddhist by law and constitution, and have been denied citizenship as a group since 1982, rendering them one of the world's largest stateless populations. They have suffered repeated attempts at what some claim is a deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing, and United Nations agencies and international nongovernmental organizations have described them as "the most oppressed people on Earth."

Some international agencies estimate that there are roughly 2 million Rohingya from Myanmar, and that nearly half have been driven out of the country over recent decades. Many are languishing in refugee camps in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia, or have been forced into the slave trade in Thailand and elsewhere.

Since 2012, repeated waves of violence, instigated by Buddhist extremists in their native state of Rakhine (formerly known as Arakan), and aided and abetted by elements in the police, military and border agencies, have corralled as many as 120,000 to 140,000 Rohingya into makeshift camps for internally displaced people, where they are routinely denied medical care, education and adequate food, to say nothing of work or other economic opportunities.

For her part, Nobel Laureate Suu Kyi, the de facto (if not de jure) leader of Myanmar's new democratic civilian administration and the longtime hope of most voters who swept her party to power in elections last November, has been disappointingly slow to address this issue.

Some claim she has decided that political expediency trumps human decency, showing herself open to doing deals with extremist Buddhist monks linked to abuses and the radical Rakhine nationalists who have been instigating and carrying out the violence.

Along with those extremists who wear ethnic cleansing as a badge of patriotic honor, she has refused to even acknowledge the existence of the group. Just the other week she reprimanded the U.S. ambassador to Myanmar for having the temerity to use the word Rohingya in a letter expressing his condolences to the families of the victims of a boat accident in which some 30 Rohingya died, along with members of other minority groups. They had been trying to get from their camp to the nearby town to visit the hospital and the market -- amenities they are denied in the camp.

Suu Kyi does, however, seem to understand the frustration of United Nations agencies and nongovernmental organizations with the situation of the Rohingya. She will be heading a new, 27-strong committee just set up for the "implementation of peace, stability and development in Rakhine state." But there are reasons to be skeptical about how much this committee will achieve -- the Rohingya will not be represented on it, while officials from Rakhine state who were in office at the height of the violence will be part of the committee.

This will be one of the biggest tests for Suu Kyi's government, and for her international reputation. But until there is tangible progress, can the West really provide sanctions relief in good conscience? Perhaps not, but I believe we must not take it off the agenda. We should not, of course, punish the majority of Myanmar's population for the abuses of an extremist minority, however sizable and violent and it may be. If we want to welcome the people of Myanmar into the 21st century, we cannot do so without dangling a carrot in front of them.

Yet, it is equally obvious that we still need to wave the stick. We must attach conditions to sanctions relief not only on the metric of progress toward democratization, but we should put at least as much emphasis on the way Myanmar treats the Rohingya and other oppressed minorities.

Any further exemptions and licenses to trade from the U.S. and other allies should be strictly regulated to make sure no individual, company or community that contributes to oppression is rewarded. Individuals, organizations and institutions that are known to be pushing for ethnic cleansing, enabling it, or acquiescing to it should be targeted and should see tightening sanctions. And the legal framework for sanctions we currently have in place should remain in force in perpetuity until such time as all those born in Myanmar are granted equal citizenship and full protections of all their rights, irrespective of ethnicity or religion.

Azeem Ibrahim is a fellow at Mansfield College at the University of Oxford and author of "The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's Hidden Genocide."

June 13, 2016

Its Ramadan and clock is sharp 7_30 and Anam is ready to leave home for work

By The Hans India

June 13, 2016

Hyderabad: For the 3,000-odd Rohingya refugees living in the city, there is some good news in the holy month of Ramadan. The Telangana Sarva Siksha Abhiyan (SSA) decided to open a school for the children of Myanmar refugees.

The international non-profit organisation, ‘Save the Children’ recently requested SSA to open a school for the children and the government responded to the request positively. The school would be started on Refugee Day on June 20.

SSA identified around 90 Rohingya children to begin the school and the school would have only Urdu and English as the medium of instruction.

SSA Additional State Project Director A Bhaskar Rao said that Vidya volunteers, Urdu and English teachers would be teaching the children. “SSA will also provide three times meal every day to the children,” he said.

Rohingya Muslims are spread in several parts of Old City with the maximum number of people staying in Balapur area. There are around 200-500 who also reside in make-shift tents in Pahadeshareef, Mir Momin Pahadi and Kishan Bagh.

Aman Ullah

RB History
June 13, 2016

[Dr Pamela Gutman was the first Australian to complete a doctorate in Asian Art, specializing in Burma. Her scholarship did much to contribute to Australian-Burmese government relations from the 1970s onwards, painting a picture of the art and cultural life of a hidden land.

Her book Burma's Lost Kingdoms – Splendours of Arakan (2001), brought together her many years of research to reveal the secrets and treasures hidden in Arakan, now known as Rakhine State.

Pamela Gutman was born in Adelaide, South Australia. Her tertiary education was at the University of Vienna, where she studied German, Philosophy, and Art History, and then at The Australian National University, where she studied Bahasa Indonesia, Old Javanese, and Sanskrit. She was first sent to Arakan in 1972 by G.H. Luce, the foremost historian of Burma. She wrote her doctoral thesis on Arakan and took her Ph.D from Australian National University on the cultural history before the 11th century. She is the author of many publications including a forthcoming book on Arakan.]

For more a millennium the policy we know as Arakan existed as a culturally strategic border state, the only state in Southeast Asia to be connected to India by both land and sea routes. The study of its culture is of particular interest as it reveals which elements of Indian cultural were adopted in Arakan and in the land to its east. We can then ask why some elements and not others were adopted, and attempted to relate this to the political, social and religious developments of the wider region.

In the periods when Arakan was at its most powerful the most important cultural influences came from the west, most immediately from the area today known as Bangladesh. When the Burmese and Mon kingdoms to the east prospered, and from time to time gained sovereignty over Arakan, the major influences came from there. Positioned as it was on the sea route around the Bay of Bengal, Arakan was also subjected to the influence of the cultures of southern and western India, and in particular to Sri Lanka, which as the most important Buddhist polity in the region has a significant impact on the religious development of the state. From the earliest urban sites we have the seal of the south Indian merchant dating to around the third century AD and an intaglio which appears to have originated in the middle east of the same period.

The archaeological remains are limited in what they can tell us, but the art and architecture which survives today suggests that the impetus for the adaptation of Indian and other influences was power. As contact with the wider region increased in the early centuries of the first millennium AD the economy diversified, urban centres developed and a more complex social structure developed. The ruler was invested, through Indian Brahmanic ritual, with superhuman qualities through which the fertility and therefore the prosperity of the state were not introduced, the caste system, for instance, although a fluid sort of class system. Not as dependent on birth as in India, did evolve.

The earliest site known to us is the walled and moated city of Dinnyawadi, "Grain-blessed". This is possibly the site of a pre-Indian cult of the earth goddess, and lying on the route from the hills to the sea would have been a trading centre. It is also the site of one of the most famous Buddhist shrines in Southeast Asia, the Mahamuni. It is here, legend has it, that the Buddha himself came and allowed a statue to be made in his own image. The object of veneration for centuries, the image was seen as the palladium of the state and coveted by the kings of neighbouring countries. While the legend as we know it probably dates from a time later than the building of the shrine, the images which survive suggest that the earliest form of Buddhism was Mahayanist, for we can identify bodhisattvas, guardians of the directions and other images which relate, surprisingly, to the Buddhism practised in China at the time. The style, however, is closely connected with the Gupta, although there are no direct connections with any Indian schools. It is possible that the sculptors used Indian texts, from which they made their own interpretation of the iconography.

Sometime around the sixth century the centre of power moved to Vesali, where we find evidence of a Brahmanised royal cult, in the form of a massive recumbent bull discovered in the centre of a brick structure used for royal ritual. The bull also appears on the obverse of a series of coins, together with the name of the king in Sankrit. On the reverse of the coins is a motif known as the srivatsa, symbolising the king's function to guarantee the prosperity of the land. This symbol is also found on coins from the same period elsewhere in Burma and in Thailand and South Vietnam, indicating a shared culture which, as Robert Brown indicates in his paper, must have existed in mainland Southeast Asia until the seventh century. The architecture of this period also has strong links with the countries further east. Two lintels in the style known as Sambor Prei Kuk, from the seventh century site in Cambodia, architecture fragments indicate contact with central and southern India.

Also found at Vesali are a great number of Vishnu images, indicating that his worship was widespread from perhaps the sixth to at least the ninth centuries. Vishnu was known too at the Pyu sites in central Burma. The iconography of the Arakanese examples is closely related to that of east Bengal at the time. There is evidence, too, of a popular form of Buddhism, with images inscribed in Sanskrit. 

After a period of turmoil, probably the result of the coming of Tibeto-Burmans to Arakan from the north, Vesali was succeeded by a serious of smaller cities which came under the sovereignty of Pagan. The Buddhist art of the 11th and 12th centuries is strongly influenced by pagan, as can be seen by Buddha image in stucco and a rare Vishnu and Laksmi from this period follows the heavy physiognomy of the late Pagan period. As the power of Pagan waned, however, Arakan was able to expand its authority to Bengal in the west and to Cape Nagrais in the south. By the beginning of the 15th century the Burmese invaded and the Arakanese king fled to the Sultanate of Gaur in east Bengal. He returned, with the assistance of the Sultan, to found the last of the great cities, Mrauk-U.

Mrauk-U at the height of its power controlled Bengal up to Dacca and Pegu in the Mon country to the south. The great originality of its art was in its architecture. Its builders used a technique of facing a brick core with stone slabs bound by mortar, and made extensive use of dark gray sandstone brought upriver from the coast. This use of stone was the great difference between the architecture of Arakan and that of Pagan and Bengal, where stone was scarcer. The architects combined the lessons of Pagan with the Muslim experience in building arches, domes and vaults, in which mortar played the dominant part of keeping the masonry together. They were thus able to conceive massive hollow pagodas, whose central shrines were entered through long vaulted passages.

The Shitthaung shrine, built be King Mong Ben after he conquered Bengal in 1536, was the magnificent statement of a cakravartin Buddhist king who had conquered Islam. An arched screen on the western side and the arrangement of stupas on the roof recall the mosque architecture of 16th century Gaur in east Bengal. Surrounding the central image are circumambulatory passages, on the outer of which the king is depicted as a god with the attributes of a cakravatin king, some derived from the iconography of Vishnu the Preserver. He is flanked by his Bengali and Arakanese wives, distinguished by their dress, and by depictions of his power and the prosperity he has brought to his country.

Other Mrauk-U shrines are decorated with glazed tiles, some decorated with Middle Eastern motifs, others have reliefs depicting the three worlds of Buddhism, and some are guarded by figures reminiscent of the 5th-6th century images founded at the Mahamuni shrine. The sculpture of the period is similarly diverse. Crowned Buddha images are derived from the style of the late Ming seated Buddhas from the art of northern Thailand. Some extraordinary Sri Lankan bronzes have been discovered, recalling the time when the Dutch rulers of Sri Lanka, wanting to overcome the influence of Catholicism brought there by the Portuguese, sent to Arakan for monks to perform the Buddhist ordination ceremony to purify the religion.

Gradually, however, the power of Mrauk-U waned. In its last century Arakan survived only because it had no aggressive neighbour. In 1784 it was conquered by the Burmese ruler Bodawpaya and the revered Mahamuni image was taken to Mandalay. With its loss, the Arakanese people seemed to lose heart, and its shrines and images were largely neglected for the next 200 years.

By Kyaw Ye Lynn
Anadolu Agency

June 11, 2016

For years porous boundary allowed migrants to travel in across border relatively unchecked, among them Rohingya Muslims

YANGON, Myanmar -- Myanmar has resumed construction of a fence along a border with Bangladesh, a porous boundary through which migrants --among them Rohingya Muslims from western Myanmar -- have been able to travel in and out of the country relatively unchecked.

Local media had reported this week that construction had been suspended due to a lack of funds to finish the fence in Western Rakhine State, which borders Bangladesh, but Aung San Suu Kyi's new government emphasized Friday that it would continue.

The state-run Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper reported the deputy director-general of the president’s office, Zaw Htay, as saying that the previous government's K5.5 billion ($45.9 million) budget for the 2016-2017 fiscal year had been reevaluated.

"The approved allocation of the budget for building the fence was neither cut nor reduced, and the project has resumed," Zaw Htay was quoted as saying. “All successive governments must lay emphasis on border security".

Construction of the 290-kilometer (180-mile) long fence began in 2009, and by 2015 four phases of construction had been finished.

However, 2015-2016's original budget did not include a remaining 64-kilometer stretch in impoverished Rakhine -- home to a majority of the country’s Rohingya population.

In 2013, communal violence between ethnic Buddhists and Muslims in the Rakhine left 57 Muslims and 31 Buddhists dead, around 100,000 people displaced in camps and more than 2,500 houses burned -- most of which belonged to Rohingya.

For years, the lack of a fence and lax security on the border has allowed Rohingya to flee persecution in Myanmar -- much of which human rights groups claim is state sanctioned -- to the port of Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh, from where they seek the help of people smugglers to take them by boat to Thailand and beyond.

On Friday, a Rakhine Buddhist resident of Ahtet Pyu Ma village in Maung Taw Township in Rakhine state described to Anadolu Agency how easy it is to cross the border.

“Although [most of] the fence was constructed, and the Naf River marks the border of Myanmar and Bangladesh, we can easily enter Bangladesh,” said the villager, who for personal reasons wished to remain unnamed.

“That’s because of the long porous border and corrupt staff,” he told Anadolu Agency by phone. “If you bribe them, you can easily cross the Naf River in day time... I saw several Bengali cross the border several times after bribing the officials.”

Bengali is a term used by many people in Myanmar to describe Rohingya as it suggests they are not from Myanmar as they claim, but instead interlopers from Bangladesh.

By Su Myat Mon

The Irrawaddy
June 11, 2016

RANGOON — A citizenship verification exercise aimed at stateless Muslims in Arakan State, which resumed last month, has been temporarily suspended in Ponnagyun Township, where residents of a small Rohingya village have refused to cooperate.

The Rohingya Muslim residents of Tarle village have refused to accept National Verification Certificates (NVCs) being handed out because the bearer’s ethnicity and religion is not stated on the cards, according to San Hla, commanding officer of a police station in Thaetap village. The process has been suspended for a week in the township.

NVCs are being handed out automatically to those who will be scrutinized for eligibility for citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Law at a later stage in the process.

San Hla said the Muslim villagers had refused the NVCs even after officials explained their immediate advantages, which reportedly includes greater freedom of travel.

The Irrawaddy spoke with Maung Ne, the Rohingya headman of Tarle village, who confirmed the refusal: They told officials that they “wouldn’t agree [to accept the new cards] unless you first put our race and religion [Rohingya Muslim] on the cards.” The officials responded that “there are no Rohingya in Arakan State” and soon left the village.

“We are Rohingya, but this is not mentioned on the cards,” Maung Ne said.

The government is currently implementing citizenship verification only in Kyaukphyu, Myebon and Ponnagyun townships of Arakan State. In Kyaukphyu and Myebon, those targeted reside in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, where they were relocated from elsewhere in Arakan State after anti-Muslim violence in 2012 and 2013.

In Kyaukphyu and Myebon townships, the process is proceeding as planned, without any reported problems.

Aung Kyi, a Kyaukphyu Township Immigration officer, told The Irrawaddy on Thursday that 1,192 people have been registered so far in the township, with NVCs handed to 140. On Friday morning, the number of NVCs disbursed had reached 484, according to Thawta Thwin, assistant director of the township Immigration office.

Phyu Chay, a Muslim resident of an IDP camp in Kyaukphyu, said on Thursday that around 75 percent of camp residents had been enrolled in the process. Phyu Chay reported that Arakan State Director of Immigration and National Registration Win Lwin had told camp residents that they could travel freely with the cards in hand.

“I am very happy about the NVCs. We believe that the National League for Democracy government will help us to become citizens under the 1982 Citizenship Law,” Phyu Chay told The Irrawaddy.

Aung Lwin who lives in a displaced persons’ camp in Myebon, said that NVCs had been issued to 126 people there on Wednesday.

The citizenship verification program is part of the Rakhine State Action Plan, unveiled under the former government in 2014 in response to the violence of 2012 and 2013. As originally conceived, the scheme only permitted the state’s Rohingya population to apply for citizenship on the condition that they self-identify as “Bengali.” The status of this provision has yet to be clarified by the new government installed in April.

A pilot citizenship verification program was carried out in displaced persons’ camps in Myebon Township in 2014. Out of the 1,094 Muslims applicants, 209 were declared eligible for citizenship in September 2014—although most were reportedly Kaman, a recognized Muslim minority group, and 169 qualified only for “naturalized” citizenship, which contains fewer rights than “full” citizenship, and can be revoked.

After an outcry from Arakanese Buddhist residents in Myebon and the state capital Sittwe, the program was swiftly suspended. It resumed only last month.

The 1982 Myanmar Citizenship Law, enacted under the military-socialist regime of Ne Win, narrowed eligibility for citizenship along ethnic lines. Those not included within 135 recognized ethnic groups must demonstrate that all four grandparents made Burma their home, and that both themselves and their parents were born in Burma. However, since the vast majority of people in Burma went without documents prior to rules requiring registration introduced in 1951, this remains very difficult for most to prove.

By Richard Cockett
Foreign Policy
June 11, 2016

For the Rohingya, Burma’s new democratic government is little better than the old dictatorship.

Burma’s new government gets down to business, one thing is increasingly clear — there won’t be much to look forward to for the country’s one million or so Rohingya people.

The West has rejoiced at the election of a new government dominated by the National League for Democracy (NLD) and headed, in effect, by the party’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel peace prize winner. But for the Muslims of western Rakhine state — described by the United Nations as the “most persecuted minority in the world” -- Burma’s new era is already turning out to be a disappointment. There is almost certainly worse to come.

The Rohingya have endured decades of harassment, marginalization, and ethnic cleansing at the hands of Burma’s old military regimes (and the local Rakhine people), amounting, some argue, to genocide. Everyone knew that Burma’s new leader, Suu Kyi, has also been ambivalent towards their plight. She has refused to even call them by their own name, for fear of offending the country’s often Islamophobic Buddhist majority in the run-up to last November’s general election, which she won by a landslide. But surely Burma’s first civilian government since the 1960s would be better than the murderous, kleptocratic rule of the generals?

Maybe not. First came the news, in mid-May, that the Burmese foreign ministry (now headed by Suu Kyi) had asked the American embassy not to use the term Rohingya on the spurious grounds that it was “controversial” and “not supportive in solving the problem that is happening in Rakhine state.” The Americans refused. The request was utterly disingenuous. The Rakhine people might indeed prefer to call the Rohingya “Bengalis” (implying that they are illegal immigrants from what is now Bangladesh), but this is an essential part of the exclusion of the Rohingya from the mainstream of Burmese life that constitutes the problem in the first place.

Prompted by the visiting U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, Suu Kyi returned to the theme on May 22, saying that her government would be firm about not using “emotive terms” like Rohingya or Bengali. Yet, as has been pointed out, she has never asked anyone — chauvinist Buddhist monks, soldiers or legislators — to refrain from using the term “Bengali.” The Rohingya will also have been disappointed that President Obama recently relaxed sanctions against Burma as a reward for its shift towards democracy, without mentioning the fact that nothing has changed in the authorities’ mistreatment of the Rohingya.

Furthermore, it is evident that the Rohingya will be excluded from the formal “peace process” that the new government intends to take up with the rest of the country’s ethnic minority groups, such as the Kachin, Karen, Chin, Shan and more. This process, inherited from the last government of President Thein Sein, is an attempt to find a lasting resolution to the civil conflicts that have plagued the country virtually since its independence from Britain in 1948. Suu Kyi has called for a second “Panglong-style” peace conference, invoking the memory of an agreement her father, General Aung San, negotiated with indigenous ethnic groups in 1947 before he was assassinated.

The recent peace process, however, has involved only those groups defined as indigenous peoples under the terms of the controversial, military-inspired 1982 Citizenship Act. The Rohingya are not citizens under that act, and they have never been included in any such process.

In all likelihood, the new government will simply try to park the Rohingya issue, which is viewed as marginal.Burma’s new president, Htin Kyaw, has set up a grand-sounding “Central Committee for Implementation of Peace and Development in Rakhine State,” which consists of 27 officials, including the members of the cabinet and representatives of the Rakhine state government, to be chaired by Suu Kyi herself. But the Rohingya fear that this is merely a bureaucratic device meant to postpone taking any firm decisions, and they also worry that they may not even have any input into the committee. Meanwhile, the government will get on with drawing up the federal-style constitution that is needed to satisfy the political aspirations of other ethnic minority groups. There is a lot of sympathy among members of Suu Kyi’s party, the NLD, for the suffering of the Karen, Kachin, and others over the past decades. So the party can be expected to negotiate in good faith with these groups, who are also represented institutionally at the higher levels of the NLD. There is very little sympathy, however, for the Rohingya among party ranks — the NLD is only marginally less riddled with Islamophobia and prejudice against the Rohingya than the last military government. Neither do the Rohingya have any voice or representation in the NLD.

Indeed, for the first time in recent years, since last November’s election there is not a single Muslim legislator in the entire country, despite the fact that the Muslim population of Burma numbers up to three million. Suu Kyi knows that that there is no political constituency in Burma for helping the Rohingya, just as she also knows that they do not have an armed wing (as most of the other ethnic groups do), so their capacity to make life difficult for the authorities has always been correspondingly less. In other words, apart from the demands of her own conscience, Burma’s de facto leader has little domestic incentive to do anything at all for the Rohingya.

The risk is that pushing the issue to the margins will have a devastating effect on the already desperate situation of the Rohingya. Separated from the rest of the population in refugee camps, or cooped up in their villages, their movement is tightly restricted. They have been cut off from their former sources of livelihood and live under an apartheid system in their own land. Ambia Preveen, a Rohingya doctor working in Germany, estimates that 90 percent of the Rohingya are denied access to formal healthcare. A recent study of poverty and health in Rakhine state by Mahmood Saad Mahmood for Harvard University shows vast disparities between the Rohingya and the Rakhine: There is only one physician per 140,000 Rohingya, but in the parts of Rakhine state dominated by the Rakhine, there is one doctor per 681 people. Acute malnutrition affects 26 percent of people in the Rohingya-dominated area of northern Rakhine state, whereas the figure is just 14 percent in Rakhine-dominated areas, and so on.

If the Rohingya give up on any prospects of change from this new NLD government — and well they might — then they will probably take to the boats again, as they did last year, fleeing in the thousands to other Muslim countries in South-East Asia. They will risk drowning in flimsy craft provided by unscrupulous human traffickers, and the crisis will merely spread abroad once again.

What can be done? Since there is no domestic imperative to help the Rohingya, it’s up to countries like the United States and Britain to exert all the pressure that they can on Suu Kyi’s government over this issue. The Western powers have helped enormously in rebuilding the NLD as a functioning political party, in providing Suu Kyi and her ministers with technical expertise and practical advice, and in beefing up the institutions, such as the national parliament, that have been at the fore of the democratic transition. Given this leverage, it must be made clear that the one million Rohingya are an essential part of that new democracy, and that even if they are not technically “citizens” under the present constitution (one which Suu Kyi herself rejects, albeit for different reasons) the government will be judged by how far it protects and gradually includes them. And even if the NLD balks at giving the Rohingya citizenship — as the United Nations, for one, has demanded — it could at least repeal repressive legislation passed by the last military government, such as the four so-called “Race and Religion Protection Laws.”

Passed in 2015, these laws were inspired by the nationalist, sectarian monks of the Ma Ba Tha movement, and are aimed squarely at restricting the personal freedom and choices of Burma’s Muslims. If enforced with any vigor, these laws could provoke even more tension, especially between the Rakhine and Rohingya. The NLD stood against these laws when it was in opposition. Now it is in power, the party should repeal them, sending a clear signal that the new government is genuinely concerned with the human and civil rights of all those who live in the country, and that the Rohingya are part of the wider reform process.

But the country’s other minority ethnic groups, as do the Rohingya themselves, also have a role to play. The latter have long been isolated from their fellow minorities, politically as much as geographically, and this has added to their marginalization. Although the plight of the Rohingya is now well advertised outside Burma, little is known about them in their own country. Rather than investing all their hopes for change in the international community, the Rohingya should now take the initiative to build bridges with the Kachin, Karen, Mon, and others, who have also suffered at the hands of the Burman-dominated central governments, to strengthen their political position and to make their case more visible.

It is in their interest of these other groups to overcome their own prejudices against the Rohingya, as the latter bring considerable international goodwill, diplomatic support, and potentially money, to the negotiating table. As much good as the international community can do, real change will not come until the political dynamics of the Rohingya issue change within Burma itself.

In the photo, a Rohingya woman sits with her children in their temporary shelter next to the Baw Du Pha internal displacement camp on May 17 in Sittwe, Burma.

By Lun Min Mang
Myanmar Times
June 10, 2016

The project, which began on June 7, is largely carrying on with the citizenship verification project the last government had launched to address the large stateless community.

Immigration officials are counting residents who had been handed light-blue “green cards” last year, and is providing the cards to those who qualify but lack them. The project is promising later scrutiny to determine citizenship eligibility, according to the process described by government officials.

Only the individuals who accept the light-blue cards are to then go through the township, state and Union-level verification processes, according to U Myint Kyaing, permanent secretary of the Immigration and Population Department.

He added that the program, which will adhere to the 1982 citizenship law, is part of the government’s 100-day plan.

“If we are unable to finish within 100 days, then we will consider a six-month plan. It is a pilot project and it is being done in Kyaukphyu, Myebon and Ponnagyun townships of Rakhine State,” he told The Myanmar Timesyesterday.

He said the government would extend the process to other townships if the pilot is successful.

The cards being given out during the simultaneous census do not include race or religion in a bid to avoid controversial terminology and inflaming sectarian conflict. The cards include an identification number, the name of the holder, the name of the holder’s father, and the holder’s gender, date of birth and marital status.

But the intention of avoiding conflict by skipping over race has already backfired. Radio Free Asia reported that a village in Ponnagyun refused the cards and would not provide information to immigration officials, citing the inability to self-identify as Rohingya.

The Myanmar Times could not independently confirm the report as most calls to state immigration officers went unanswered yesterday. Those who did pick up confirmed the census project but declined to comment.

The chair of the Arakan National Party, U Aye Maung, said he and the other party members are not paying close attention to the process, but he also declined to comment. In a proposal to parliament last month, ANP member Daw Khin Saw Wai urged the government to address what she referred to as a problem of increasing numbers of illegal immigrants in the state.

U Maung Maung Ohn, former Rakhine State chief minister and now Union Solidarity and Development Party state parliamentarian, said the government needs to convince the Muslim community that accepting and cooperating with the government’s plan will benefit them.

“When I was chief minister, I faced huge pressure and difficulty executing orders from above. [Rakhine and Muslim] communities have been too dogmatic to build trust,” he said.

In order for the citizenship project to succeed, he said, the government must convince the Muslim community that they will get full citizenship rights once they are verified.

The previous government revoked all temporary identity cards – known as “white cards” – held by stateless Muslims and other ethnic groups in 2015. Acting on a ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal, parliament alsodisenfranchised all potential white-card voters, who had previously been allowed to cast ballots in 2010 and in the 2012 by-elections.

More than 300,000 Muslims in Rakhine State out of an estimated 800,000 white-card holders across the country surrendered their documents by the April 1, 2015, deadline. In return they were given receipts which they were supposed to exchange for the “green cards” valid for two years. Few appear to have done so.

White cards were first issued in the early 1990s as a result of the 1982 Citizenship Law introduced by General Ne Win’s military regime. The law established three categories of citizenship that excluded most self-identifying Rohingya and barred them from obtaining national registration cards.

Under the previous government, the citizenship verification process was meant to be a three-step process, moving from township to state to Union-level committees. The township scrutiny committee is composed of general administrative officers, township immigration officials and township law officials, as well as one Muslim and two Rakhine representatives.

If the township scrutiny committee approves the candidate, forms are sent to the state immigration and population department. If the state officials pass the request, the Union ministry can determine whether or not to grant national registration cards (NRCs).

However, U Maung Maung Ohn said up to 1000 individuals from Myebon township who were granted NRCs during his tenure as chief minister faced difficulties travelling and living wherever they wanted, further fuelling mistrust of the citizenship system.

“They were afraid and they could not settle in other places,” he said.

He added that he believes it would be easier for the self-identifying Rohingya to gain citizenship if they relinquish claims to the term. Under the previous government the community was officially called “Bengali”.

“To be practical, it [citizenship] is not possible if they continue to insist and demand the name and rights as an ethnic group,” U Maung Maung Ohn said. “Rohingya” is not among the 135 recognised ethnic group labels.

State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said last month that the terms “Rohingya” and “Bengali” both have political connotations and can incite problems, and so should best be avoided as the government continues finding a solution that would benefit both communities in Rakhine State.

Yesterday, the Tatmadaw newspaper Myawady published an article that described the Muslim community as settling in Rakhine State under British colonial rule. It suggested that “Bengalis” who invaded from Bangladesh should not be granted citizenship, while those who have lived for generations in Rakhine State should not be recognised as “ethnic Rohingya” either.

The article also said the citizenship process should proceed under the provisions of the 1982 Citizenship Law.

By Caleb Quinley
Asian Correspondent

June 10, 2016

THIS week marks the one year anniversary of the disastrous Andaman Sea migrant boat crisis. However, one year on, it appears not much has changed in terms of resolution. Following the events that took place last year, national and international human rights organizations have consistently documented a lack of protection regarding Rohingya refugees.

They unanimously urge for the discontinuation of arbitrary and indefinite detention of refugees and survivors of human trafficking — stating such consequences as a detriment and ultimately exasperating the already difficult situation. More so, they have pushed for an abolishment of the “push back” policy that exposes trafficking survivors and migrants to even greater dangers. Rights groups have tenaciously voiced that protection is still lacking and even more so that basic human rights are continuing to be disregarded.

“If Thailand continues approaching the issue of Rohingya refugees merely in the spirit of protecting the country’s face, its efforts will prove to be meaningless and the problems will persist,” said Papop Siamhan, Anti Trafficking Coordinator at Human Rights and Development Foundation (HRDF). “The best way to save face is by saving lives.”

Saving face is integral to Thailand’s intricate culture. Though owning up to these reoccurring abuses will ultimately have an even greater impact on the country’s international reputation. On May 1, 2015 Thai officials initiated a public acknowledgement of the existence of mass graves containing more than 36 Rohingya and Bangladeshi bodies. Soon after, it become clear that these were victims of human trafficking which immediately sparked outrage. In the following days more bodies were discovered, consequently causing traffickers to clear out and abandon their camps.

Not only were Thai officials found to be involved in trafficking networks, Thailand began a bitter clamp down on its borders, refusing Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrants and trafficking victims access or assistance. This directly triggered thousands to become stranded at sea causing an unknown loss of life. Human rights groups are highlighting that the protection of these individuals are of the utmost importance and should never be overlooked, urging Thailand to react appropriately.

The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT) hosted a forum in Bangkok Wednesday discussing the condition of Rohingya refugees and human trafficking survivors in Thailand one year after the boat crisis. Six other groups also contributed to the forum: the Coalition for the Rights of Refugees and Stateless Persons (CRSP), the Human Rights and Peace Studies Center at Mahidol University, the Migrant Working Group (MWG), Asylum Access Thailand (AAT), Fortify Rights, and the Human Rights and Development Foundation.

“It’s encouraging that Thailand has taken steps to combat the vast network of human traffickers that have long preyed on the desperation of Rohingya refugees,” said Mr. Siwawong Sukthawee of the Migrant Working Group. “But it’s not enough. Much more needs to be done to protect survivors. In many ways, the crisis continues.”

Over 170,000 Rohingya seek refuge from systematic abuses today due to religious persecution and violence in Burma (Myanmar). Migrants are commonly captured by transnational criminal syndicates where they have been documented sustaining abuse such as imprisonment and torture while being trafficked through hidden camps scattered in Thailand. Rescued survivors however are still victims of abuse while they are detained in IDC’s (Immigration Detention Centers). All six organizations have voiced their concern with the length that such migrants stay in these IDCs, illuminating the tragic possibility of indefinite detainment.

The panelists discussed their support for a Cabinet Resolution that passed on March 15. If implemented, the resolution would allow witness protection to all witnesses in human trafficking trials and even legal status for those who have survived human trafficking in the country. Regardless of the support, the Resolution has not been seriously implemented.

In the past six months, 60 Rohingya refugees have reportedly escaped from IDCs in the south of Thailand. After receiving alerts from locals on the escapee’s whereabouts, Thai police made an attempt to re-arrest the Rohingya individuals. Police then fatally shot one of the men, failing the Rohingya once again. This most recent occurrence has led these organizations to take swift action calling on the Thai government to examine the incident.

“Thailand’s policies and practices towards Rohingya refugees are putting lives at risk and must be addressed immediately,” said Amy Smith, executive director of Fortify Rights. “The Thai government should ensure protection for Rohingya refugees and human trafficking survivors without delay.”

The organizations insisted that Thailand should protect human trafficking survivors, stop push back policies, grant protection for trafficking related witnesses, push for the Cabinet Resolution and end indefinite detention.

Caleb Quinley is a writer and photographer based in Bangkok, Thailand. His focus topics are politics, conflict, urban poverty, and human rights issues.

Aman Ullah

RB Article

June 8, 2016

"Everyone has the right to a nationality," and "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality." Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

The motion concerning the issue of citizenship scrutiny was put on record at the recent session of the Pyithu Hluttaw after the voting turned to be 154 votes for and 228 against, with 7 abstentions.

Daw Khin Saw Wai, an MP from Rakhine State, brought the motion before parliament stressing that her proposal was national, not regional. “The issue of citizenship scrutiny is a national concern, and it is not specific to Rakhine State alone,” she said.

In his discussion about the motion, U Aung Kyaw Zan of the Pauktaw constituency described the issue as unconnected with racial and religious matters as other people might have thought, putting the blame on illegal immigrants. He also called for the exercise of the Myanmar Citizenship Law 1892 in the scrutiny process, stressing that the law is up to standard.

Labour, Immigration and Population Union Minister U Thein Swe responded that the undertaking of citizenship scrutiny required security and stability. He pledged greater transparency in the scrutiny process to be conducted across the country on a national scale after the establishment of scrutiny committees at different levels in all states and regions. He called for collective cooperation in the process, which he said would present challenges. He proposed putting the issue on record, saying that the scrutiny process is included in his ministry’s 100-day plan.

Almost all of the MPs and many Rakhine political leaders of Arakan believe that the 1982 Citizenship Law is up to standard and try to use it against the Rohingya to make them illegal immigrants and stateless persons. While Daw Aung San Suu Kyi many time told that this law was unfair and any law relating to citizenship should be according to international standard and universal norms.

In true sense, the 1982 Citizenship Law is a pluralistic ignorance like the story ‘The Emperor's New Clothes’, a Danish fairy tale written by Hans Christian Andersen and first published in 1837. The story is about a situation where "no one believes, but everyone believes that everyone else believes. Or alternatively, everyone is ignorant to whether the Emperor has clothes on or not, but believes that everyone else is not ignorant.”

The story is like this, 

Many years ago there lived an emperor who cared only about his clothes and about showing them off. One day he heard from two swindlers that they could make the finest suit of clothes from the most beautiful cloth. This cloth, they said, also had the special capability that it was invisible to anyone who was either stupid or not fit for his position.

Being a bit nervous about whether he himself would be able to see the cloth, the emperor first sent two of his trusted men to see it. Of course, neither would admit that they could not see the cloth and so praised it. All the townspeople had also heard of the cloth and were interested to learn how stupid their neighbors were.

The emperor then allowed himself to be dressed in the clothes for a procession through town, never admitting that he was too unfit and stupid to see what he was wearing because he was afraid that the other people would think that he was stupid. 

Of course, all the townspeople wildly praised the magnificent clothes of the emperor, afraid to admit that they could not see them, until a small child said:

"But he has nothing on"! 

This was whispered from person to person until everyone in the crowd was shouting that the emperor had nothing on. The emperor heard it and felt that they were correct, but held his head high and finished the procession.

Today, the phrase "emperor's new clothes" has become an idiom about ‘logical fallacies’ or’ pluralistic ignorance’.

Although, under the Article 202 (a) of Ne Win’s 1974 Constitution clearly states that, “This Constitution is the basic law of all the laws of the State.” Ne Win enacted this citizenship law, which was contrary to his constitution of 1974. However he and his BSPP government did not enforced it during their term and set it as dead law. The USDP and Thein Sein’s Government intentionally try to use this dead law as a legal law against the Muslims of not only Arakan but also throughout country while this law is also contrary even to the 2008 Constitution.

We welcome the recent resolution of the Pyithu Hluttaw that put on record the issue of citizenship scrutiny. We hope and pray that the new Government will respect and try to take action in accordance with the United Nations Resolution issued shortly after the election in 2015, an attempt to forestall further bloodshed by providing a framework to secure peace and reconciliation in the Arakan state. 

According to that resolution, “The NLD government should immediately abolish the Rakhine Action Plan and end institutionalized discrimination against the Rohingya, including the denial of citizenship. It must hold accountable all those who commit human rights abuses, including inciting ethnic and religious intolerance and violence. In Arakan/Rakhine state the government must facilitate the safe, voluntary return of IDPs to their communities. Neighboring countries should offer protection and assistance to Rohingya asylum seekers. The international community must urge the new NLD government to develop a comprehensive reconciliation plan, including establishing a commission of inquiry into crimes committed against the Rohingya in Arakan/Rakhine state. The new government must demonstrably improve the welfare of ethnic and religious minorities and repeal laws and discriminatory practices that pose an existential threat to the Rohingya community.

A central component of the new government's reform process must include constitutional reform that addresses the needs of ethnic minorities, as well as the development of an independent judiciary as a means of safeguarding human rights and tackling the culture of impunity regarding past mass atrocity crimes.”

As a member of the United Nations, Burma is legally obliged to take action to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” 

By Asian Correspondent

June 7, 2016

BURMA’s top Buddhist authority has vowed to monitor the activities of the hard-line Ma Ba Tha group.

State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee general secretary U Sandi Marbhivamsa said the Ma Ba Tha should comply with the set of guidelines prepared by the committee.

“Some of Ma Ba Tha’s ideas are aligned partially with those of Mahana [the Sangha, or monk community] because they are under our guidance. But some Ma Ba Tha members are intense on religion and race and go against the committee’s stance,” he was quoted as saying in the Myanmar Times.

The prominent monk said although no action had been taken against any Ma Ba Tha members due to weak implementation of regulations, authorities can take action against them.

The announcement by the Sangha was made several hours after Ma Ba Tha leaders sent support letters to protesters staging a demonstration against the use of the term “Rohingya” to describe the stateless Muslims from Rakhine state.

Nationalist protesters in Mawlamyine in Mon State had gathered on Strand Road bearing anti-Rohingyan posters.

Protest leader Ko Than Zaw said: “We are protesting to show the new government that we are against the use of the term ‘Rohingya’ instead of ‘Bengali’”.

An estimated 1,000 people attended the nationalist protest on Friday, which Ko said was not organised by any particular group or party.

During a third anniversary gathering today, the Ma Ba Tha monks vowed to continue protecting race and religion under the new government.

They also want to maintain the fight against citizenship for those who self-identify as Muslim Rohingya.

Organisation chair U Tilawka Bhivamsa told a crowd of 1,000 monks and followers that they must focus on uniting 135 recognised ethnic groups of Burma.

“Whatever the party and whoever the president is running the government, Ma Ba Tha shall protect nationalism for future generations,” he said.

At the event, U Tilawka also raised the Rohingya issue: “I heard now the Myanmar government has stopped building the border fence in Rakhine State due to a lack of funding under the current budget. We must support its completion if the current government can’t implement the needs of the country’s security.”

By Radio Free Asia
June 7, 2016

Authorities conducting a census of Muslim residents in three townships in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state have encountered opposition from the inhabitants of one village who refuse to provide information because they are not allowed to mention their race and religion in order to qualify for national identification cards, a local official said.

Colonel Htein Lin, Rakhine’s border affairs and security minister, and a state immigration officer told the Muslim residents of Kadi village in Ponenakyune township about the census, but the residents refused to provide the necessary information unless the cards listed their race and religion, said village administrator Maung Ni.

“We will not accept this census because our nationality and religion will not be shown on the card they are giving us,” Maung Ni said.

The villagers will participate in the census once the cards include such information, he said.

Previously issued cards, which are referred to as “green cards” but are light blue in color, have contained an identification number, the name of the holder, their gender, date of birth, place of birth, marital status, and father’s name, with visible identification marks in Burmese and English.

Those who possess green cards can apply for full Myanmar citizenship, but must first undergo a citizenship verification process.

Authorities are issuing Muslim residents older than 10 the cards while they conduct checks to see if they are eligible to become citizens.

Officials said that they have collected census data from about 90 Muslims in the town of Kyaukpyu and more than 120 in Myaypon township and will try again to collect information from those in Ponenakyune next week.

Stateless Rohingya

About 1.1 million stateless Muslims, also called Rohingya, live in Rakhine, with about 120,000 residing in internally displaced persons camps following communal violence with the majority Buddhists in 2012.

The government refers to the Rohingya as “Bengalis” and considers them illegal immigrants from neighboring Bangladesh, though many have lived in Rakhine for generations.

Myanmar’s President Htin Kyaw last week created a Central Committee for Implementation of Peace and Development in Rakhine State to put the impoverished, strife-torn region on a path to peace and development.

State Counselor and de facto national leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who chairs the new committee, recently met with Rakhine Chief Minister Nyi Pu and various national government ministers to discuss the controversial process of registering internally displaced persons that reportedly resumed in June, the online journal The Irrawaddyreported.

Lieutenant General Ye Aung, Myanmar’s minister of border affairs and member of the committee, said last week that the citizenship verification process will be carried out transparently and in accordance with the country’s 1982 Citizenship Law.

The government began issuing green cards to Muslims in 13 townships in Rakhine state a year ago to verify their identities, bringing them a step closer to applying for citizenship.

Myanmar’s former military junta had issued temporary identification cards known as “white cards” to Muslims in Rakhine for the 2010 elections, which saw Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government take power from the army regime.

But in 2015, authorities began collecting the white cards and distributing green cards in their place so that holders could apply for citizenship.

By Min Thein Aung and Nay Rein Kyaw for RFA’s Myanmar Service. Translated by Khet Mar. Written in English by Roseanne Gerin.

By Muhammad Pizaro
The Jakarta Post
June 7, 2016

The plight of the Rohingya people in Myanmar has attracted the world’s attention for years. In May 2015, the Rohingya refugee crisis grabbed international headlines when tens of thousands of Rohingya fled from Myanmar’s state-sponsored persecution in overcrowded boats heading toward Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.

Myanmar’s government views the Rohingya as illegal citizens and describes them as immigrants from Bangladesh, despite the group having inhabited Rakhine state since the 16th century. Government policies bar them from praying, obtaining education or getting married. Many children have witnessed their parents killed by the junta regime, as if the Rohingya people were delinquent evildoers. 

The Rohingya also lack religious freedom. The problem is compounded by the attitude of many of the country’s monks, who approve of enmity against the Rohingya, as the majority of Myanmar’s population is Buddhist. Ashin Wirathu, a Buddhist monk and the leader of the anti-Muslim movement in Myanmar, is known for his controversial idea of sending the Rohingya people to a third country.

According to the UNHCR Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2014, the number of individuals forced to leave their homes and seek protection elsewhere averages 42,500 individuals per day. 

In 2015, a report by ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights ( APHR ), an organization of members of parliament from several ASEAN countries, stated that infraction of human rights against Rohingya had resulted in a regional human trafficking epidemic. The group added that there had been further abuses against the Rohingya people upon their arrival in other Southeast Asian countries.

A number of non-governmental organizations in Indonesia have tried to resolve this humanitarian crisis in Myanmar by pushing ASEAN. Humanitarian activists have begged ASEAN to take a firm stance against Myanmar and urge Myanmar’s government to restore the citizenship and full rights of the Rohingya people. 

Unfortunately, ASEAN itself has failed to adequately respond to the crisis, and the suffering of the Rohingya endures.

The role of ASEAN society

The international community previously looked to Aung San Suu Kyi to solve these crises, as a Nobel Peace Prize winner for her struggle for democracy. Thus far, however, the Lady has remained silent on the issue.

Penny Green, a law professor at the University of London and director of the State Crime Initiative, said, "In a genocide, silence is complicity, and so it is with Aung San Suu Kyi."

At this point, humanitarian activists must speak up regardless of the consequences. This situation is so critical that ASEAN society can no longer stand by watching. The longer we choose to be silent, the greater the loss to our collective humanity.

In the midst of silence, an international summit initiated by the South East Asia Humanitarian Committee (SEAHUM) deserves our utmost appraisal.

SEAHUM is a humanitarian organization network based in Southeast Asia, aiming to encourage countries to cooperate in humanitarian activities in the ASEAN region. The group initiated an international summit on 18-19 May ago in Bogor, West Java, as a bridge for stakeholders who have contributed to this issue.

The summit discussed a number of issues related to the Rohingya, such as understanding the opportunities and challenges for the Rohingya after the general election in Myanmar, ASEAN countries’ role in helping the Rohingya and how to create good cooperation with all stakeholders. 

SEAHUM also encouraged the Indonesian government and ASEAN to commit support for the protection of the human rights of the Rohingya people in Myanmar.

During the summit, Parni Hadi, a founder of Dompet Dhuafa, said Indonesia should launch a measure of total diplomacy, which he called “civic diplomacy”. This diplomacy, which involves the people instead of depending on governments, is similar to public diplomacy. 

According to Parni, civic diplomacy involves “people to people” contact through all means, involving social media and conventional media ( press diplomacy ) with particular emphases on social ( humanitarian ) and concrete cultural activities.

The UN General Assembly’s human rights committee unanimously passed a resolution calling for Myanmar to grant citizenship to the Muslim minority Rohingya people. Committee also called on the Buddhist nation to contain violence against the Rohingya and other Muslims.

The international community and ASEAN, in particular, have an important role in mitigating human crises in Myanmar as mentioned before. Humanitarian advocacy is one of the most effective ways to end violence in Rakhine state. 

As the most influential organization in South Asia, ASEAN must dare to converse and act when infractions occur – and so must society.

***

The writer is a humanitarian activist.