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A Muslim man stands inside a mosque destroyed by a Buddhist mob in Thuye Thamain village in southern central Myanmar's Bago region, June 24, 2016. (Photo: AFP)

August 8, 2016

Myanmar’s central government is demolishing Buddhist and Islamic religious structures across the country that were built on state-owned land without permission from state or regional officials, director of the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs Myint Win Zaw said Thursday.

“Every religion in Myanmar has to follow rules and regulations,” he told RFA’s Myanmar Service. “We announced this in newspapers to let people know that every person and organization needs permission to build religious buildings.”

The government grants permission to build mosques, temples, and pagodas called stupas to people who obtain proper documents, including recommendations or agreements from the state or regional governments and local organizations and residents, he said.

“If there are religious buildings that were built without permission, we will remove them, and we will take action against those who constructed them if they don’t listen to us when we tell them to remove them,” Myint Win Zaw said.

The government is now removing 173 Buddhist monasteries in lower Myanmar’s Yangon region and 86 monasteries in other states and regions that were constructed without official permission, he said.

The central government’s actions come as authorities in northern Myanmar’s Kachin state arrested five local villagers who led a Buddhist mob that burned down a mosque on July 1 in Lebyin Village of Lone Khin Village Tract of Hpakant township.

Several days prior to the incident, township authorities told trustees of the mosque that they would have to demolish the structure because it had not been legally authorized for religious purposes, according to a report in the online journal The Irrawaddy.

The trustees removed three extensions to the mosque, but refused to demolish one part because it had been funded by private donations, the report said.

Authorities charged the trustees with violating the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law of 2012, but the mob burned down the structure before legal proceedings could begin, it said.

The five people responsible for the incident will be tried in court in Kachin state, Myint Win Zaw said.

Pagoda-building spree

Tensions between majority Buddhists and minority Muslims in various parts of the country flare up from time to time over the building of religious structures.

Buddhist monk Myaing Kyee Ngu, also known as U Thuzana, has been erecting stupas on the grounds of churches and mosques in eastern Myanmar’s Karen State since April in an act of defiance to supposedly reclaim ancient Buddhist lands.

Despite objections by religious authorities, Myaing Kyee Ngu and his supporters built several stupas on the grounds of St. Mark Anglican church in Kondawgyi village of Hlaingbwe township and elsewhere in the village.

In June, an angry mob of about 200 Buddhists destroyed parts of a mosque and a house belonging to a Muslim family following a disagreement between a Muslim man and a Buddhist over the building of a Muslim school in Thuye Thamain village in south-central Myanmar’s Bago region.

The Muslim man suffered head injuries during the attack, and 70 Muslim residents sought overnight shelter in a local police station.

Reported by Wai Mar Tun for RFA’s Myanmar Service. Translated by Khet Mar. Written in English by Roseanne Gerin.

Image credit: Noah Seelam/AFP | Rohingya children at a refugee camp in the Old City area of Hyderabad.

By Scroll.in
August 7, 2016

Denied citizenship and persecuted in their home country of Myanmar, the Muslim minority group has found some semblance of acceptance in cities like Hyderabad.

A diminutive concrete structure on Hyderabad’s rocky fringes is home to the only school for Rohingya refugees in India. Here, from 9 am to 4 pm everyday, 110 children seated on thin, striped rugs, solve simple maths problems and recite the alphabet in halting Hindi and English.

“Hindi class is my favourite,” Muhammad Yacin, a lanky 10-year old in a flowing kurta told me before he darted out to play. Outside, unfinished construction sites and a stretch of patchy grass double as a playground.

The school – set up by Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, the Centre’s programme to ensure universal elementary education, Save the Children Foundation and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in June – is so far from the thrum of city life that a Rohingya student can walk a kilometer without seeing an Indian, said Srinivas Reddy, the school’s in-charge. But it guarantees each student a set of clothes, three square meals a day – and for most here, their first-ever experience of formal schooling.



Living without a state

The Rohingya, whom the United Nations groups among the most persecuted minorities in the world, are an ethnic Muslim group from the Buddhist-majority Rakhine state in Myanmar. A majority of Hyderabad’s 3,500 Rohingya arrived in India between 2012 and 2013 by boat, foot and train, after a wave of sectarian violence between Buddhists and Rohingya engulfed Rakhine and drove 1,40,000 Rohingya from their homes. They have been a stateless people since 1982, when the Burmese Citizenship Act labelled the Rohingya illegal Bangladeshi migrants, effectively stripping them of citizenship in Myanmar.

Nearly every Rohingya on foreign land has one – or multiple – tales of a harrowing escape. Yet the11,000-odd Rohingya, thousands of Afghan Muslims and others seeking shelter in India from war and persecution – were conspicuously absent from a list of persecuted minorities whom the Cabinet last month offered a host of concessions.

According to the announcement, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians from Pakistan, Bangladesh or Afghanistan staying in India on long-term visas may now open bank accounts, purchase residential and commercial property, and apply for a driver’s license as well as PAN or Aadhaar card.

The Cabinet also relaxed citizenship registration fees to a uniform Rs 100 (from upwards of Rs 3,000) and empowered district collectors in 16 districts across seven states to grant citizenship.

This stands in stark contrast to the lengthy series of interviews that other refugees and asylum-seekers, like the Rohingya, go through to obtain refugee status, a UNHCR refugee card and a long-term visa. While most of the Rohingya in Hyderabad live peacefully, uncertainty haunts their rebooted lives.

“Like anyone without work, we go to the adda – a place where unorganised labourers go to look for odd jobs daily. If we find something, we’ll do it. If I’m a builder, I’ll do construction work,” 27-year-old Muhammad Zubair said in a crowded tarpaulin tent in Camp 1, a hovel of around 100 families in the Balapur area of Hyderabad's Old City. Zubair said he works for 10 to 12 days each month.

Most of Hyderabad’s Rohingya live in makeshift camps and small settlements on donated land scattered across the city’s outskirts. Sizable Rohingya refugee populations also live in Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir, and West Bengal.

The Rohingya school in Balapur aims to pull its students – most of whose parents work as rag-pickers, laborers, and factory-workers – out of this penury. Whatever the children's legal status, (all 110 students have UNHCR refugee cards, which can be renewed every two years), the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan, which funds the school, sees reason to proactively help.

“We aren’t interested in their background," said G Kishan, the state project director of the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan. "We have to provide the [Rohingya] with minimum basic rights, like education. Otherwise they can grow up to become anti-social elements. They can create any kind of issue tomorrow."

India’s opaque refugee policy

For decades, rights activists and academics have criticised India’s treatment of refugees for being influenced by political priorities. India is anot a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol – which govern how 144 nations address refugees. And while the country has a long history of accepting refugees from South Asia and beyond, it has never formalised them within a national legal framework.

This has meant that while vast numbers of Sri Lankan Tamil and Tibetans have benefitted from direct aid either by state or Central governments, other refugee groups, who have been in the country for years, like Afghans, Rohingya, Somalis, Iraqis and others, are left to the limited purview of the UNHCR. This division persists with little explanation.

In this arbitrary system, the UNHCR operates out of Delhi and in other cities via partner organisations to issue refugee cards to those to whom it grants refugee status. The card improves a refugee’s access to basic services like education and healthcare while providing some protection from detention and deportation, said Ipshita Sengupta of the UNHCR. It is also a launching point to apply for long-term visas.

In 2011, the UNHCR said there were more than 2,00,000 refugees and asylum seekers in India, most of whom are Sri Lankan Tamils and Tibetans. Others claim the number is higher. As of June 2016, only 36,500 refugees and asylum-seekers in the country were registered with the UNHCR.

Consonant with the BJP’s 2014 election manifesto that declared the country “a natural home for persecuted Hindus,” last week’s Cabinet move, first introduced in 2015 by the Ministry of Home Affairs, not only skirts the issue of inconsistency, it expands it by dividing refugees in India by religion.

"While India has accepted several refugees from countries in the region, it is important that it end the ad-hoc nature of its refugee policy and the uncertainty and arbitrariness in the treatment of asylum-seekers and refugees,” said Shailesh Rai, senior policy advisor at Amnesty International India to Scroll.in via email.

To Rohingya refugees like Zubair, India is somewhere to stay. He reached Hyderabad in 2013 after crossing the Naf River from Rakhine state into Bangladesh. There, he stayed in Cox’s Bazar, where 35,000 Rohingya live in squalid government-run camps, for two days before he left for the Indian border. Distant family that was already here told him that Hyderabad was friendly to the Rohingya.

“I became a refugee in India,” he said, pointing to his UNHCR card on the floor. “Here, we’re getting a ration, sometimes work and we have this card. Why would I leave?”

1990 Multi-Party Democracy General Elections And

The Rohingyas’ Enfranchisement 


Aman Ullah
RB Article
August 7, 2016

“The elections of 1990 are an important landmark in the modern history of Burma. After three decades... almost three decades...of military dictatorship, finally the people of Burma were going to be able to vote for a government of their choice. The elections of 1990 were free and fair. It was one of the freest and fairest that had taken place in this region at that time. But unfortunately, the results of the elections were not honoured”.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi 

1990 Multi-Party Democracy General Elections, contested by 93 political parties, was sponsored by the military junta on 27 May 1990 after it took over the power of state on 18 September 1988. The people of Burma voted overwhelmingly for a democratic Parliament. It was free and fair and affirmed as such by the Burmese people and the world.

The people exercised their right to freely choose candidates to represent them in a Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Parliament)in keeping with the democratic principles that “sovereign power lies with the people which is transferred by way of elections “.

In accordance with Article 2 (a) of the Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law (State Law and Order Restoration Council, Law No.14/89 of 31 May 1989), the elections held on 27 May 1990, is for the Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Parliament) and not for a Constituent Assembly.

The Article 21 (3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that, “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures”. The will of the Burmese people has been obviously expressed in the May 1990 elections in Burma.

In this election, among the 492 constituencies election was held in 485 constituencies where more than two thousand candidates participated. There were 20,818,313 eligible voters in 485 constituencies and 15, 112,524 votes casted where 13,253,606 votes were valid.

In this election the Rohingyas were not only allowed to vote but also, in their exercise of franchise, elected four Rohingya members of Parliament. U Chit Lwin (a) Ebrahim, Mr. Fazal Ahmed, U Kyaw Min (a) Shomshul Anwarul Haque, and U Tin Maung (a) Nur Ahmed have been elected as members of the Parliament.

National League for Democracy fielded 447 candidates. Of them, 392 got elected. There were altogether 485 constituencies. Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) won 23 seats. Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) won eleven. National Unity Party (NUP) won ten. Mon National Democratic Front (MNDF) won five and National Democratic Party for Human Rights won 4 seats. 

In Arakan State NLD won in 9 seats; Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) won 11 seats; National Democratic Party for Human Rights (NDPHR) won 4, Kamans National League for Democracy and Mro or Khami National Solidarity Organization won 1 seat each. The total votes for NLD winners were 1,77, 999; the total votes for ALD and othe Rakhine Parties were 1,97,536; the total votes for NDPHR and other Rohingya parties including Kamans one were 2,05,367, and The Mro get 28,500 votes.

The candidates who won in 1990 election from the National Democratic Party for Human Rights (NDPHR) are as follows : -

1. U Kyaw Min

U Kyaw Min (aka) Shamsul Anowarul Hoque was elected from Buthidaung (1) Constituency with 30,997 valid votes from 41,668 valid votes, where 58, 449 eligible voters and 46, 065 voters were casted in the 1990 elections. The SLORC banned the NDPHR under order No. 8/92 on 18 March 1992, and at the time U Kyaw Min was a member of the party’s Central Executive Committee.

U Kyaw Min, son of Fazar Rahman, was born in the village "Mikyanzay" under Buthidaung Township in Arakan State of Burma in 1944. He was graduated from the Rangoon Institute of Economics in 1968 with a Bachelor of Economics degree and in 1983; he received a Diploma in Education from the Institute of Education Rangoon.

He joined to the Education Department of Burma in 1969 and served there as a Senior Assistant Teacher (SAT) up to 1985 in various state schools in Arakan. He was promoted to Headmaster of State Middle School in TanBazaar, Buthidaung, in 1985. However, he was dismissed from his post in 1989 due to his involvement in the August 1988 uprising. 

He joined the Committee Representing the People's Parliament (CRPP) in 1998 at the invitation of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to represent the Rohingya ethnic minority. The National Unity Party (UNP) also invited him to join NUP to support military backed national convention after resigning from CRPP. But he did not agree and this has caused serious wrath of the military rulers and the ultimate consequence was the handing of 47 years imprisonment. 

In 1992, he was put in detention for 3 months in the custody of the military intelligence during operation Pye Thaya. In 1994, then the military intelligence again put him in detention for 45 days. Finally, in March 2005, he was arrested from his residence in Rangoon and was charged under Section 18 Citizenship Law 1982 and section 5(j) Anti State Emergency Law. He has been sentenced to 47 years imprisonment and at the same time his wife Daw Tiza, his two daughters Kin Kin Nu and Way Way Nu and his son Maung Aung Naing have also been sentenced to 17 years imprisonment respectively. 

2. U Tin Maung (aka) Nur Ahmed

U Tin Maung (aka) Nur Ahmed was elected from Buthidaung (2) Constituency with 20,045 valid votes from 40,143 valid votes, where 55,095 eligible voters and 46,037 voters were casted in the 1990 elections. U Tin Maung was the Chairman of the NDPHR when the SLORC banned the party in 1992.

U Ting Maung, son of U Saiful Mulluk , was born in 1928 in Phone Nyo Lake village of Buthidaung. His early education was at Buthidaung State High School. After matriculation he attended to the two years Health Assistant Training Course in Insein, Rangoon from 1954-1956. After the training he joined to the department Anti-Malaria Unit in Buthidaung as Unit Head. Later he served as a Health Assistance Officer in Buthidaung and Sandoway Township till 1968. Then he abandoned his job and joined to the Rohinya Independent Force (RIF) as a full time member but back to Buthidaung 1n 1978. 

3. U Chit Lwin (aka) Ibrahim

U Chit Lwin (aka) Ibbrahim was elected from Maungdaw (1) Constituency with 20,045 valid votes from 64,019 valid votes; where 87,174 eligible voters and 73,633 voters were casted in the 1990 elections. U Chit Lwin was Vice-Chairman of the NDPHR when the SLORC banned the party in 1992.

U Chit Lwin, son of Master Siddique Ahmed, was born in 1946 in Myuthugyi village of Maungdaw. His early education was at State High School Maungdaw. He was graduated with a Bachelor of Commerce degree from the Rangoon Institute of Economic, in 1967. He also received a Post-Graduate Diploma of Economic Planning in 1977 from the Institute of Economics in Rangoon. Later he pursued Register of Account and Register of Law (RL) also. He is a certified accountant and auditor also.

He joined t the Ministry of Planning and Finance and served there from 1967-1983. Since 1984, he practices law as an advocate at the High Court.

4. U Fazal Ahmed 

U Fazal Ahmed was elected from Maungdaw (2) Constituency with 24,881 valid votes from 58,230 valid votes; where 84,166 eligible voters and 58,230 voters were casted in the 1990 elections. . He was a Central Executive Committee member of the NDPHR when the SLORC banned the party in 1992.

U Fazal Ahmed, son of U Mohammed Kalu, was born in 1941 in Basuba village of Maungdaw. His early education was at State High School Maungdaw. After finishing his High School education, in 1960, he joined to Deputy Commissioner’s Office in Maungdaw as a clerk and he served in various offices in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Kyauk Taw, Kaukpyu, Taungup, and Sittwe in Arakan State. Later he passed the higher grade pleader (HGP) examination and he started working as a private lawyer.

KAMANS NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (KNLD)

U Shwe Ya

U Shwe Ya was elected from Akyab / Sittway (1) Constituency with 9,821 valid votes from 30,332 valid votes; where 49,899 eligible voters and 36,441 voters were casted in the 1990 elections. The SLORC banned the KNLD on 11 March 1992. Following the 1990 election, the ALD candidate for Sittwe 1, U Maung Thazan, accused U Shwe Ya of cheating in the election. The Election Commission subsequently launched an investigation into the matter but the case was dismissed.

U Shwe Ya, son of U Shwe Maung, was born in Akyab town in 1955. He is a Kaman Muslim. His early Education was at State High School Kyaukpyu. After Matriculation he joined in the General Administrative Department in Myebon , Arakan State, in 1974. Later he pursued his L.L.B degree as a correspondent student from Rangoon Art and Science University. After obtaining his LLB degree he joined to the court as a lawyer. 

The elections of 1990 were free and fair. It was one of the freest and fairest that had taken place in this region at that time. But unfortunately, the results of the elections were not honoured. The people exercised their right to freely choose candidates to represent them in a Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Parliament)in keeping with the democratic principles that “sovereign power lies with the people which is transferred by way of elections“.

The Rohingyas were not only permitted to vote but also to form their own political parties during the May 1990 election. Two parties were formed the Students and Youth League for Mayu Development and the National Democratic and Human Rights (NDPHR).The NDPHR won all four seats in Maung Daw and Buthidaung constituencies, and in each constituency votes for the two parties counted for 80 per cent of the total votes cast. Moreover, the turnout in both constituencies equaled the national average, at 70 per cent of eligible voters. The NDPHR also fielded candidates in four other constituencies; Kyuk Taw-1, Minbya-1, Mrauk U -2 and Sittwe -2, and they gained an average of 17 per cent of the votes while the Government- backed National Unity Party got only 13 per cent. 

Although the name of Rohingya was not permitted to use in the party title, the NDPHR was allowed to produce a booklet in Burmese called ‘Arakan and the Rohingya people: a short History’ on August 31, 1991. According to the NDPHR sources, the permission to print this booklet was rescinded two months later. 

This election was held under the Constitution of 1974 and according 1982 Citizenship Law. Under the1989 election law ‘all citizens, associate citizens and naturalized citizens are permitted to vote, but only the citizens are allowed to stand for election. No foreign residents were allowed to vote.’ Thus, allowing taking part in the national elections was clearly indicated that these people were eligible voters and full citizens. In other words we can say that the then government clearly recognized these Rohingyas as citizens till 1990 in accordance with the Constitution of 1974 and 1982 Citizenship Law. 

Sixty-two migrants from Myanmar wait at a house in Padang Besar, Thailand, to be taken into police custody, Aug. 2, 2016. (Photo: Benar News)

August 5, 2016

Thai authorities said they plan to charge and deport 62 undocumented migrants from Myanmar, including five Rohingya Muslims, who were arrested after human smugglers left them in a house near Thailand’s southern border with Malaysia.

The 62 were waiting to cross into Malaysia illegally but were taken into Thai custody Tuesday after being found at a townhouse in Padang Besar, a subdistrict of Songkhla province, officials said.

Padang Besar is the same area where dozens of graves of trafficked Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrants were found in the jungle in May 2015. That discovery precipitated a Thai crackdown on human smuggling that contributed to a regional migration crisis.

Meanwhile, some 139 graves of other victims of human-smuggling were discovered on the other side of the border in northern Malaysia’s Perlis state.

At around that time, thousands of Rohingyas and Bangladeshis came ashore in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia after being abandoned in smugglers’ boats adrift in the Andaman Sea and Strait of Malacca.

“The 62 immigrants have been detained and questioned at Padang Besar police station. The police have been interrogating them, and will press charges of illegal entry. They intend to deport them to where they came from,” Lt. Col. Prapan Areebambud, deputy chief of the police station in Padang Besar, told Benar News on Thursday.

Police were notified about the group of undocumented foreigners by a woman from Myanmar who was being kept in the same house but managed to sneak out, according to the superintendent of the Thai police anti-human trafficking branch in Songkhla.

“We interrogated a Myanmar woman who escaped from the house to seek help from authorities. She said Thai and Malaysian brokers brought them from border checkpoints in Mae Sod district, in Tak province, and the border in Ranong province, and they each paid them 200,000 kyats (U.S. $168.50),” said the superintendent, Police Col. Narong Tedwiboon, referring to Thai provinces along the border with Myanmar.

“They were kept there for five days, waiting for the next brokers to take them into Malaysia, but no one came. They were afraid that they were cheated, so she sneaked out to seek help from authorities,” Narong told BenarNews.

‘Way too small’

Malaysia, a predominantly Muslim and relatively prosperous country, has been a prime destination in Southeast Asia for Rohingyas, with southern Thailand serving as an overland transit route for many.

Rohingyas belong to a stateless minority in Buddhist-dominated Myanmar whose members have been fleeing ethnic and religious persecution in Rakhine state, in search of better employment and educational prospects abroad.

Last year’s crackdown on human-smuggling in Thailand resulted in arrests warrants being issued for 153 suspected members of a transnational ring linked to the jungle graves in Padang Besar. Ninety-two of the suspects, including an army general, police officers, and some local officials, are standing trial in Bangkok on human-trafficking charges.

Nu Muhammad, a Rohingya expat who has lived in Thailand for more than 10 years, said human-smuggling into the country from Myanmar will go on on because operators at the ground level have not been caught, he said.

“The traffickers are using land routes because they can no longer go by sea,” he told BenarNews.

A trafficker in Padang Besar, who declined to reveal her real name, indicated that many more people were being trafficked through the area on their way to Malaysia.

“The arrest of 62 is way too small. To traffic [such] a small number is not worth the economy of scale,” she said, adding that human trafficking in the area was bouncing back after a lull that followed last year’s crackdown.



By The Editor
RB Opinion
August 4, 2016

When asked to seek the truth behind the current arrests concerning an alleged meeting between a Saudi National, a Bangladeshi MP and the "RSO leader", my immediate thought was; the truth is hard to come by. My next thought was of the possible implications that renewed talks of RSO activity can have on Myanmar's troubled Rakhine (Arakan) state. 

Let's just touch on the RSO for a minute. The RSO stands for the Rohingya Solidarity Organization and is a group regarded as a terrorist organisation on both sides of the Bangladesh/Myanmar border. In 1982 the RSO was said to have emerged as a sort of military wing from local groups fighting for Rohingya citizenship. The reality is, other than some old allegations of attacks against Myanmar defence posts, group at the height of its activity was not that serious of threat of terrorism. After the early 2000's, Myanmar political parties began exchanging information with the USA as there were rumours of the RSO being in contact with Al-Qaeda. At which time operations went into action and the scattered militants were largely believed to have been disarmed/arrested in Rakhine state and there hasn't been any real evidence of militant training or arms caches in the name of the RSO in Myanmar since then. So, why should the RSO name be popping up now? Probably because it's convenient for governments on both sides of the border. Here's some things that you should consider: 

In Myanmar, one of the most effective arsenals of anti-Muslim hate groups such as the notorious 969 have been stoking fears of terrorism and Islamic militants in Rakhine state for many years. After the Rohingya lost their citizenship, local fears of the RSO as a militant group was no doubt part of the justification of what started the crackdown on the Rohingya's right of movement. This of course eventually escalated to the massive Rohingya IDP crisis currently in Rakhine state. The RSO still a sensitive subject in Rakhine state, so much that the Rohingya community shuddered at the recent news coming out of Cox's Bazar. 

In Bangladesh, the country is seeing an unprecedented amount of attacks being claimed by militant groups over the past year. The ruling Government has come under international pressure to address what is being portrayed in the media as a rise of Islamic terrorism in the country. Bangladesh is has a population of around 160 million people and over 80% of them Muslim and led by a secular government. The Political situation is not good here and deteriorating. The Awami League, are notorious for calling for the arrest of BNP opposition members and leaders. They have recently been executing leaders of the main Islamic Political Party the Jamaat - e - Islami (conviction of war crimes during the War against Pakistan that claimed Bangladesh’s independence. The JI fought against independence with Pakistan at the time.) The government ever fearful of renewed ideas of Islamic party coalitions seek to discredit Islamic political parties as terrorist threats. Keep in mind, both the JI and BNP have proven more sympathetic to the Rohingya refugee crisis in Cox’s Bazar. During Ramadan, Bangladesh government arrested well over 11’000 people in the name of investigating terrorism and targeted many members of Islamic Political Parties. 

Not long before all of this talk of terrorism, the main issue at the Myanmar/Bangladesh border wasn’t militants or even for refugee hopefuls attempting to gain entry into Bangladesh. The issue has been Drugs. Specifically, the trafficking of Yaba (methamphetamine) tablets from Myanmar into Bangladesh. Once in the country, drug dealers enlist from an unlimited supply of vulnerable undocumented Rohingya girls to sell the product in Cox’s Bazar. Arrested refugee females filling the local prisons and no laws written to protect them in the country.

The local and international NGO community have also been targeted in the long list of government led arrests. Several foreign nationals have been arrested on separate occasions in the weeks leading up to this alleged RSO related arrest. All parties and their local helpers were arrested in an attempt to distribute money or aid to unregistered Rohingya refugees in the Teknaf area. Over 200’000 undocumented Rohingya live in this area alone and as they are undocumented they cannot be registered for aid. Small foreign NGO’s who cannot acquire permission often attempt to bring some aid to these people, but as of late, any foreign NGO workers outside of those invited by Bangladesh’s Government controlled UNHCR are arrested while visiting the target areas.

So, what seems to have happened in Cox’s Bazar these Teknaf and alleged border arrests seemed to be a perfectly timed opportunity. An MP, notorious for being involved in the Yaba drug trade in the same general area as a foreign national visits a makeshift refugee area near Myanmar’s border with a man dubbed as a terrorist because of ties with an Islamic political party with the intention of distributing unapproved aid. The MP says he was in Inani (that’s a good hour’s drive from Teknaf, when he said he heard of the arrest) when decided to visit to inquire about the situation. Meanwhile, the BGB are reporting of arrests at the border and that they are investigating the connection between the three incidences as a possible meeting or operation for terrorism. 

The product of this is that the Bangladesh government gets a few more opposition members and a (rumoured to be corrupt, but most likely peaceful local people) attempting to help a foreign national offer some relief to some poor people. Any connection between the MP and the arrested men at the border is most likely drug deal related. That’s if the arrest there actually happened. Local news between border guards on both sides of the border shows sharp contrast. Frequent announcements on the Bangladesh side of repatriating small pockets of refugees, in an effort to taunt the Registered Refugee community at pick at the wounds of the history of forced repatriation by the hands of the BNP who were the ruling government at the time. The next week the Myanmar side will reply to the allegation and deny the occurrence taking place. We may never get full details or concrete proof this border arrest indeed happened.

Having a man listed to be RSO in these arrests further strengthens the government’s argument for their harsh stance against unapproved aid serving the Rohingya community while at the same time sparks rumours in Myanmar and generating a fear that often leads to tense situations in Rakhine resulting in further Mobility crackdown on the Rohingya. It leaves the Rohingya on both sides of the border vulnerable to random searches from authorities in the name of investigating terrorism. These searches, like most things in these affected areas are corrupt. It gives the lower level police an additional means to extort the Rohingya for money.

That’s pretty much my take on it. I can’t offer you the truth about the men involved. As I said, at this point the truth is hard to come by. Will hope that more information surfaces through investigation of the foreign national. The main thing is not to panic and the RSO are most likley not a threat to anyone, other than the problems that a story about their existence can create for the Rohingya of Arakan.

Written by RB Editor based in Bangladesh.

Myanmar's Aung San Suu Kyi (C) is escorted by bodyguards during a visit to Myitkyina, capital of northern Myanmar's Kachin state, Feb. 24, 2012. (Photo: AFP)


August 3, 2016

The Myanmar government is arranging more security for State Counselor and Foreign Affairs Minister Aung San Suu Kyi after her name appeared on a hit list sent by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) militant group to police in Malaysia, a government spokesman said Wednesday.

Her name was listed along with those of Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, the attorney general, inspector general of police, and three ministers. The list was sent on Monday to a police station in the town of Nilai in the Seremban district of Sembilan state on the western coast of peninsular Malaysia, according to Malaysian media reports.

“After hearing the threat information, we have to be very careful and work on checking, investigating, and preparing [additional] security,” said Zaw Htay, spokesman of the President’s Office.

“We don’t need to worry too much, but we also can’t underestimate it,” he said.

Malaysian police are trying to identify the sender, while forensics experts are examining the letter, which also claimed that there could be more than 700 ISIS members in Negeri Sembilan. Police received a similar letter two months ago, but did not provide any details, the reports said.

About 61 percent of Malaysia’s population of more than 30 million people are Muslim.

The Myanmar government provides its state VIPs with four types of security in the form of bodyguards, close protection, executive protection, and escorts, Zaw Htay said.

The country’s security officials have already studied the operational methods of ISIS terrorists, and they remain concerned about the possible penetration of ISIS terrorist attacks in Myanmar, he said.

“Although they [ISIS militants] are based in Iraq and Syria, they usually carry out attacks with home- grown networks of terrorist cells,” he said. “We have to check for home-grown terrorist cells very carefully.”

Even though it is difficult for terrorist organizations to take root in Myanmar, security officials are not underestimating ISIS, he said.

“It is especially important for young people not to be persuaded to serve in terrorist organizations,” he said. “Religious leaders, people, and government are responsible for seeing to it.”

Earlier death threat

Aung San Suu Kyi’s security detail was beefed up in February after a man posted a death threat on Facebook, alluding to her presidential ambitions after her National League of Democracy (NLD) party won national elections in November 2015.

The man named Ye Lwin Myint threatened to shoot anyone who attempted to change a clause in the constitution that bars Aung San Suu Kyi from the nation’s top office because her two sons are foreign nationals, as was her late husband, Agence France-Presse reported.

She is nevertheless viewed as Myanmar’s de facto leader under the administration of her close friend and aide President Htin Kyaw.

ISIS, which controls areas of war-town Iraq and Syria, routinely makes threats against national leaders of other countries who are “non-believers” of Islam or who govern areas where Muslims are said to be suppressed.

Myanmar’s Muslim minority group is often on the receiving end of hate speech and other forms of persecution in the predominantly Buddhist country.

About 120,000 Rohingya Muslims currently live in displaced persons camps in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state following communal violence between them and Buddhists in 2012. Thousands of others have fled persecution on rickety boats headed to other Southeast Asian countries in recent years.

The government does not consider the Rohingya to be full citizens of Myanmar and denies them basic rights, freedom of movement, and access to social services and education.

Reported by Kyaw Thu for RFA’s Myanmar Service. Translated by Khet Mar. Written in English by Roseanne Gerin.



August 3, 2016

Foreign Minister AH Mahmood Ali has stressed “voluntary repatriation” of Myanmar refugees back to their homes in the Rakhine State.

This is the “durable solution” to the protracted refugee situation in Bangladesh, he told the newly appointed Country Representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Shinji Kubo.

Kubo met him on Wednesday to present his credentials, the foreign ministry said.

Mahmood Ali told him the senior official that his government highly appreciated the UNHCR’s continued support to Myanmar refugees living in Bangladesh.

“The foreign minister alluded to the positive momentum generated by the recent change in the leadership of Myanmar,” the ministry said in a statement.


He also mentioned the visit of the foreign secretary to Myanmar as a goodwill envoy.

The country representative acknowledged efforts of the government in dealing with a large number of refugees.

Kubo promised that the UNHCR would continue to work with the government of Bangladesh to find a durable solution to the refugee issue.

Bangladesh gives shelter to thousands of Myanmar refugees who have fled sectarian violence in the Rakhine State. 

However, Myanmar authorities are denying them citizenship.




By Andray Abrahamian
August 3, 2016

All it took was Yangon Chief Minister Phyo Min Thein saying 'We don’t need Ma Ba Tha' at a meeting in Singapore, and three weeks later 'the face of Buddhist terror' appeared meek and terrified itself.

Ma Ba Tha, the abbreviation of what in English is the Patriotic Association of Myanmar, is a Buddhist nationalist organisation that thrust itself into political prominence two years ago. At the time, Myanmar’s more open atmosphere allowed Ma Ba Tha to gain traction with a divisive, anti-Muslim platform that once would have been stamped out by censors and police personnel. It held stadium-sized rallies with the blessing of the government of the day, organised protests, and pushed laws 'defending race and religion' through parliament.

The organisation has contributed to a climate of fear for Myanmar’s Muslims, who have seen violence and property damage directed against them in recent years. Ma Ba Tha’s seemingly unstoppable momentum had Myanmar’s politicians cowering before them. Until it didn’t. 

It unravelled rapidly. Chief Minister Phyo Min Thein arrived back Yangon Airport from Singapore on 6 July and was greeted by a small protest, calling for him to take back what he’d said. Instead, he doubled down. His comments went viral on social media, with users changing their profile photos and sharing quotes in opposition to Ma Ba Tha.

Ma Ba Tha leaders called for the government to punish Phyo Min Thein and threatened a nationwide campaign against him. An escalation of the conflict seemed likely: in the past Ma Ba Tha’s leaders have shown a great capacity for mobilising supporters, usually small in numbers, but vociferous and sometimes violent. This time though the authorities also moved quickly. A spokesperson for the National League for Democracy (NLD), said the party would not take Ma Ba Tha 's demands on the matter seriously. The NLD is Aung Sang Su Kyi’s party and leads the government.

The Chief Minister’s remarks were in the context of the state already having an oversight committee for the state religion. The Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee is a clerical council appointed by the government to oversee Buddhist religious life. Within a week, and likely in coordination with the NLD, the Sangha declared that it did not recognise Ma Ba Tha in the official Buddhist order, greatly delegitimising it. The committee’s statement was strong: 'Ma Ba Tha is not a Buddhist organisation that was formed in accordance with the basic Sangha rules, regulations and directives of the State Sangha authority'. The Sangha did not call for Ma Ba Tha's dissolution, however.

Ma Ba Tha’s most prominent monk, Wirathu, lashed out with insults regarding the government and Aung San Su Kyi, calling her a dictatorial woman, but the protests Ma Ba Tha promised have failed to materialise.

Meanwhile, Myanmar’s Minister of Culture and Religion, Aung Ko, told reporters that the government plans to ask the Sangha Committee to deal with cases of hate speech. Aung Ko specifically stated Wirathu could be charged if someone were to complain about hate speech to the Council, in what appeared to be an appeal for civil society groups to join a widening coalition against the nationalist movement. The same week a charity group filed a defamation lawsuit.

The NLD-led government has been wary of provoking Ma Ba Tha, given its ties to powerful people in the previous government, and its capacity for stirring up trouble. The government wanted Ma Ba Tha’s influence diminished, but also felt it could not be too hostile towards the sentiments underlying that influence. Aung San Suu Kyi’s party and government have been particularly unwilling to challenge nationalists on the issue of the Rohingya, Muslim Indo-Aryans from the Rakhine State recognised by the UN as one of the most persecuted minorities in the world. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested the US embassy in Yangon refrain from using the term 'Rohingya' on the heels of protests in Yangon over the Embassy’s use of the term. The international community views Aung San Su Kyi's capitulation on the Rohingya issue as a major black mark on her record.

Now though the government has found an aligned position with the Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, and been empowered by the social media response to Phyo Min Thein’s stand. Is this the end of Ma Ba Tha as a political force? 

Probably. The NLD was long-worried its conflict with Ma Ba Tha might escalate beyond its control. The time for Ma Ba Tha to push back hard against the government seems to have passed, however. In failing to escalate immediately, it has allowed the government to coordinate legal and political challenges with the Sangha’s moral and religious repudiation.

Furthermore, census results on religion were released late last month. This was after two years of delay due to the sensitivity of the information. They showed that the Muslim population has not risen significantly over the last 30 years, diminishing a pillar of Ma Ba Tha’s fearmongering on the Islamic penetration of Myanmar.

Of course, facts and figures are rarely the most motivating influences on a democratic polity. The underlying issues and sentiments that made Ma Ba Tha relevant remain. These will be far more difficult for the government to stamp out and a successor movement may yet arise. Hopefully the government has bought itself some time to demonstrate successes in the peace process and economic development before it does. A strategy for empowering more inclusive civil society organisations will also be needed. 

Photo by Lauren DeCicca/Getty Images


Nationalist Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu speaks during a rally in Myanmar. "Human rights activists claim that Wirathu and his group, called 969, are the main forces behind riots that have killed scores and displaced thousands of Rohingya (a million strong ethnic Muslim minority living among more than 50 million Buddhists) since 2012," writes Faisal Kutty. (KHIN MAUNG WIN / AP FILE PHOTO)


By Faisal Kutty
August 1, 2016

Hate movement led by Buddhist Monk Wirathu has significant support in Burma and the acquiescence of the government.

“They are trying to transform Myanmar into a Muslim state,” says Ashin Wirathu, a Buddhist monk dubbed by Time as the “The Face of Buddhist Terror.” Human rights activists claim Wirathu and his group, called 969, are the main forces behind riots that have killed scores and displaced thousands of Rohingya (a million strong ethnic Muslim minority living among more than 50 million Buddhists) since 2012.

Disturbingly, evidence suggests his hate movement has significant support in the country and even the acquiescence of the government. In fact, decades before Wirathu, described by some as the “Buddhist Bin Laden,” came on the scene, various state policies existed singling out the Rohingya.

The Canadian government may be finally forced to take a serious look.

A few weeks ago, a Parliamentary Subcommittee on International Human Rights issued a report titled “Sentenced to a Slow Demise” highlighting the plight of these stateless persons. Among the 12 recommendations are: Reassess the effectiveness of economic sanctions against the military, demand that authorities repeal discriminatory laws, restore full citizenship and rights to the minority, and calling on the government to end its complacency and allow humanitarian groups access.

Global and Canadian reaction appears to be too little, but hopefully not too late. Some attribute the hesitation on disbelief about the religious identity of the perpetrators. “In the reckoning of religious extremism — Hindu nationalists, Muslim militants, fundamentalist Christians, ultra-Orthodox Jews — Buddhism has largely escaped trial,” notes Time. But as the cover story went on to state, “Every religion can be twisted into a destructive force poisoned by ideas that are antithetical to its foundations. Now it’s Buddhism’s turn.”

As with most violence attributed to religious causes, the nuances of political and social influences are mostly minimized. In any event, whatever the impetus, their victims are real.

Earlier this month, the European Parliament became the latest international body to highlight what it termed as the “brutal repression” and “systematic persecution” of this group. The Resolution also noted that the Rohingya are “one of the world’s most persecuted minorities.” The U.S. State Department also downgraded Burma to Tier 3 (lowest) on its annual Trafficking in Persons report.

In a 2015 report, the International State Crime Initiative at the University of London alleged the Rohingya were facing the final stages of state-sponsored genocide. While most shy away from the term genocide, rights groups, include Human Rights Watch, and the United Nations have suggested the pogroms may amount to ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

While debate rages about whether they are indigenous or migrants from Bangladesh, the undisputed fact is that they have lived in Burma for hundreds of years. Indeed, a British survey confirmed a population of 58,255 in just the state of Arakan (now Rakhine) dating back to 1891.

Repressive government initiatives (forced labour, sexual assault, two child policy, etc.) and hate from fellow countrymen have had serious consequences. 

An Association of Southeast Asian Nations-linked human rights group noted in 2015, “The long-standing persecution of Rohingya has led to the highest outflow of asylum seekers by sea [in the region] since the U.S. war in Vietnam.” 

Meanwhile, Matthew Smith, executive director of human rights group Fortify Rights, says 150,000 live in internal displacement camps, while 500,000 asylum seekers live in squalor in Bangladesh, with little to no help from the already strapped Dhaka government.

As if to assist the efforts of Wirathu and those of his ilk to single out victims, Burma banned its officials from using the name “Rohingya,” insisting that they be called “people who believe in Islam.”

Months after democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi won the country’s first national elections, calls to end the mistreatment of the Rohingya fall on deaf ears. In fact, the Nobel Laureate herself refuses to use the name “Rohingya.” More disturbingly, her own prejudices were revealed when, after a heated interview with BBC reporter, Mishal Husain, she was reportedly heard angrily saying, “No one told me I was going to be interviewed by a Muslim.”

Burma should be about more than democratization, it should also be about ensuring protection, fairness, and justice for all its people. It’s high time for donors to leverage their aid, and for the broader global community to pressure the Suu Kyi government to end repression. 

The subcommittee report calls on our government to submit a formal response within 120 days. Ottawa must do better and demand that Burma respect international law end its complicity and punish those responsible.

Faisal Kutty is counsel to KSM Law, an associate professor at Valparaiso University Law School in Indiana and an adjunct professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. @faisalkutty.



The scene outside the Tamwe township courthouse on August 1, 2016. Photo: Aung Naing Soe / Coconuts Yangon

August 1, 2016

A traveling Sufi Muslim speaker from Pakistan and his son were convicted of immigration offenses on Monday and deported after giving sermons at mosques in Yangon. 

Authorities say that Zulfiqar Ahmad, 63, breached tourist visa rules by giving religious sermons. His son, Saifullah Ahmad, 29, is traveling with him. 

Here's what happened, according to police. 

Local authorities detained the two at around 3am on July 30 from their rooms at the Chatrium Hotel. 

“They were detained at Dagon Township police station but we didn’t use handcuffs when we took them from place to place,” a police officer said in an interview. “And they will be sent back to their place [country] today by the Immigration Department from Tamwe Township.” 

According to his Facebook account, Shaykh Zulfiqar Ahmad is a former engineer and a leading Sufi author and traveling speaker. 

“He regularly travels to more than thirty countries transforming the lives of people all over the world,” his Facebook page says. “Shaykh Zulfiqar Ahmad regularly delivers lectures in both English and Urdu across the world. Furthermore, he has written dozens of books many of which have been translated into several languages.” 

One of the books, available on Amazon, speaks of solutions to solving terrorism. 

U Tin Maung Than, a Muslim community leader in Yangon, said that the father was well-known in Sufi circles, and that permission wasn’t needed to allow him to speak. 

“He is not giving speeches on the road, he just gave them in the mosque. So, we don’t need to ask permission from authorities as he was giving religious speeches.” 

Working on a tourist visa is not permitted in Myanmar, but it's unclear if religious activities constitute work. 

Myanmar has a religious visa but it is for "meditation," meaning for those wishing to practice Buddhism, the main religion in the country. 

Attempts to interview an immigration official at the Tamwe township courthouse where the hearing for the two took place on Monday were unsuccessful. 

Tin Maung Than said that those who had listened to the speeches said they contained no content about extremism or terrorism. 

“He just talked purely about religion,” he said. 

A recording of the speeches was not available. 

The Tamwe courthouse was full of police and journalists and members of the media on Monday as the hearing took place. 

Asked if the pair would prefer a fine of about $100 or a year imprisonment, they chose the fine. 

Following the ruling the men were escorted to the airport by a caravan of police cars.

A man walks out from a destroyed mosque that was burnt down in recent violence at Thapyuchai village, outside of Thandwe, in the Rakhine state, October 3, 2013. (Soe Zeya Tun/Reuters)

By Susan Hayward and Matthew J. Walton 
July 31, 2016

How to Deal With Discrimination

Myanmar’s young government, led by the party of Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, has been beset in recent months by protests, violence at sacred sites, and confrontations between the state’s monastic council (the official body that regulates the Buddhist monkhood) and Buddhist nationalist groups.

Anti-Muslim violence and discrimination—and religious conflict more generally—persist in Myanmar and are understandably high atop the priority lists of many Western countries and international organizations. Yet the country’s continued fragility makes it all the more important for international involvement to be carefully calibrated. If outside actors come with a clear and nuanced assessment of Myanmar’s complex domestic politics, the country’s diverse communities can flourish and a primary driver of violent conflict will be erased. More importantly, success or failure will be an indicator of the broader prospects of religious pluralism at a time when religious discrimination and conflict are ascendant.

TRICKY TERMS

In late April, crowds of Burmese Buddhist protesters demonstrated outside the U.S. Embassy in Yangon. Organized by the Myanmar Nationalist Network with support and participation of monks from MaBaTha (a monk-led group whose name is an acronym for the Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion), protestors objected to U.S. Ambassador Scot Marciel’s use of the term “Rohingya” in reference to an ethnic minority Muslim population in Rakhine State. They demanded that the newly arrived ambassador be evicted from the country. The ambassador had used the term in discussing victims in of a ferry accident off the coast of Rakhine State, although it was later revealed that most of those who died were from the Kaman Muslim minority rather than Rohingya.

Many people in Myanmar reject the term “Rohingya” because they are worried that it provides political standing to a group largely seen to be “Bengali” foreign nationals and, thus, not part of Myanmar’s national community. People outside of Myanmar generally recognize that many Rohingya have lived in the country for generations and that they deserve to have their basic rights (including the right to self-identify) recognized. Aung San Suu Kyi’s recent calls for people to use less “emotive” identity terms in the dispute, and to find alternatives to both “Rohingya” and “Bengali,” have also been rejected by some protesters.

In more recent violence in late June, a mob of two hundred Buddhists destroyed a mosque in Bago in central Myanmar. A week later, a similar mob razed a Muslim prayer hall in Kachin State. Both incidents echoed violence targeting Muslim communities that has plagued Myanmar’s transition since 2012, and seemed to be sparked by arguments over the construction of new Muslim buildings. Most recently, Yangon Chief Minister U Phyo Min Thein sparked an angry backlash by MaBaTha and its supporters when he called the organization unnecessary and redundant of the Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, the official state-sponsored body of senior monks. Several days later, a statement from the Sangha Maha Nayaka was leaked online clarifying that MaBaTha was not formed in accordance with official protocols and thus was not an officially sanctioned Buddhist organization. Meanwhile, several online civil society groups voiced their support for U Phyo Min Thein. A charity group filed a defamation suit against prominent MaBaTha monk U Wirathu. In response, MaBaTha did cancel antigovernment protests, but U Wirathu called Aung San Suu Kyi a “dictator.”

These developments indicate a willingness on the part of the new government (and civil society) to confront the group, which is particularly welcome given the permissive environment that the previous government had created for anti-Muslim prejudice and violence. But these events should not be interpreted as an eradication of the sentiments that led to the group’s rise—namely, widespread views of Muslims in and outside of the country as a threat to Buddhism in Myanmar and the need to defend the prominent place of Buddhism in the state in the midst of its dramatic reform process. The new government’s other recent efforts to reduce religious violence are also a welcome development, although it will still need encouragement (and possibly pressure) to include the brave civil society groups that have been doing the heavy lifting on preventing religious conflict over the past few years. Moreover, history has shown that outlawing religious or nationalist groups such as these only entrenches and inflames them, so both the government and the Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee should carefully calibrate their responses to target violent, discriminatory, or exclusionary rhetoric and actions, rather than particular groups or individuals.

Although anti-Muslim and anti-Rohingya sentiments have received the most global media attention in recent years, many groups in Myanmar have experienced religious discrimination and persecution, and they seem to resent the neglect of their own issues. Rights groups continue to document arrests, detentions, torture, cross burnings, and refusals of permission for Christians to preach or hold church services. Alleged perpetrators have included local officials and military officers.

That these reports continue reflects the Burmese military’s sense of impunity in the border regions and the precarious position of non-Buddhist ethnic leaders. They are also reminders of the vast gulf between life in urban spaces and the experiences of people living in rural regions.

The United States and other international supporters also must understand the diversity within Buddhism itself in Myanmar and within each of the country’s religious communities. Understanding the complexity of Buddhism in Myanmar, particularly as it relates to political issues, requires greater care in categorizing Buddhist activists. Much of the international media coverage of religious conflict in Myanmar has demonized Buddhists en masse rather than targeting criticism at violent or hateful rhetoric and actions. Such rhetoric has spurred people in the country to close ranks in the face of perceived universal attacks on Buddhism. In many instances, international condemnation has more often played into the hands of groups such as MaBaTha by strengthening their argument that Buddhism is under attack.

PRODUCTIVE PRESSURE

When Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy won the November elections and subsequently took office, Suu Kyi asked the United States and other foreign supporters for space to allow her government to work on persistent religious and ethnic conflict and discrimination without exacerbating existing tensions. Admittedly, the new government has a seemingly endless list of priorities, including most especially the advance of the political dialogue process with ethnic armed groups to negotiate a peace deal, constitutional reform, and the continued democratic reform process. At the same time, patience does not require backing down from basic principles such as the overall commitment to religious freedom.

The new government will need regular pressure to ensure that religious freedom issues remain on the agenda but will sometimes need to be supported and empowered to put pressure on the military (and the ministries it controls) when necessary to advance human rights. Because Myanmar’s constitution gives the military power over key institutions such as the police and the General Administration Department (which controls the bureaucracy at almost every level), the government often does not have sufficient authority to act in areas related to security and policy implementation. And in the areas that it does control, the government will need to be encouraged to balance freedom of expression with restrictions on hate speech, so that the need to combat extremism does not justify a crackdown on civil liberties.

Myanmar’s leaders will also need to demonstrate to the world that they are sincerely seeking a resolution to the treatment and political status of the Rohingya, of course within a wider context of addressing the conditions in western Rakhine State, home to a multitude of ethnic and religious groups in addition to the Rohingya. Although measures to restore livelihoods and basic services ought to be prioritized, large-scale development projects should be delayed until critical questions regarding decentralization of power and resource-sharing are resolved. The raised economic stakes of projects such as deep-sea ports and special economic zones are likely to further exacerbate conflict. Trust-building and reintegration of communities will be a painstakingly slow—but absolutely necessary—part of the resolution, yet it needs to occur at the most local levels.

Another important role, given the West’s strong financial support for the peace process, would be to ensure that the ongoing political dialogue between the government and ethnic armed groups addresses issues of religious diversity and freedom. Participants in the dialogue must also be prepared to tackle sensitive and thorny questions related to the future relationship between religion and the state, including the role of the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs and the official status of Buddhism as described in the constitution. These issues will inevitably arise as the political dialogue proceeds, and have the potential to provoke nationalist sentiment. National reconciliation in Myanmar will have to occur on multiple fronts in the coming years.

One of the most basic strategies ought to be continued engagement with groups such as MaBaTha in creative and constructive ways. Under Derek Mitchell, who served as U.S. ambassador in Yangon from 2012 to 2016, U.S. Embassy staff made doing so a major component of their public outreach, a policy continued under the current ambassador. But others concerned about peace and human rights in and outside the country are also trying to better understand the concerns and motivations of such Buddhist organizations, even as these observers insist on respect for minority groups.

Finally, another small-scale but effective strategy has been to create opportunities for the people of Myanmar to gain international experience, usually in non-Buddhist majority countries, as a means to challenge some of the common misperceptions about foreign contexts and demonstrate models of peaceful, diverse democratic societies. One goal of this engagement needs to be strengthening and promoting alternative narratives that do not demonize Muslims or non-Buddhists and that remind people in Myanmar that peaceful interreligious coexistence has been the norm in their country, not the other way around. Monks and other respected figures will be important allies in this process.

Myanmar’s progress toward democracy and peace since 2012 has been undeniably remarkable, but its continued advancement will require committed and careful attention to these complicated issues of religious identity and practice. The U.S. and other foreign governments and organizations will need to navigate their roles carefully to prevent doing more harm than good.

Rohingya Exodus