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United We Stand, Divided We Fall



By Salai Za Ceu Lian

The military regime likes to trumpet its  hollow rhetoric about democratizing the Union of Burma through its  cautiously premeditated seven-step road-map to a disciplined democracy.  However, the regime’s ongoing full-scale military onslaught against  ethnic armed opposition groups such as the Kachin Independence  Organization (KIO) and Shan State Army (SSA) indicates that the new  Burmese military government has no intention of ending the long-standing  political stalemate. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP),  is in fact led by a general-turned-President Thein Sein, who has no  intention of pursuing any peaceful political dialogue.

As the saying goes ‘violence begets  violence,’ the regime should realize that its harsh policy of military  offensives towards ethnic armed groups has been - and will be - met with  full-blown defensive armed resistance. Naypidaw’s relentless military  offensives against ethnic armed groups remain driven purely by the  junta’s blatant denial of ethno-cultural diversity and ethno-political  rights of equality, self-determination, and freedom.


What is crystal clear is that the  regime’s propensity for violence will neither serve to bring about  national reconciliation nor will it lead Burma to become a democracy; it  will only deepen the enduring political grievances of systemic  alienation and suppression felt by ethnic national minorities, who take  up arms for decades to rightfully defend and claim their national  birthright of ethnic equality and self-determination within their own  territory.


More than ever before, the changing  political trends and drama unfolding inside Burma have demanded that  leaders of ethnic-based armed opposition groups stand together in their  resistance armed struggle against successive military regimes. The  political stakes are too high for non-cooperation. Knowing what they can  do together and the potential power of their collective force, they  need to fight their common enemy under the banners of ‘we suffer  together; we will fight together; we die together; we celebrate  together’.


Indeed, the notion that we need each  other and will stand together is not uncommon, however. For instance,  realizing the necessity to stand together in their armed struggle  against the military dictatorships, the collective leadership of ethnic  nationalities long embraced the principle of ‘together we stand, but  separated we lose our principal battle’, resulting in the creation of  the National Democratic Front (NDF) in 1976. In negotiating with the  military regime, one of the overarching principles of the NDF is that  members of the NDF are not to enter ceasefire agreement with the  military regime individually and separately, but only as one political  body under the umbrella of NDF.

However, due to the corrosion of the  internal cohesion among its members and lack of commitment in adhering  to their common strategy, the military regime had succeeded in  effectively undermining the front by persuading some members of the  front to enter into the ceasefire agreements individually. In my  conversation with one of the high-ranking ethnic Mon leaders on the  subject back in 2007, he confessed to me saying, “when one of our core  members in the front reneges on its commitment to our core principle as  one common body by choosing to sign a ceasefire with the military  government, we have no option but to sign a ceasefire deal with the  military government. This happened even though what we got was not even  half of the terms and conditions of our original demands as a ground for  negotiation.” Once one main member party signs a peace deal with the  military regime, it enables the military regime to break the internal  cohesion and unity, thus subsequently weakening the collective movement.

Over the years, understanding full well  that the collective forces of the armed group pose a serious threat to  its grip on power, successive military regimes have been employing the  strategy of ‘divide and conquer’ in dismantling the collective forces of  opposition armed groups.


While many of Burma’s watchers wonder  about the future of armed struggle in Burma, the recent re-unification  of ethnic-based armed organizations under the umbrella of the United  Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) reinvigorates the hope of many in  the ongoing democratic movement. The creation of the UNFC once again  signifies the realization that ‘we are more powerful and stronger when  we fight our common enemy collectively, rather than fighting separately  without cooperation.’ Remembering that countless innocent lives have  been sacrificed with the goals of reclaiming their inalienable rights to  self-determination, equality, and universal human rights within their  own territory, the current and future leadership of ethnic national  minorities should attempt to minimize making a collateral strategic  blunder in negotiating with the cunning military government.


There are two explicit lessons that the  leadership of ethnic armed groups - especially of the UNFC - can learn  from the NDF’s experience. One, in any negotiation with the military  regime, leaders of ethnic armed groups must not allow their economic and  social incentives outweigh their political rights. Second, by firmly  upholding the principle of collective bargaining, they should not enter  into a ceasefire agreement with the military regime individually and  separately, which would again result in lack of trust and erosion of  unity among them, eventually paving the way for the military regime to  dismantle them one after another.  The key forward is to stick to their  basic premise and die for it unless their common political demands are  met: for instance, no nation-wide negotiation means no ceasefire of any  sort on any terms and conditions. On this front, in their ongoing  ceasefire talks with the Burmese government delegation, leaders of the  Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) did a commendable job in  demanding that there should be a nation-wide ceasefire if the KIO is to  enter a long-term peace agreement with the military government.


Despite the ongoing talks between the  KIO and Burmese delegation, the military regime has refused to dispatch  high-ranking officials to find a negotiated settlement with the KIO. The  regime’s unwillingness to send a high-ranking official for negotiation  demonstrates that the new Napyidaw government is clearly reluctant and  not at all interested in finding a negotiated settlement to the ongoing  political conflict. Moving forward, we need to understand that the  military regime will refuse to have a dialogue with leaders of the UNFC  as a common body. By aiming to undermine the collective spirit and  cohesion of such common body, the regime will make every attempt to make  a peace deal with each member individually. But, this is the  responsibility for leaders of the ethnic armed groups to insist that no  peace negotiation will be pursued unless the military regime is prepared  to have a nation-wide ceasefire agreement.


For far too long, we have allowed the  military regime to dictate the terms and conditions of ceasefire  agreements in a way that serves its own interest of retaining power.  Realizing that we have the ball in our court at these ongoing talks, the  time has come for the KIO or the SSA or KNU, or any of these smaller  players, to set the ground conditions for negotiation and ceasefire  agreements. To review, such terms and conditions must include the  demands that: (a) no ceasefire agreement be entered into individually  unless the military regime is committed to a nation-wide ceasefire deal;  (b) no political dialogue for negotiation would take place unless the  military regime has appointed the ministerial level official as its  principal negotiator; (c) all the terms and conditions entered into  negotiation must be mutually agreeable and will be signed by both  parties in the presence of the international team of observers, either  ASEAN or China or India or other outside appropriate parties, witnessing  the agreement signed. If the regime refuses to agree to any of the  above-mentioned, leaderships of armed group should choose to continue  their armed battles.

Seizing the ongoing moment is a chance  to showcase their tenacity and commitment in undertaking their armed  struggle. In order to defend their territorial integrity and claim their  right of self-determination, leaders of the ethnic armed groups should  steadfastly choose to adhere to the core political objectives of their  decades-long armed struggle over the incentives of the social and  economic opportunities offered by the military regime. The phrase  “united we stand, divided we fall” has never been more relevant.





The author is the Commentary Editor at  Chinland Guardian. He holds a Master degree in Political Science from  the University of Toronto, Canada.

Credit : /chinlandguardian.com

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