Within a year of governing time span, President Thein Sein, military-backed regime has achieved a higher degree of success in wooing the international community to lend increased legitimacy and hope for a better change of the country than all past, successive military regimes in fifty years.
Sai WansaiAlternative Asean Network on Burma, in its January 2012 Burma Bulletin writes:
“In January, the regime continued to promote the appearance of a reform agenda by pursuing ‘peace agreements’ with ethnic armed groups. The regime’s apparent haste to produce ‘initial’ agreements appears to be aimed at removing economic sanctions and other barriers to foreign investment. Regime representatives signed agreements with the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), the Chin National Front (CNF), the Karen National Union (KNU), and the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N). However, the regime failed to reach an agreement with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO).”
The enthusiastic West has already loosened the sanctions to some extent, due to the regime’s 13 January release of over 300 political prisoners, including numerous high-profile dissidents.
Australia, the EU, and Norway all eased their existing sanctions, while Washington would start the process of exchanging ambassadors. Also, ASEAN Foreign Ministers call for the lifting of economic sanctions against Burma, saying that lifting sanctions would contribute significantly to the country’s socio-economic development.
With the changing of political stance of Aung San Suu Kyi, leading to the National League for Democracy (NLD) re-registration and decision to enter the by-elections to be held this coming April, and the ceasefire agreements signed with various armed ethnic groups, except for a few still in the process of negotiation, particularly with the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA), roughly two trends of political approach have emerged, on how political solution or settlement should be worked out.
Amendment versus rewriting the 2008 Constitution
One is the approach that has pinned its hope on the amendment of the military-supremacy, 2008 Constitution from within, which Suu Kyi’s NLD and other Burman and non-Burman political opposition parties within the Parliament are identified with, and the other, the rewriting – not amending - of the 2008 Constitution, based on the 1947 Panglong Agreement, within the frame of federal system, which the armed ethnic groups and non-Burman ethnic political parties - that have not yet reregistered – pinned their aspirations, as the sole way out of the ongoing ethnic conflict.
On the part of the military-backed Thein Sein government, it has been posturing that a similar Panglong Agreement gathering would be held at the last stage of the peace process in Naypyitaw, according to his close aide U Aung Min, Minister of Railway Transport, when he met the armed ethnic groups last November in Thailand.
According to him, President Thein Sein’s three steps peace process is: conclusion of ceasefire pacts followed by implementation of development projects in ceasefire areas and the convening of a peace conference in Naypyitaw.
However, President Thein Sein himself has never mentioned “Panglong-like Conference” or spelled out with a time frame, to be held officially.
A report filed by VOA, on 28 January, regarding the ceasefire talks between the regime and the KNU, in Burmese section writes:
“Concerning the armed ethnic issue, U Aung Min explained that he was following the three steps directive of President Thein Sein. First, ceasefire; second, deliberation of development and political progress; and third, comprehensive discussion in the parliament, leading to decision and lawmaking. The Panglong Agreement type conference, demanded by the non-Burman ethnic nationalities could as well be held during the third stage of peace initiative process.”
Long drawn-out developmental second phase
And thus, after the conclusion of ceasefire or truce agreement, the second phase of development and deliberation of political progress would likely be a long, drawn-out process, most likely, at least, until 2015 general elections, from the perspective of Thein Sein government.
Having said that, the non-Burman ethnic nationalities are faced with either to go along according to the regime’s game plan and eventually get bogged down in the developmental second phase – like the past ceasefire period from 1989 to 2009 – or to pressure for a speedy political dialogue, leading to lasting political settlement. In other words, playing along with the regime’s drawn-out, delaying tactics will erode the opportunity and political will of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities like in the recent past.
The United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) Positon Statement on Peace in the Country, dated 4 December 2011 said that the regime used military might in suppressing some groups, while luring those who signed ceasefire with “regional development” incentive to break their “political equality” struggle in a deceitful way, depriving the country of peace for more than 60 years.
On 31 January, SHAN reported that Hkun Okker, Chairman of the PaO National Liberation Organization (PNLO), speaking at the closing ceremony of the 11th batch of the Shan State Social Justice Education Programme training on Sunday, 29 January, pointed out military-backed, Thein Sein government’s incompatibility with a multi-ethnic state and as well, the negative effect of the second phase developmental implementation as follows:-
The identities of Burma’s multi-ethnic peoples hang in the balance as long as the country’s latest constitution which is “of the military, by the military, for the military” is not amended or jettisoned.
“Read the preamble and you will find the word ‘oneness’,” he told the 30 students graduating from the school set up by one of Shans’ foremost women activists Charm Tong. “It means the regime continues to aim for one nation, one country and one single identity and there is no room for multi-nationalities.”
He offered the newly adopted national flag as an example. “No country practicing federalism uses a one-star flag, which denotes oneness. But all the authoritarian states like Vietnam and North Korea have one-star flags.”
“Cosmetic changes by President Thein Sein government have created confusions both at home and abroad. The policy shift by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD (National League for Democracy) has also added fuel to the flame. As a result some countries are prematurely lifting sanctions and some foreign aid agencies including the ODA (Official Development Assistance) are preparing to re-enter the country.”
He strongly criticized the ongoing peace talks and agreements emanating from them as a “quick fix” to solve what is primarily a political issue between the Burman government and the non-Burman ethnic peoples. “They are generously offering business opportunities under the name of Development or Special Economic Zones and using them as delaying tactics against meaningful political dialogue,” he charged.
“This is because they want a quiet rather than peaceful Burma before the 2013 SEA Games, the 2014 Asean Summit and the next round of elections in 2015.”
“Unitary” versus “Federalism”
The central conflict issue or core problem is none other than the incompatible position taken by adversaries between “unitary, presidential” and “federal union” political system. As have been repeatedly spelled out by the broad spectrum of non-Burman ethnic nationalities, their demands for rights of self-determination, equality and democracy are closely intertwined with the federal union setup, like two facets of a coin, which has its roots at the formation of the then new political entity, “Union of Burma” in 1948, made possible by virtue of 1947 Panglong Agreement and 1948 Union Constitution.
The present 2008 Constitution and also the 1974 Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) Constitution both unitary system based, intentionally sought to reject the original agreement of federalism, agreed and signed by General Aung San, in 1947, on behalf of the Ministerial Burma or Burma Proper.
The reason, although not spoken, seems to direct at changing the concept of nationalism based on multi-ethnic state to individual citizenship, coupled with civil rights by disregarding ethnic diversity. In other words, unitary system is to replace the multi-ethnic state concept and get rid of various ethnic identities, once and for all.
This concept might probably find broad acceptance among the Burman majority for its numerical population advantage, and could find their need satisfaction under individual citizenship and civil rights, according to the universally accepted, democratic norms.
But in contrast, the non-Burman ethnic nationalities, which see themselves as non-state nations, could hardly give up their ethnic identities and feel secure by just accepting only the individual citizenship and civil rights. To put it differently, the non-Burman ethnic nationalities need guarantee to protect their ethnic, cultural identities and control of natural resources and so on, apart from just the individual citizenship and civil rights.
And this is when the federal system of arrangement comes in, to be able to exist as non-state nations and uphold their birthright sovereignty, rights of self-determination and ownership of their own natural resources. The non-Burman ethnic groups have voluntarily joined the Union of Burma, where they were accorded and promised equal rights within the mould of a federal union, and they are not about to be satisfied with downgraded minorities status from equal partners and surrender their sovereign rights handed down to them by their forefathers.
Ceasefire and political dialogue
Naypyitaw has successfully negotiated ceasefire agreements with 7 armed groups: United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), Chin National Front (CNF), Karen National Union (KNU) and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP). And recently, another group New Mon State Party (NMSP) has signed a ceasefire pact on 01 February, Wednesday.
However, the KNU has denied signing the ceasefire agreement, but said it merely agreed to meet again with the regime in the near future.
On 4 February, New York Times writes: “We can’t say there’s a cease-fire yet,” Naw Zipporah Sein, the general secretary of the Karen National Union, said in an interview. “We still need to discuss the conditions.”
Ms. Sein said the delegation sent to negotiate with the government was not authorized to sign a cease-fire. A document was signed, but all that was agreed upon in January, she said, was that the two sides would “meet again” at the end of February. She declined to release a copy of the agreement.
The only ethnic armed group holding out against Thein Sein peace initiative onslaught is the KIO/KIA, and with a sound political logic. It has an experience of 17 years ceasefire agreement, with the promise that political dialogue and settlement would follow. But instead, the 2008 Constitution framer, the SPDC regime, had ignored the Kachin and other non-Burman ethnic groups’ proposal of a genuine federal proposal and pushed through the drafting of military-supremacy constitution, constitutional referendum and 2010 nation-wide elections, which were either free, fair, credible or transparent. On top of that, the Border Guard Force (BGF) plan of forceful assimilation of all ethnic armed groups into the Burma Army was implemented, leading to the breakdown of more than decade-long ceasefire agreements.
Third party mediator and ethnic conflict
Thein Sein government self-help conflict resolution has widened some political space but is still a long way from being comprehensive and fair, especially where the issue of ethnic conflict is concerned.
SHAN report on 04 February said that when Hkun Tun Oo was asked whether he thought a new peacemaking team made up of a third party would be desirable, Hkun Tun Oo, leader of the 1990 elections winning party in Shan State, Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), gave his answer in the affirmative. “It must be formed with persons whom people can trust to restore peace in our lifetime,” he was quoted as saying. “But, the way things are shaping up right now, I fear the process might last at least another generation.”
Hkun Tun Oo, together with other prominent activists, was released on 13 January, a day after amnesty was announced by Naypyitaw.
But he didn’t spell out with whom the third party mediator team should be made up of.
An ideal third party, whom the non-Burman ethnic groups have always wanted, would be the UN authorized mediating team, involving ASEAN, EU and the US. After all, the UN has been, for years, endorsing a “tripartite dialogue” between the military, Aung San Suu Kyi led NLD and the non-Burman ethnic groups to resolve the decades old conflict.
Broad-based coalition among non-Burmans?
And as such, it will be wise to strive for collective bargaining, by forming a broad-based coalition among non-Burman ethnic groups and push for a speedy political dialogue, aimed at achieving a just political settlement.
The non-Burman ethnic groups had shown that they were united, when it comes to common issues already twice; in the Panglong Conference (1947) and Taunggyi Seminar (1961), out of which emerged the following 5 point call:
Burma Proper must be a constituent state like Chin, Kachin, Shan and others
Equal power to the two Houses of Parliament
Equal representation for each state in the Upper House
Reservation of the following subjects for the Union government and the remaining subjects for the states: Foreign affairs, Defense, Finance, Coinage and paper currency, Posts and Telegraphs, Railways, Airways and Waterways, Union Judiciary and Sea Customs Duty
Fair distribution of the revenue collected by the Union Government among the state (Source: SHAN – 28.11.2011)
If the non-Burman ethnic groups were able to do it twice before, there is no reason not to be able to revive it again this time again. There are such broad-based organizations like United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC), United Nationalities Alliance (UNA) and United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD) already; and with a little more effort and determination, they could form a formidable, collective force to strive for their rights. With many of the UNFC ethnic armed group members on ceasefire terms with Naypyitaw, the possibility to call for the formation of such broad-based coalition is even more possible than ever. Just imagine how the coming together of ethnic armed groups and ethnic political parties could achieve collectively.
The Thein Sein regime, under the banner of Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) is a top-dog, controlling 90 percent or so vote within the Parliament, coupled with undisputed military backing; and Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the NLD is a formidable opposition, with the backing of Burman majority, even if it is not clear how she could push through any constitutional amendment with merely 2.5 percent of the vote, if she wins the 40 or so seats in the forthcoming April by-elections. However, both are Burman political parties and well organised, in contrast to the non-Burman ethnic groups, which still need to organise themselves in a more effective form, to be able to bargain on equal basis, if ever the long sought out “tripartite dialogue” is to take place.
But one thing is sure, the non-Burman ethnic groups cannot afford to accommodate the Thein Sein’s developmental, drawn-out, second phase plan and the need for speedy political bargaining is crucial, if they want to restore their ethnic identities and rights of self-determination. In other words, there is a choice to be made; either to eventually give up the struggle by staying aloof and let the regime’s delaying tactics overwhelm and destroy their aspirations or strive in unison to realise the common goal of federalism, democracy and equality.
It is high time for the non-Burman ethnic nationalities to be more proactive, get organised and push for the restoration of their birthright sovereignty, coercively taken away from them.
The contributor is the General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union (SDU) - Editor
President Thein Sein seems to be on the right track, when he ordered or instructed the military on December 10 to cease its offensive against the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA). But reports coming in indicate that either the military is disobeying the presidential order or the instruction has not reached all the units, which according to Aung Thaung, Minister of Industry and head of the Union Level Peacemaking Group, sporadic skirmishes in remote areas occurred, due to the fact that troops there might not have received the instruction due to a lack of a proper telecommunication system.
Sai WansaiAccording to the Kachin News Group (KNG) report of 17 December, Thein Sein's directive to halt offensive against the KIA has not been heeded. It writes: “Although Burma’s President Thein Sein publicly released a letter on December 10 to the commander-in-chief of the military directing the army to end its northern offensive, the Burmese army has continued to fight the KIO. Fighting has been particularly fierce in territory belonging to the Kachin Independence Army’s (KIA) third battalion. Eyewitnesses on the ground in Kachin State report that despite Thein Sein’s peace directive, the army on Wednesday sent more than 500 troops to the Sadung region in preparation for an apparent government offensive."
Likewise, The Irrawaddy reported on 15 December that according to one Western observer fighting continues to rage on unabated near the KIO's headquarters of Laiza, on the Sino-Burmese border. The observer, who just returned on 14 December, said that fierce fighting just outside of Mai Ja Yang, a few kilometers away.
AP also reported on 14 December that despite the ceasefire announcement, KIA officials said fighting continued on the front lines and reinforcement troops were arriving.
"This is welcome," said Henry Hkaung, an advisor to the KIA's chief of staff. "But the problem is although Thein Sein has encouraged the army to stop offensive fighting; military offensives are still going on and mostly increasing the number in all parts of the state. The fighting on the front line is still going on, so the military does not listen to Thein Sein's order."
In an interview conducted by Mizzima, in Burmese, on 13 December, David Thakabaw, Vice-President of the Karen National Union (KNU) said, in order to achieve ceasefire, the government must first stop its offensives against all the non-Burman ethnic groups.
He said: "What I'm thinking now is that whether U Thein Sein really has the power to implement. Does he really want ceasefire? Does he have power over the military? As a president, he should have power. If he's fake he won't have power. We must now consider and decide on the given situation. We only want to discuss with the real president, so that it will be workable. If not, it will be only tactical move for us. That's why we need to wait and see, whether the president is genuine or fake."
As such, Aung Thaung's excuse of sporadic skirmishes, due to lack of a proper telecommunication system to relay the President's instruction to halt offensive on the KIA to the Burmese troops in the field, is totally unconvincing.
Thein Sein's progress in trying to polish his international standing could be said to be enormous, especially in accommodating Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD by widening the political space, even though major crucial points in the 2008 Constitution like military's right to be placed in a leading role position; 25% built-in seats allotment for the military in national, states and regions parliaments; military's right to declare emergency rule, whenever it feels national security is threatened and so on are not mentioned or discussed.
Accordingly, NLD is now allowed to be reregistered and would run for by-elections for 40 or more parliamentary vacant seats soon. In regional level, ASEAN has already endorsed Burma to chair in 2014, which it previously had surrendered following the crackdown on the saffron revolution. On top of this, Secretary of States, Hillary Clinton's historic visit to Burma, with the prospective opening up of ties with the US, a few weeks ago also has uplifted Burma's tattered legitimacy standing to a new height, which could eventually open previously closed doors, due to its gross human rights violations.
To date, Thein Sein regime has signed ceasefire agreement with four ethnic armed groups, United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and Shan State Army “South” (SSA-S), while negotiation is going on with the Shan State Army “North” (SSA-N) through the go-betweening of its former boss Gen Hso Ten, who was sentenced to 106 year imprisonment by Naypyitaw but released after serving 6 years.
Further talks have been going on with the Karen National Union (KNU), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Kachin National Organization (KNO) and Chin National Front (CNF), including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which Thein Sein regime is waging a major offensive.
And it is this double standard approach of ceasing hostilities on most all ethnic areas, while conducting a full scale war with a hundred or more battalions against the KIA, which makes the non-Burman ethnic armed groups doubtful of the regime’s sincerity to end the conflict.
Although there was a meeting between KIO and Burmese government representatives, in Ruili, Yunnan Province, China, on 29 November, no agreement could be reached, due to the fact that the KIO has insisted on political dialogue as a starting point, while the regime wanted to sign the ceasefire pact first, followed by establishing liaison offices, prior notification when entering each other’s territory, area development and finally union-level dialogue, used as a standard in negotiating with other ethnic armed groups.
After the breakdown of ceasefire agreement on 9 June, which has lasted some 17 years, due to the insistence of the Thein Sein regime to forcefully integrate the KIA into its Border Guard Force (BGF) plan under the Burma Army, several peace talks have been conducted between the two adversaries, without success.
The talks failed mainly because of the different political positioning. The KIO position has been the 1947 Panglong Agreement, guaranteeing the rights of all non-Burman ethnic nationalities in the multi-ethnic nation, which should serve as the basis for any agreement or political give-and-take. But the regime’s stance is to negotiate on the basis of the 2008 Constitution, which means the KIO needed to disarm its military wing, the KIA, aside from having to agree to the regime’s military supremacy position, without question.
Recently, Brig-Gen Gwan Maw, the deputy commander in chief of KIA, told DVB that a letter signed by U Aung Thaung, head of the national-level negotiating team, on 18 December. Accordingly, the government peace committee wanted to discuss political issues, and that eleven-man committee has been specifically formed to negotiate with the KIA, which also include U Aung Min, Minister of Railway and U Thein Zaw. The KIA is said to soon reply to the regime’s overtures.
According to The Mirror, the government owned newspaper, representatives from the DKBA and representatives from the union level of Thein Sein’s government met for the first time on 11 December, in Pa-an Town, Karen State. The DKBA was led by Major General Saw Lah Pwe and Burma government representative from union level was headed by Member of Parliament U Aung Thaung.
Both sides signed an agreement on the following points:
Confirm temporary agreements reached at the 3rd November preliminary meeting,
Not to separate Karen State from the Union of Burma,
Uphold the three main national causes, (a) Non-disintegration of the Union, (b) Non-disintegration of the National Solidarity and (c) Perpetuation of Sovereignty
Set up temporary base at Sone Zee Myaing and carry out local development for the DKBA’s Klo Htoo Baw soldiers families in the Sukali area,
Corporate with the government to eradicate [illicit] drugs and
Continue to hold further talks to build lasting peace.
Meanwhile, RFA reported that Sai Lao Hseng, spokesman for SSA-S said that its representatives met the Burmese counterparts in Tachilek, on 17 December, and agreed to proceed to union level discussion, sometime in January 2012. SSA-S has signed a state level ceasefire agreement, on 2 December, in Taunggyi, with the Shan State Peacemaking Body. It looks that the SSA-S forthcoming meeting might somehow produce the same result like what the DKBA has just agreed.
Given such a perplexed scenario, one couldn’t help to wonder, as to why Thein Sein does not opt for a nation-wide ceasefire and hold a collective meeting, encompassing all stakeholders, to solve the problem once and for all.
The answer to the question could be that the President is not his own man and has still to take orders from General Than Shwe, the retired strongman and real power behind the government; or he is a real reformer having to do the tightrope walking, so that the hardliners don’t feel threatened or offended in anyway; or he is just pretending to be a reformer, when in fact, he is protecting the privileged military top brass, to which he also belong, by helping them to fade away in dignity and as well, with all their acquired, ill-gotten wealth of the country.
The contributor is the General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union (SDU) - Editor
credit here
By: Sai Wansai
On November 18, a meeting of Central Committee members, more than 100 from across the country, would decide whether to re-register as a political party and go mainstream officially, within the political set up of Naypyidaw, which is the only game in town.
On 4 November, President Thein Sein signs a revised law on political parties to enable Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), to re-register as an official political party. Previously, NLD has rejected the military-drawn, 2008 Constitution for not being democratic enough and refused to take part in the November 2010, general election.
After one year of controversial, farce election, Thein Sein government has doled out a series of political reform; such as holding direct talks with Aung San Suu Kyi, defying China and freezing work on an unpopular Mega dam, parliamentary meetings being opened to the media, parliament passing eye-catching laws such as the right for workers to strike and clearing the path for NLD to legally register.
Many international stakeholders have been lobbying for the support of Thein Sein’s minimal reform process by rewarding him with more recognition and increased incentives, so that the pace of reform will heighten and eventually become irreversible. In other words, the lifting of sanctions imposed by the West and accelerating or granting international legitimacy should be on the agenda, to quicken the reform process.
In the meantime, the government has delayed an expected release of political prisoners on Monday, which was said to be put off at short notice by the high-powered National Defence and Security Council (NDSC).
NDSC is headed by President Thein Sein and 10 out of 11 members are military personnel or ex-military personnel and one remaining full fledge civilian, Vice-President Sai Mauk Kham is from the pro-military party, Union Solidarity and Development Party.
On the ethnic conflict front, Naypyidaw’s achievement is somewhat mixed. It has managed to sign ceasefire with the United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) – which defy Naypyidaw’s Border Guard Force (BGF) plan of integration into Burma Army, but have not engaged in open armed conflict - and Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). At the same time, it has established contact to talk over ceasefire arrangement with the Shan State Army North (SSA-N), Shan State Army South (SSA-S), New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Karen National Union (KNU), which are all engaged in open armed conflict with the regime. But parallel to all these peace overtures, the war with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Shan and Kachin states is intensifying, ongoing and in full swing.
To end the ethnic conflict, the Naypyidaw on its part has proposed four steps procedure, which are ceasefire, exchange of liaison offices, prior notification before entering each other’s territory, and political dialogue.
The ethnic armed groups seem to be going along but insist that the fourth and final step of political dialogue be conducted collectively under the banner of United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). However, Naypyidaw’s response to the demand is still not yet being spelled out.
The UNFC formed in February 2011, is composed of six armed groups as permanent members: the Karen National Union (KNU), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Chin National Front (CNF), the Kachin Independence Organization, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), and the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA).
With such a backdrop, the NLD, as a responsible public and mainstream party, is in a very delicate position to decide its political course, for any wrong move will affect its own political standing and could even deviate from its own prescribed principle. Furthermore, it couldn’t even predict what real impact it could make on genuine democratic reform from within the mould of military supremacy, 2008 Constitution.
According to Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), the SNLD has already warned that the participation of NLD in the upcoming by-elections, after the re-registration of the party, could erode the trust of non-Burman ethic groups, which Aung San Suu Kyi so far enjoyed.
“We understand that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is trying hard to gain the release of political prisoners and to achieve a genuine democracy, but I'm afraid participating in the elections without first achieving at least the release of political prisoners is a good idea. We are worried ethnic nationalities will never dare to trust her again,” said Sai Leik, the SNLD spokesman recently.
Before making a final decision, perhaps it might be helpful to look at the 2009 NLD “Shwegondaing Declaration,” which includes, among others, the following points.
Unconditional release of all the political prisoners
Review of the 2008 Constitution
Establishment of a genuine Union based on the principle of equality for all the ethnic nationalities
Recognition of the result of the 1990 general election
Political dialogue
Of the mentioned points above, only the recognition of the 1990 general elections was recently accepted by the Thein Sein government.
Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) recently reported Suu Kyi stated that the party should also accept that the 1990 election results were “history”, after the speaker of the National Parliament, Khin Aung Myint, said that he “recognised the result”.
And as such, all the other remaining points, which are most crucial, remain untouched.
A recent article, which argues that the NLD should re-register, appears in Myanmar Times writes:
The NLD could not continue as an “illegal” entity forever.
If the NLD represents the public in parliaments it could lead to a strengthening of the “democratic forces”, not only in terms of the overall number but in their effectiveness in pushing for more reforms.
The participation of NLD could help garner more technical assistance for the parliamentary system from those with more experience with democracy, such as the United States and the European Union. They will not lift sanctions immediately but they could ease some restrictions that will strengthen Myanmar’s nascent democratic system, such as building the capacity of politicians and strengthening of civil society.
Sure, no doubt, Aung San Suu Kyi and Thein Sein need each other to advance their own interest. Thein Sein craves for international legitimacy and eventual lifting of sanctions, while Aung San Suu Kyi is exploring avenue to speed up a genuine democratic reform. The four times meeting of Aung San Suu Kyi with Labour Minister U Aung Kyi and once with President Thein Sein have brought some minor changes, but hardly enough to put the reform process on an irreversible footing. The regime half-hearted implementation of amnesty for political prisoners is the case in point, which makes the regime’s reconciliation overtures or reform motivation looks insincere and doubtful.
In a press release of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC), dated 14 November, on the eve of 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali, it writes: “The reform process thus far has been stunted due to it being driven by the individual initiative of President Thein Sein, rather than being part of a national platform for reform. Change that depends on the willingness of the president alone is not reform,” said Ms Sundari. “It is wrong therefore for ASEAN to conclude that further incentives should be given to Myanmar in reward for superficial reforms.”
Of course, it is for the NLD and Suu Kyi to decide whether they could achieve more as a pressure group, outside the parliament or better served by working within the existing political system.
The contributor is the General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union (SDU) - Editor
Credit :www.shanland.org
By Sai Wansai
With Thein Sein government seen as almost bending over backwards to pave way for Aung San Suu Kyi led National League for Democracy (NLD) party re-registration by changing the party registration law, which would enable it to be engaged in parliament by-elections later this year and also lend legitimacy to the regime, it must be hard pressed to come up with a clear-cut decision on whether to join or refuse to participate in Naypyidaw’s political set up.
It is said that the amendments still need to be signed into law by Thein Sein.
For now, Suu Kyi is still able to evade or duck the question of re-registration by saying that the amendments have not been in place yet and that the party meeting could only tackle the issue once the amended law is promulgated While rejection could roll back Suu Kyi’s freedom, visibility and resumed harassment of the NLD, if Naypyidaw choose to curtail or withdraw the privilege granted so far, going along to re-register the party would mean abandoning the 2009, Shwegondaing Declaration and democratic norms.
If so, Suu Kyi is confronted with a dilemma and a scenario of “escaping between the horns”; to live up to the moral obligation and Panglong Agreement would have to be worked out, if she is to survive the recent delicate, political pressure heaping down on her.
The revision of recent party registration law, which dropped the barring of anyone convicted of a crime from joining a party and a re-wording for political parties to "respect and obey" the 2008 constitution instead of "preserve and protect”, is a progress in itself but hardly enough to satisfy the broad spectrum of stakeholders involved in Burma’s political arena.
To be able to push for a genuine reform, the 2008 Constitution, which is in effect a military supremacy one, would have to be amended.
Some major flaws of the Constitution are as follows:-
The self-appointed, political leadership role of the military.
The right to appoint 25% of active military representatives in Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the Region Hluttaws and the State Hluttaws by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services as Hluttaw representatives.
The National Defense and Security Council” (NDSC), which is a “Permanent Military Institution”, could exercise executive power by way of the State President and also by itself.
The ceiling of more than 75% approval votes to amend the constitution, by representatives of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, followed by a nation-wide referendum only with the votes of more than half of those who are eligible to vote.
Without serious discussion and amendment of these major flaws, one could not hope to push for a substantial and genuine, democratic reform process. At least, Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD would need to have an assurance that the time frame attached, step by step, fading out of military representatives within the parliament would have to be worked out, before agreeing to re-register the party and eventual political participation within the framework of the existing political system.
Naypyidaw, rightly or wrongly, believes that its longing for more international legitimacy and lifting of sanctions could be achieved through Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD political participation.
From the point of non-Burman ethnic nationalities, the amendment of the following points is crucial to end the ethnic conflict and possible political participation in nation-building process.
Only the President is entitled to select, submit and appoint the Chief Minister of the Region or State concerned, from among the Region or State Hluttaw representatives.
The appointment of a person as a Chief Minister of the Region or State nominated by the President shall not be refused by the Region or State Hluttaw unless it can clearly be proved that the person concerned does not meet the qualifications of the Chief Minister of the Region or State.
The President has the right to submit again the list with a new name replacing the one who has not been approved by the Region or State Hluttaw for the appointment of the Chief Minister.
The seven Regions, previously known as Divisions and the seven States are designated as seven States are equal in status.
As could be seen, the 2008 Constitution could not fulfil the non-Burman ethnic nationalities’ rights of self-determination for it has a rigid centralisation system, rather than the required decentralisation. It should be noted here that the non-Burman ethnic nationalities have joined the Union of Burma on a voluntary basis, based on the promise of General Aung San that a federal system of government would be established, following the independence from the British. But after the assassination of Aung San, on 19 July 1947, the Burman political class has chosen to take over the mantle of the British colonial master, instead of the agreed equal partnership agreement, signed in Panglong the same year. For a little more than a decade, a semblance of federal system, with unitary overtone, was practiced until the military stage a coup in 1962. Since then, the Burman has become a full blown aggressor overnight, instead of being a partner. The reason for the coup was to safe guard the union from disintegration for the non-Burman ethnic nationalities had called for an equitable and fair union with their “federal proposal” to amend the 1948 Constitution.
It should also be noted that the non-Burman ethnic groups had called for a genuine federalism, during the National Convention to draft the 2008 Constitution, but was pushed aside and simply ignored.
Furthermore, the newly created seven Regions, which was known previously as Ministerial Burma or Burma Proper, is in fact a Burman state and splitting it into seven is a deliberate move by the military to counter and limit the ethnic states political clout vis-à-vis the Burman state.
As it is, the non-Burman ethnic states do not have the right to develop its own constitution within the framework of the Union Constitution of Burma, or have the power to elect its Chief Minister. In addition, the natural resources could only be exploited mainly by the Union government and not by the states themselves.
And as such, the ethnic conflict, going on for decades will definitely continue, until a compromise to address the grievances and injustice of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities could be found.
But while the reconciliation overtures towards Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD seem to be in progress, the Naypyidaw’s handling of ethnic armed groups is rather a mixture of confrontation and peaceful-coexistence.
According to the news, the Burma Army’s war against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is in full swing, while the offensive on the Shan State Army North (SSA-N) has ceased since September, but resumed again according to the 1 November report of Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB). The clash was said to have taken place on 28 October, in a forest in Mong Nawng area, southern Shan State.
The peace talk’s overtures with the Karen National Union (KNU), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and Shan State Army South (SSA-S) have also been made by the Thein Sein government.
The ceasefire agreements with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) have also been signed almost two months ago.
The normal logical approach of a government willing to instil peace initiative would create a peaceful atmosphere by calling for a nation-wide ceasefire, instead of heightening the offensive. But news coming out from Kachin sources indicates that just the opposite is happening.
On 31 December, the Kachin News Group (KNG) reported that the unidentified chemical weapon has been in use in three war zones against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The areas under attack are along the Myitkyina-Manmaw (Bhamo) Road in Waingmaw Township, Christian Prayer Hill and Lung Zep Kawng in Ga Ra Yang village, and Shwe Nyaung Pyin village, said KIA soldiers, who have been attacked by the poisonous gas.
It was said to produce a dark smoke, causing extreme dizziness, difficulty to breathe, thirstiness and vomiting for hours.
Given such a backdrop, Thein Sein would need to reassess his priority setting of the issues that need immediately attention, coupled with decisive implementation and those that need to be handled in a medium and longer range time frame.
The release of all the political prisoners and ceasefire or peace initiative could be tackled immediately, without fear or any costly investment. The call for comprehensive peace talks could be conducted within a medium time slot, while poverty reduction, economic improvement and so on could fall into a long term time frame.
When the Labour Minister Aung Gyi said 'We will not stop, and also not jump with both legs,’ regarding criticism of the meagre release of political prisoners a few weeks ago, he was missing the point. The wholesale release of the political prisoners won’t cost the regime a penny and would even reap praise and sympathy. But holding the political prisoners as a bargaining chips tend to erode the confidence and good will of the regime, plus the disappointment of those longing for a real irreversible reform.
The same goes for the continued offensive on the KIA and to a lesser extent on the KNU. Again, it won’t cost the regime anything to call for a nation-wide ceasefire and even would polish its image and international standing.
The Burma Army’s offensive in Kachin, Shan and Karen states have already cost some hundreds, if not thousands, of Burmese soldiers and ethnic resistance troopers’ lives and uncountable collateral damage inflicted upon the civilian population. In short, the cost of human lives and material loss are tremendously high, which makes the effort of Thein Sein government’s poverty reduction initiative looks meaningless and hollow.
The one speculation left, on why such a natural or logical approach to call for a nation-wide ceasefire has been shunned, could be that Thein Sein is not in total control, and thus could not rein in the military in the field. If this is so, the power struggle within the government would have to be settled first, before an all-embracing political settlement could be worked out. It could also be that Thein Sein is playing the good cop, while the military is taking the role of a bad cop, while hood-winking all the stakeholders, posturing as a reformist, when in fact he is representing a handful of military top brass, both retired and active.
No one knows for sure. .
The contributor is the General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union (SDU) - Editor
Credit :shanland
By: Sai Wansai>>
The latest move of President Thein Sein shelving the construction of the $3.6 billion Myitsone dam project in Kachin state is the right decision and hopefully would expand to other problem areas, leading to reconciliation and conflict resolution.
President Thein Sein’s note was read out in parliament by lower house speaker Thura Shwe Mann, on Friday, for a halt to the construction.
According to Reuters, "The president sent a message comprising 10 points to the parliament this morning. One of them said that the construction of the dam on the Irrawaddy will be shelved during the term of his government."
President Thein Sein’s note was read out in parliament by lower house speaker Thura Shwe Mann, on Friday, for a halt to the construction.
According to Reuters, "The president sent a message comprising 10 points to the parliament this morning. One of them said that the construction of the dam on the Irrawaddy will be shelved during the term of his government."
"He said that his government, being born out of people's desire, has to act according to the desire of the people," said the official, who declined to be named because he was not authorised to speak to the media.
The suspension will satisfy the people of Kachin state and downstream populace and not to mention the environmentalists and opposition parties. But Thein Sein still needs to work out the details with China on how to terminate the contract with state-run Chinese companies that are funding and building the dam.
Meanwhile, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei, in reply to question of shelving Myitsone Dam by Thein Sein spelled out China’s position, on Saturday, as follows:-
“The Chinese Government always supports Chinese enterprises cooperating with enterprises of other countries based on the principle of mutual respect, mutual benefit and equality, requires them to perform duties and fulfill obligations in strict accordance with laws and regulations of the host country and urges relevant government to protect the legal and legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises. The Myitsone Dam is a jointly invested project between China and Myanmar that has gone through scientific verification and strict examination of both sides. Relevant matters arising from the implementation of the project should be handled appropriately through bilateral friendly consultation.”(Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China)Prior to this, on 27 September, Burma’s foreign minister, Wunna Maung Lwin, told the UN General Assembly (UNGA) that an amnesty for prisoners is being considered, but gave no date for a possible release. He said that the President Thein Sein would grant the amnesty “at an appropriate time in the near future”.
Again, on Friday, Aung San Suu Kyi and Minister U Aung Kyi met for the third time, since Thein Sein came to power, and spelled out three issue areas – presidential amnesty for political prisoners, preservation and protection of Irrawaddy River, and restoration of eternal peace with the armed ethnic groups - that were discussed.
Indeed, Thein Sein has moved with relative swiftness in trying to deflate the political tension, built over years by confrontation between the ethnic-democratic opposition and the successive military governments. His poverty reduction workshop, a close-door, four eyes meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, invitation of exiles to return home, peace overtures directed at armed ethnic groups, and easing off the restrictions on the media were conducive to some improvement in political atmosphere.
Thein Sein’s moves, while quite effective in thawing the rigid and polarized political stance of the military and democratic opposition headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, in contrast, his peace initiative directed at the ethnic armed forces is producing more negative than positive results.
True, the regime could book in some success, when signing initial ceasefire agreement with the Untied Wa State Army (UWSA) and National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) on the 6th and 7th September respectively, which includes, no hostilities, reopening of liaison offices, advanced notification when entering each side’s territory carrying arms, and a joint coordination team for regional development. But it should be noted that the regime, although on the war footing with both groups, have not entered into open armed conflict like the Shan State Army (SSA) or the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The SSA likened the regime moves of applying remedy to the wrong location and accused it of driving a wedge between the UNFC members and non-members like UWSA and NDAA.
The UNFC formed in February 2011, is composed of six armed groups as permanent members: the Karen National Union (KNU), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Chin National Front (CNF), the Kachin Independence Organization, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), and the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA).
A few weeks after the ceasefire agreement with the UWSA and NDAA, SHAN reported on Friday, that a thousand bags of rice which have been blocked by the Burmese military for 2 years were reportedly returned to the UWSA, in addition to releasing its imprisoned members serving sentences on opium trafficking charges in Buthidaung Prison on the western Burmese border, and allowing domestic airline Yangon Airways, to fly again on 16 October, which is owned by Aik Hauk, son of prominent UWSA leader Bao Youxiang. The airline was refused a new license in November and ceased operations in December last year.
Similarly, on 13 September, SHAN filed a report that pickups and vans have been allowed to ply between Mongla and Kengtung, 80 km, since Sunday (11 September), 4 days after a new ceasefire agreement was signed between Naypyitaw and Mongla-based NDAA.
The immediate economic incentive given back to the two ethnic armed groups is a stark reminder that the regime is ready to apply its old strategy of “divide and rule”, which have worked so well in the past.
Meanwhile, the offensives against the KIA and SSA by the Burma Army are in full swing, making it hard to believe if Thein Sein’s peace initiative is for real or just a public relation stunt to curry international sympathy, in its charm offensive to win legitimacy.
According to BBC, the recent Burma Army’s offensive with 10 battalions on KIA 4 brigade, in northern Shan state, starting last Friday, have suffered at least 60 Burmese soldiers killed, while KIA casualties were said to be 8 killed and 8 wounded.
The Burma Army casualties, in its offensive in central Shan state, which have begun a few months ago, were equally devastating for the Burma Army, estimated to be in hundreds, due to the guerrilla warfare conducted by the SSA.
Likewise, the same situation exists, where Burma Army’s human cost numbered in hundreds, in its war against the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), led by Brig-Gen Saw Lah Pwe, who refused to become Border Guard Force (BGF) under the Burma Army, and Karen National Union (KNU).
On 26 September, VOA reported that Lanyaw Zawng Hra, the chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization, spelled out his terms Monday in a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Mr. Ban has been seeking negotiations to end fighting between the Burmese government and ethnic rebels, including the KIO's armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army.
He pointed out that the military-backed regime is still using the usual “divide and conquer” tactics, even though it could take another path to reconcile with the ethnic groups, and instead choose to ignore the basic rights of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities.
He also stressed that all recommendations from ethnic groups in drafting Burma's new constitution were not taken into account, and banned the country's 2 million ethnic minority members from voting.
According to the report of The Irrawaddy, on 27 September, the most crucial point spelled out in the letter is that “Despite the fact that Burma achieved independence in 1948 as the Union of Burma, it has been operating as a Unitary System, rather than practicing a true federal system as agreed to by independence leader Gen. Aung San and ethnic leaders.”
The leaders of Shan, Kachin and Chin decided at Panglong, on the 12th of February 1947, to join with U Aung San and the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League) and leaders of other nationalities, to live together under one flag as co-independent and equal nations. This marks the birth of a nation-state now known as "Union of Burma".
In this way the desire of the leaders of the Frontier Areas to co-operate with Burma to more speedily achieve freedom was initially put into effect. However, it was as yet, merely a temporary union for the transition period.
The establishment of a future Federation, consisting of Burma proper and the Frontier Areas, although prescribed in the decision of 6th February 1947, was not mentioned in the Panglong Agreement as it was understood that the matter should be considered in detail at the Constituent Assembly which was yet to be convened.
The Sub-Committee of the Supreme Executive Council of the United Hill Peoples, headed by the Saohpalong of Mong Pawn and U Kya Bu, negotiated with the Burmese Delegation headed by General Aung San, on the 10th February 1947, at Panglong and the demands tabled by the representatives of the Frontier Areas: - for full internal autonomy, for the establishment of a separate Kachin State, and for the federal organ to deal with only common subjects such as Defence, Foreign Affairs, Railways and Customs etc. – was accepted in principle by General Aung San.
General Aung San, however, requested that the demand for the Right of Secession from Burma at any time after attaining freedom, should be decided at the Constituent Assembly. ( Source: Document containing proposals For the REVISION of the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF BURMA - submitted by THE SHAN STATE - Translated by Sao Singha. This document was ratified by the Convention, attended by delegates from the entire Shan State, which was held in Taunggyi, on Saturday, 25th of February1961.)
It is not an exaggeration to state that without Panglong Agreement or Accord, signifying the intent and willingness of the free peoples and nations of what could be termed British Indochina, there would have not been born the Union of Burma in 1948.
Accordingly, the right of secession was included in 1947 Union of Burma Constitution, where the Shan and Karenni states were accorded with the right to exercise it after ten years.
A careful reading of the Constitution and the documents relating to the formation of the Union, suggests that the framers intended the - secession - right to be a measure of protection for those hill peoples who were dubious about allying themselves with the dominant and politically more advanced state of Burma proper. (Source: Politics in the Shan State: The Question of Secession from the Union of Burma - Josef Silverstein)
As we would witness later, this measure of protection was not even in a position to protect the human rights of the non-Burman ethnic peoples, much less their rights to internal autonomy and rights of self-determination. They were helplessly delivered to the racial supremacy ambition and military occupation onslaught of the Burmese military and its political class, which sought to monopolised the political decision-making power.
Following General Aung San’s assassination in July 1947, the Union Constitution was rushed through to completion without reflecting the spirit of Panglong. The ethnic homelands were recognized as constituent states but all power was concentrated in the central government. In other words, it was federal in name only but unitary in practice.
According to Mr. Tinker, a former Professor of History at the University of Rangoon, the Constitutional Advisor, Chan Htoon, observed much later that “our Constitution, though in theory federal, is in practice unitary.”
In 1958, the right of the Shan and Karenni people to disassociate from the Union after 10 years, guaranteed in the 1947 Union Constitution, was denied them. As a precaution, U Nu invited the Commander-in-Chief, General Ne Win, to form a ‘Caretaker’ government to restore law and order for a period of 2 years as young people took to the jungles to claim their rights.
In 1961, the ethnic nationalities leaders tried to return to the spirit of Panglong by proposing to amend the 1947 Constitution as a means of preventing the nation from disintegrating. This was probably the last legal attempt to ward off the growing political tension, which was about to blow out of proportion, leading to armed conflict between the Burman-dominated government and the non-Burman ethnic peoples.
But General Ne Win launched a coup d’etat in 1962 ‘to save the nation from disintegration’ and suspended the 1947 Constitution. From the ethnic nationalities’ point of view, this act abolished the legal instrument that bound their homelands to the Union. As such, they consider themselves to be independent entities held by force in subjugation by an invading army.
This breaching of contract, from the part of the successive Burman-dominated governments – starting from U Nu, General Ne Win, General Than Shwe to the present ex-general, President Thein Sein - is the main reason for the ongoing armed conflict continuing to these days.
The 1974 Constitution, adopted by General Ne Win’s Burmese Socialist Programme Party and the 2008 Constitution drawn and adopted by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), headed by General Than Shwe were both unitary in nature, which do not in anyway address the self-determination and autonomy aspirations of the non-Burman ethnic peoples.
From the perspective of the non-Burman ethnic peoples, the breaching of the Panglong Agreement, which explicitly spelled out the voluntarily participation in forming a new union, with complete autonomy and rights of self-determination in tact, is a non-negotiable position. And the altering of the federal structure to a unitary one amount to blatant dishonouring of the agreement or pure cheating, from the part of the successive Burman-dominated regimes.
The situation is like making a contract on a co-owned acquired piece of land to build a condominium, where involved parties would be allotted one unit each, while sharing the lobby, swimming pool and other facilities among the inhabitants. But a dominant party hijacked the agreed plan, declared its sole ownership and instead, built a house to its liking to suit its own purpose and desire, effectively sidelining all the other originally involved parties, who were also the rightful owners of the land and as well, the previously agreed building plan. This kind of scenario is certainly programmed to produce a heated, open conflict, if the previously agreed plan is not utilised or taken into account.
And as such, the military-backed Thein Sein regime’s unitary presidential system, based on its 2008 Constitution would not be able to accommodate the rights and aspirations of the non-Burman ethnic peoples. Only if the regime is ready to go back to the original federal set up agreement, as promised by the late General Aung San, would the ethnic armed resistance subside and eventual conflict resolution be worked out. But if the regime refuses to undo its breaching of original, federalism agreement contract and in contrary, insists to hold on to its unitary system at all cost, the ethnic armed conflict will continue to rage on unabated.
The contributor is General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union - Editor
By: Sai Wansai>>
Quite a lot of positive happenings have been making headlines during the last few days, notably where Aung San Suu Kyi’s interaction with the military regime and her freedom of movement, which could be taken as political ones, are concerned. The Pegu or Bago day trip, open letter to the President Thein Sein and ethnic armed conflict parties to the most recent meeting for one hour with the President himself, while, on the side line, attending a forum on the impoverished nation's economy on Saturday morning, have lined Aung San Suu Kyi’s busy agendas.
On the part of President Thein Sein, some policies to remedy the hard-hit country's economy, offering peace talks to end the armed conflicts with ethnic armed groups and reaching out for the return of dissidents staying in and out of the country, were spelled out, on the eve of Aung San Suu Kyi’s arrival to Naypyidaw to meet him.
Of all these measures, peace offensive is the most crucial issue, which needs to be seriously scrutinized. For political future of the country will depend on the outcome of this initiative.
The military regime under General Ne Win made two attempts to reach a political solution. First, offers were made in 1963 for peace talks that included both communist and ethnic groups, but the talks failed. Then, in 1968-1969, Ne Win invited former political leaders under the direction of U Nu to make suggestions for the restoration of national unity. The majority of the members of this advisory committee recommended a return to democratic civilian rule and a federal state, but their advices were rejected. (Source: Burma – Twelve Years After 1988 - Camilla Buzzi)
When N e Win assumed direct control of the Burmese government for the second time in 1962, he gave the highest priority to ending insurgency. For almost 15 years the Rangoon government had been coping not only with the problem of Communist insurgency but with the larger, more serious problem of ethnic insurgency. As a first step towards solving the problem, Ne Win announced a general amnesty to all insurgents who surrendered to the government. After this availed nothing, he went a step further in June 1963, inviting all underground groups, Communists and non-Communists alike, to come to Rangoon for unconditional peace talks. (Source: CIA Intelligence Report - RSS NO. 0052171, July 1971)
Almost all of armed resistance groups participated the 1963 peace talks in Rangoon, including the Burma Communist Party (BCP), Communist Party, Burma (CPB), Karen National United Party (KNUP), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Karen Revolutionary Council (KRC) and Shan State Independence Army (SSIA).
However, after several months, on 14th November, the peace talks broke down, due to the Revolutionary Council (RC) military government's pressure only to surrender and refusal to listen to their demands.
Points that were unacceptable to the negotiating parties include that “all troops must be concentrated in a designated area, no one must leave without permission, all organisational work must stop and fund-raising must stop”. (Source: Wikepedia -Communist Party of Burma)
Other than that, the RC was determined to pressure all political parties, including all the negotiating anti-government armed organizations to come under the banner of Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which was due to be the sole party to govern the country.
In accordance with the RC directive, on 28th March 1964, a decree that dissolved all political parties and associations except the (BSPP) was issued.
After the 1963 nation-wide peace overture, piecemeal ceasefire negotiations were conducted by successive military regimes.
According to the recent military-backed government, since 1994, 17 major anti-government ethnic armed groups and 23 other small groups have made peace with the government. Of them, 15 groups laid down arms completely; five were transformed into government's border guard forces and 15 into militia. (Source: Xinhua)
The government official invitation, announced through the state radio and television on 18th August, directed at anti-government ethnic armed groups for peace talks to end internal dispute and build peace in the country is a positive, conciliatory gesture and should be welcomed.
The statement, which was read out urged ethnic armed groups engaged in conflict with the military to contact state or division governments as a first step leading to further meetings with a union government delegation, which is to be formed soon.
Almost on the heels of the announcement non-Burman ethnic leaders said that the government offer was doubtful and insincere, since the key demand of collective participatory in the peace talks have been rejected.
The United Nationalities Federal Council (UNCF), an alliance of some 12 ethnic armed resistance groups, disagree with the regime’s two steps negotiation plan and insists on a collective bargaining directly with Naypyidaw, which should first declares a temporary nation-wide ceasefire to create a matching atmosphere for a ‘political dialogue.’
According to Chinland Guardian of 19th August, “During one of the recent ceasefire talks with the KIA – against the KIA insistence that talks be held collectively with the UNFC members – the Burmese head of delegation Col. Than Aung likened the conflict situation with other ethnic groups to the relationship between parents and spoiled children, which he said, requires the responsible parents to deal differently with each child according to their individual behaviours. If this analogy represents the mentality of the Burmese government, then it would have validated the fear of the UNFC members that the Burmese government remains committed to its decades-old “Divide and conquer” tactics.”
The recent KIO statement, published by Kachin News Group, dated 17 August writes:
The KIO wants to solve political problems using the principles of the 1947 Panglong Agreement but the government wants to solve the problems on the basis of the military-designed 2008 Constitution.
The KIO and other ethnic armed groups believe all political problems in the country are caused by successive governments failing to follow the Panglong Agreement, the historic treaty which formed the Union of Burma through the cooperation of ethnic Burman, Kachin, Shan and Chin representatives.
The civil war started early this year after the new government pressured Kachin, Mon, Karen, Wa and Shan ethnic ceasefire groups to transform into the Burmese Army-controlled Border Guard Force, without offering political dialogue.
Clearly, the distrust of the armed ethnic groups on the military-backed government is enormous, for during the past few decades, the KNU and KIA have made several negotiations to find a political settlement but have always been pressured to surrender. On top of that, they are not ready to conduct a negotiation process within the mould of military supremacy, 2008 Constitution.
For the time being, it is still hard to predict whether President Thein Sein’s peace initiative will repeat the same failure of General Ne Win’s peace call in 1963 or break rank with the traditional, conservative military doctrine and deliver the long awaited peaceful co-existence and co-habitation for the benefit of the people.
The author is General Secretary of the exiled Shan Democratic Union
By: Sai Wansai>>
Fresh after the second meeting with minister Aung Kyi, the Pegu or Bago day trip visit of Aung San Suu Kyi have been a success, both in terms of large public turnout and the eager cooperation of the police, which indicates an about turn from harsh, confrontational stance of the Than Shwe, SPDC regime.
Indeed, the warming up of the situation even lead to 4 point statement between Aung San Suu Kyi and minister Aung Kyi, which states:
Will cooperate with government for stability and development
Will cooperate for the flourishing of democracy and economic / social development
Will avoid conflicting views and focus on mutual cooperation
Will continue the meetings (Source: Mizzima)
So far so good. But both Aung Kyi and Information Minister Kyaw Hsan, also leader of the new unit, called the Spokespersons and Information Team, insist that it is illegal for NLD to function as a political party, due to its dissolution for failing to register during the run up of the last election, and urge to register so that it could politically be involved.
From the view point of the NLD, while the outsiders could imagine or understand the regime's offer of urging NLD to register as a party as being reconciliatory, the NLD is in an awkward position to follow suit, for this would mean the acceptance of the government’s legitimacy in exchange for permission to take part in politics. This, in turn, would weaken the political position of the NLD party, which overwhelmingly have won the 1990 nation-wide election and is entitled to form the government, on behalf of the people.
The NLD leader, Aung San Suu Kyi has made it known, time and again, that she didn't endorse the 2008 Constitution. On 8 August 2011 - Aung San Suu Kyi, marking the 23rd anniversary of the 8888 uprising, says, “We still do not accept the 2008 constitution.” (Source:DPA)
For now, the military-backed government seems to put the NLD registration issue on a back burner and prioritising “national unity”. Signs that the government is reaching out to Aung San Suu Kyi could be seen by the invitation to meet with officials of the government-backed political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP); and to the National Level Workshop on Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation in Naypyidaw this month
While reconciliatory gestures are abundant for Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD, just the opposite is true with the SSPP/SSA and KIO/KIA.
The ceasefire armies, including the KIO/KIA and SSPP/SSA, don't agree with the 2008 Constitution, even though the regime used to point it out that the ceasefire armies also participated in the drafting of the constitution, during the national convention. The point is that the ceasefire armies and ethnic political parties' suggestion of forming a federal union to satisfy their rights of self-determination was bluntly rejected by the then SPDC's dominated national convention. And as such, the ceasefire armies were of the opinion that they owe no legal obligation to the 2008 Constitution and also to the government, especially where the Border Guard Force (BGF) program is concerned.
According to the 2008 constitution of chapter Vll, under the heading “Defence Services”, Paragraph number 338, it states: “All the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defence Services”.
Since Naypyitaw launched offensive against the SSPP/SSA on 13 March, more than 31,700 people have been displaced and 24 had died in July alone, according to Shan Women’s Action Network and Shan Human Rights Foundation. (Source:AP)
Amid deliberation of ceasefire talks by the military-backed government, the armed conflict is still going on in Kachin State. Also there were reports that the regime has sent out feelers to SSPP/SSA and New Mon State Party (NMSP) for ceasefire talks.
So far as the non-Burman ethnic nationalities are concerned, the military-backed government is sending out mixed signals, without much political will or sincerity to resolve the core of the problem: rights of self-determination.
It also looks like that the regime is deliberately trying to side-line the non-Burman ethnic nationalities as a third force, in Burma political arena.
To sum up, the issue of urging NLD registration as a political party and the forced assimilation of the armed ethnic groups within the mould of BGF by the military-backed regime are due to the non-recognition of the 2008 Constitution.
While it might seem that the Thein Sein government is becoming reasonable, the fact remains that all have to honour the 2008 Constitution and any give-and-take will only happen within this mould. And it is here where the most crucial problem is embedded.
The military-back regime could not dictate its self-drawn game plan on all its adversaries and postures itself immaturely by sticking to its "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose" rhetoric.
Instead, a more pragmatic and logical approach would be to call for a 'Tripartite Dialogue', between the NLD, non-Burman ethnic nationalities and itself, to resolve all the problems encompassing ethnic conflict and democratization process.
The author is General Secretary of the exiled Shan Democratic Union.
Last week, KIO/KIA prepared a set of questions for Col Than Aung, the Kachin State minister for border affairs and head of the government emissary, who was sent to negotiate about possible ceasefire conditions.
The questions among others include:
- Who has given order to the team to negotiate?
- How “peace” should be defined by both parties?
- How should the term “ceasefire” be interpreted or understood?
- How much negotiation power is vested in the negotiation team?
- In case, if one party breaks the ceasefire agreement, who will be responsible to take action
- What is the government opinion on “Panglong Agreement”?
- How would the government consider KIO/KIA as an organisation?
(Source: RFA – 2011-08-05)
Of all the questions posed, defining “peace” and “ceasefire” are two most crucial terms, which the contending parties must agree upon, if ever the ongoing ethnic conflict is to be resolved.
Martin Luther King, Jr. said, “True peace is not merely the absence of tension; it is the presence of justice.” And Eleanor Roosevelt emphasized, “It isn’t enough to talk about peace. One must believe in it. And it isn’t enough to believe in it. One must work at it.”
Peace is a state of harmony characterized by the lack of violent conflict. Commonly understood as the absence of hostility, peace also suggests the existence of healthy or newly healed interpersonal or international relationships, prosperity in matters of social or economic welfare, the establishment of equality, and a working political order that serves the true interests of all. In international relations, peacetime is not only the absence of war or conflict, but also the presence of cultural and economic understanding and unity.
(Source: Wikipedia)The online free dictionary states two points; one is the absence of war or other hostilities; and the other, an agreement or a treaty to end hostilities.
Generally, ceasefire could include an order to stop firing and suspension of active hostilities; a truce.
A ceasefire (or truce) is a temporary stoppage of a war in which each side agrees with the other to suspend aggressive actions. Ceasefires may be declared as part of a formal treaty, but they have also been called as part of an informal understanding between opposing forces. An armistice is a formal agreement to end fighting.
Israeli–Palestinian conflict
An example of a ceasefire in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was announced between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority on February 8, 2005. When announced, chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat publicly defined the ceasefire as follows: “We have agreed that today President Mahmoud Abbas will declare a full cessation of violence against Israelis anywhere and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will declare a full cessation of violence and military activities against Palestinians anywhere.” (Source:Wikipedia)As far as peace is concerned, the successive military regimes and the recent, military-backed government have never spelled out their position clearly, on how they would like to achieve.
What the ethnic armed resistance forces have experienced by now is either to surrender, become government militia or ceasefire arrangement, which the Burmese government misleadingly called “Peace groups”. In short, there is no “give-and-take” negotiation process, but just being asked to follow the prescribed regime’s plan and become part and parcel of its administrative apparatus, one way or the other.
The coercive planned integration of the ceasefire ethnic armed ceasefire armies into its Border Guard Force (BGF) under the Burma Army is the case in point, which went terribly wrong, when it has been rejected and resisted aggressively to the dismay of the Burmese government.
Former ceasefire armies like KIO/KIA, SSPP/SSA, and the large portion of DKBA resisted Burma Army furiously, while the UWSA rejected the BGF plan, although not yet in open armed conflict with the Burma Army.
As a result, Burma is now on the brink of a full blown civil war, just because the regime likes to have its radical, racial and military supremacy way without compromising or accommodating the aspirations of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities’ rights of self-determination.
The Panglong Agreement of 12th February 1947, to join with U Aung San and the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League) and leaders of Shan, Kachin and Chin nationalities, to live together under one flag as co-independent and equal nations, marks the birth of a nation-state now known as “Union of Burma”.
It is not an exaggeration to state that without Panglong Agreement or Accord, signifying the intent and willingness of the free peoples and nations of what could be termed British Indochina, there would have not been born the Union of Burma in 1948.
This Panglong Agreement, which emphasizes the rights of self-determination, democracy and equality have been denied by successive military regimes and this has been the roots of the conflict, encompassing all non-Burman nationalities.
As such, while the ceasefire agreement is seen as a kind of partial surrender, eventually leading to total integration into Burma Army or dissolving the ceasefire armies, it was understood as a temporary cessation of war on the way to iron out a settlement through political, negotiation process, by the non-Burman ethnic nationalities.
A Kachin leader recently pointed out that the Burmese military, during SLORC regime had maintained that political settlement should be carried out only with the future elected government, for it was only a military care taker government. And after almost five decades, the negotiation process has not started. Perhaps, the military-backed government likes all to believe that its 2008 Constitution is carved into stone and that everyone has to abide by it. Ironically, the people of Burma knows that the constitutional drafting, constitutional referendum to nation-wide elections were all flawed, rigged and manipulated to suit the military leadership, from the beginning to the end.
For now, no one is quite sure, whether the military, status quo faction of Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo, Gen Than Shwe’s protégé, or President Thein Sein, who is backed by Thura Shwe Mann, the parliament house speaker, is calling the shots, where offensive against the ceasefire armies is concerned.
Just as the KIO/KIA pointed out clearly, so long as the definition of “peace” and “ceasefire” terms are not understood on the same wave length and the power vested to the ceasefire negotiation team not crystal clear, meaningless ceasefire talks will lead us nowhere and the armed conflict between the KIO/KIA and the Burma Army will continue unabated. Consequently, the war in Shan, Karenni, Karen and Mon states will likely go on, at the expense of the people.
The author is General Secretary of the exiled Shan Democratic Union.
By: Sai Wansai
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s open letter to President Thein Sein, together with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Karen National Union (KNU), New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Shan State Army (SSA), is a move which must be welcomed.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s open letter to President Thein Sein, together with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Karen National Union (KNU), New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Shan State Army (SSA), is a move which must be welcomed.Sai Wansai
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has pinpointed the importance of peaceful co-existence among co-inhabitants of the Union of Burma and that it is a paramount task for every party concerned to make it a reality.
The letter added that armed conflicts within the non-Burman ethnic areas have created human tragedy, suffering, loss of lives, economic deterioration and destruction of costly physical infrastructures.
The use of force wouldn’t bring the warring parties nearer and that only negotiation and political dialogue could deliver the desired genuine peace and reconciliation.
She added that only within the atmosphere of peace would a genuine nation-building process be successfully implemented.
In closing, she made herself available to do everything in her power for the termination of armed conflicts and building peace within the Union of Burma.
In closing, she made herself available to do everything in her power for the termination of armed conflicts and building peace within the Union of Burma.
While this is, undoubtedly, a sincere and noble act from the part of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, it is also essential to look deeply into the underlying core conflict issues and Burmese military leadership mindset, as to why it is so uncompromising and unyielding, when it comes to facilitating genuine reconciliation and democratisation process.
First, successive military dominated regimes, including the present military-backed Thein Sein government, see Burma as an existing unified nation since the reign of Anawratha thousands of years ago. As such, all other non-Burmans - Shan, Kachin, Chin, Arakanese, Mon, Karen and Karenni - are seen as minorities, which must be controlled and suppressed, lest they break up the country.
On the other hand, the non-Burmans maintain that the Union of Burma is a newly developed territorial entity, founded by a treaty, the Panglong Agreement, where independent territories merged together on equal basis.
Given such conceptual differences, the Burmese military goes about with its implementation of protecting "national sovereignty" and "national unity" at all cost. This, in turn, gives way to open conflict resulting in more suppression and gross human rights violations. The intolerance of the military and its inspiration to "racial supremacy" and political domination and control has no limit and this could be seen by its refusal to hand over power to the winners of 1990 nation-wide election, the NLD, SNLD and other ethnic parties. The genuine federalism platform, which the NLD and ethnic nationalities embrace, is a threat to its racist mind-set. And as such, the non-Burman ethnic groups aspiration of “unity in diversity” or “genuine federalism” is viewed by successive military regimes, including the present Thein Sein government, as a “disintegration ploy “, which will break up the country, if ever allowed to be implemented.
Secondly, the woes of Burma today are deeply rooted in the inadequate constitutional drafting of 1947. The Union Constitution was rushed through to completion without reflecting the spirit of Panglong. The ethnic homelands were recognised as constituent states but all power was concentrated in the central government or the government of the Burma Mother state.
Almost all the non-Burmans and Burman democratic opposition groups are in agreement that the ethnic conflict and reform of social, political and economics cannot be separated from one another. And the only solution and answer is to amend the 1947 Constitution according to Panglong Agreement, where equality, voluntary participation and self-determination, of the constituent states, formed the basis for the Republic of the Union of Burma.
Again, instead of reforming and addressing the grievances of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities, the junta’s orchestrated the present 2008 constitution - dubbed Nargis constitution, due to the rigging of referendum vote by the junta shortly after Cyclone Nargis - is just doing the opposite, which is designed to give the military a clear political monopoly and military supremacy in all aspects of governing the country.
As a result, the non-Burman ethnic nationalities’ aspiration of “federalism, proportional share of power, in a true sense, in at least one major decision-making body in the central government so that they can protect themselves, and plausible guarantees that the military will not resume attacks on them” were not mentioned or provided in the 2008 constitution.( Source: Analysis of the 2008-SPDC Constitution for Burma - David C. Williams, Executive Director, Center for Constitutional Democracy)
Thirdly, rightly or wrongly, the Burmese military has appointed itself to be the sole saviour of the country and the believe that the army under its command is the only institution that is capable of governing the country. In other words, the junta is entitled to rule over the civilian, with the help of the army.
Fourthly, Burmese military leadership urge for assimilation of non-Burman ethnic nationalities is closely intertwined with its version of forging national identity.
The views of successive Burmese governments, including the present, military-backed Thein Sein regime, concerning national identity has never been clear. They have been at a loss even as to what sort of name they should adopt; that is the reason why they are still using "Bamar“ and "Myanmar" interchangeably for what they would like to be termed a common collective identity, in other words, national identity. The reality is that when one mentions "Myanmar", "Bamar", "Burmese" or "Burman", such words are usually identified with the lowland majority "Bamar” and have never been accepted or understood by the non-Bamar ethnic nationals as a common collective identity to which they also belong.
For about a little more than a decade ago, the then Burmese military regime changed the name of Burma to Myanmar. Its aim is to create a national identity for every ethnic group residing within the boundary of the so-called Union of Myanmar. But since the name Myanmar has always been identified with the lowland "Bamar", the SPDC’s effort in trying to establish a common national identity among the non-Bamar ethnic nationals is doomed to fail. On top of that, this national identity was not chosen with the consent of the non-Bamar ethnic groups, but coercively thrust down their throats by the hated Burmese military dictatorship.
The point to note here is that the successive Burmese governments' nation-building process has totally shattered, failing even to take root after all these years, not to mention the forging of common national identity. It would be more pragmatic to accept the existing diversified “national identities” of all ethnic nationalities as a fact and work for a new common identity in the future federal union with the consent and participation of all ethnic groups, Burman included.
The point to note here is that the successive Burmese governments' nation-building process has totally shattered, failing even to take root after all these years, not to mention the forging of common national identity. It would be more pragmatic to accept the existing diversified “national identities” of all ethnic nationalities as a fact and work for a new common identity in the future federal union with the consent and participation of all ethnic groups, Burman included.
Finally, the misconception of majority-minority configuration has been so entrenched; at least in media and academic studies, it needs some clarification.
The Burman are majority in Burma Proper and in numerical sense, but become a minority in the Shan, Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, and the Mon states, where respective ethnic groups are in majority within their own territories.
Besides, Burma was formed in 1947 by virtue of the Panglong Agreement, one year prior to independence. This agreement was signed between the interim government of Ministerial Burma, headed by Aung San, and leaders of the Federated Shan States, the Chin Hill Tract, and the Kachin Hill Tract. It could be said that this agreement is the genesis of the post-colonial, current Burma.
Thus, the indigenous groups of Burma -- Shan, Arakanese, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mon and including the Burman -- are neither minorities nor majorities, but equal partners or co-inhabitants in a union of territories, the Union of Burma.
Fundamentally, the grievances of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities stem from the inadequate drafting of constitutions, whether they are 1947, 1974 or the recent one in 2008. The flare up of the recent armed conflict in Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen and Mon states has its root in the flawed constitutional drafting.
On 9 June 2004, during the SPDC's held national convention to draw up the 2008 constitution, 13 ethnic ceasefire armies put forward a joint proposal for the formation of a federal union. But no action or follow up action was taken on this advice till the end of national convention. This has been taken as a real drawback and disappointment for the ethnic ceasefire armies.
Thereafter, many instances of the non-Burman ethnic groups’ proposal within the national convention and outside of it were only met with deafening silence from the part of the then ruling junta, the SPDC. (Please see appendix for more information on ethnic initiatives and statements)
According to the 2008 constitution of chapter Vll, under the heading “Defence Services”,
Paragraph number 338, it states: “All the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defence Services”.
This paragraph has been quoted, time and again, as an argument that the ceasefire armies must come under the Burma Army. But the point is that the suggestion and proposal of a federal set up as a political system, during the drafting of 2008 constitution, by the attending ceasefire armies and ethnic political parties were rejected. And the aftermath half-hearted participation of the ceasefire armies, due to the heavy handedness of the junta could not be viewed as a whole-hearted acceptance of this particular paragraph, which in effect would mean the end of their self-determination struggle.
The junta was pressuring the ceasefire armies, even before the change of military-back, Thein Sein government. It even was able to overrun the Kokang ceasefire army in August 2009, when its Border Guard Force (BGF) plan was rejected. But the mainstream ceasefire armies like KIA, UWSA, SSA-N and NDAA continue to resist the Burma Army’s BGF plan.
As such, the ceasefire armies have every right to defend themselves and their homelands, and owe no legal commitment to the 2008 constitution, much less the paragraph 338.
To wind it up, the central issue is still the “constitutional crisis”. And in order to make a meaningful approach leading to a more accommodating, win-win outcome, there is no way around rather than the amendment of the present constitution, or better still, drafting a new constitution. For all the warring parties, negotiating the differing positions along the line of “pluralism” and “unity in diversity” is the only hope left to resolve the ongoing armed, ethnic conflict.
The author is General Secretary of the exiled Shan Democratic Union.
APPENDIX
April 7, 1993:
The convention is suspended again after ethnic nationality delegates protest against the proposed centralized political structure.
The convention is suspended again after ethnic nationality delegates protest against the proposed centralized political structure.
June 7, 1993:
Lt. Gen. Myo Nyunt reopens the convention by stating that the new constitution must guarantee a leading role for the Defense Services in national politics.
Lt. Gen. Myo Nyunt reopens the convention by stating that the new constitution must guarantee a leading role for the Defense Services in national politics.
September 16, 1993:
The National Convention is suspended again, as ethnic minority representatives continue to propose a federal system. According to official reports, delegates have agreed to the 104 principles for the draft constitution.
The National Convention is suspended again, as ethnic minority representatives continue to propose a federal system. According to official reports, delegates have agreed to the 104 principles for the draft constitution.
December 23, 1995:
The convention acknowledges and then rejects a Shan Nationalities League for Democracy proposal for the constitution to accept the principle of sovereignty invested in the people.
The convention acknowledges and then rejects a Shan Nationalities League for Democracy proposal for the constitution to accept the principle of sovereignty invested in the people.
March 21, 2001:
A statement is issued by seven ethnic nationality groups that had concluded military ceasefires (“ethnic ceasefire groups”) with the government—the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO), Shan Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SNPLO), Shan State Army (SSA), and Shan State National Army (SSNA)—calling on the SPDC to begin a more inclusive negotiating process for political development and democracy and national unity.
A statement is issued by seven ethnic nationality groups that had concluded military ceasefires (“ethnic ceasefire groups”) with the government—the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO), Shan Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SNPLO), Shan State Army (SSA), and Shan State National Army (SSNA)—calling on the SPDC to begin a more inclusive negotiating process for political development and democracy and national unity.
May 11, 2004:
Eight ethnic ceasefire groups, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO), Shan Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SNPLO), Shan State Army (SSA), and Shan State National Army (SSNA), issue seven points for changes to the convention:
Eight ethnic ceasefire groups, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO), Shan Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SNPLO), Shan State Army (SSA), and Shan State National Army (SSNA), issue seven points for changes to the convention:
- The right to discuss Objective 6 (military’s leading role in the future affairs of the state) again and revise it, since it does not fit with the democratic principles and does not reflect the wishes of the people;
- The right to discuss and revise the points that are not in line with democratic procedures and principles;
- The right to hold consultation with anybody and any organizations that can provide good advice for the sake of the Union while attending the National Convention;
- The right of delegates to freely communicate with their mother organizations and to seek advice for discussion while attending the convention;
- The right of the representatives of the people elected in the 1990 elections to participate in the convention;
- The right of ceasefire organizations, and non-ceasefire organizations after entering into ceasefires, to join the National Convention;
- To revoke Law No.5/96 that was announced in June 1996 to protect the National Convention.
July 7, 2004:
Thirteen of 17 ethnic ceasefire groups issue a joint proposal for devolving authority to future state assemblies and for those assemblies to maintain armed militias. The nine points submitted to the NCCC were:
Thirteen of 17 ethnic ceasefire groups issue a joint proposal for devolving authority to future state assemblies and for those assemblies to maintain armed militias. The nine points submitted to the NCCC were:
- To include a list of concurrent legislative powers for the states;
- To give residual powers to the states;
- To add a separate section on ethnic affairs in the union legislative list;
- To include a defense and security planning section in each state’s legislature;
- To include a literature/language section in each state’s legislature;
- To include a section for ethnic minority tradition in each state’s legislature;
- To let the states draft their own constitutions;
- To let the states make specific foreign policies in dealing with neighboring countries regarding various issues such as issuing border passes and border trade;
- To let the states collect local taxes and finance.
February 17 – 31 March, 2005:
The National Convention conducts another session with 1,075 delegates attending, including members of ethnic ceasefire groups, to discuss legislative power sharing. Some Shan delegates leave the convention in February following the arrest of leaders of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, which won the second highest number of seats in the 1990 general election, including the SNLD chairman Hkun Htun Oo and the leader of the Shan State Army-North, Maj. Gen. Sao Hso Ten.
The National Convention conducts another session with 1,075 delegates attending, including members of ethnic ceasefire groups, to discuss legislative power sharing. Some Shan delegates leave the convention in February following the arrest of leaders of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, which won the second highest number of seats in the 1990 general election, including the SNLD chairman Hkun Htun Oo and the leader of the Shan State Army-North, Maj. Gen. Sao Hso Ten.
Mid-July 2007:
The Kachin Independence Organization, one of the largest ethnic ceasefire groups, which signed a peace accord with the government in 1994, releases a 19-point list of demands to the SPDC calling for significant reforms to the constitutional process, including, point one:
The Kachin Independence Organization, one of the largest ethnic ceasefire groups, which signed a peace accord with the government in 1994, releases a 19-point list of demands to the SPDC calling for significant reforms to the constitutional process, including, point one:
As currently intended, the Union will be composed of constituent states; we believe that specifying these additional goals clearly and concretely will be necessary. One, that the constituent state union system of state be technically and genuinely a system of federation of states, and two, that this system of state organization be fully transparent in its implementation. We are mindful of the fact that, whereas, the Constitution of 1947 specified a Union that is a federation of states, what actually transpired was a system where all political power was centralized, as in a unitary system, instead of a federation, and one constituent state alone held that power. Therefore, to effectively preclude a recurrence of this fate, and the calamitous results, we urge in the strongest sense possible, that a specific constitutional mandate be included for a federal system of union and for its judicious implementation.
(Source: Chronology of Burma’s Constitutional Process – Human Right Watch -http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0508chronology.pdf)
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