Aman Ullah

RB Analysis

May 16, 2016

“The 1982 Burma Citizenship Law was not fair” Daw Aung San Suu Kyi

Daw Khin Saw Wai, a Pyithu Hluttaw representative from Rathedaung township, submitted a proposal on May 6 calling on the government to address the citizenship status of Muslims living mainly in Rakhine State whom she referred to as “Bengali”, but who self-identify as Rohingya. According to her, “Bengalis, who are not a national race of Myanmar and come from the Myanmar-Bangladesh area, have illegally entered the country and that causes unrests in the state.” The MP added that she thought it was time to re-start the citizenship scrutinizing process that has been on hiatus since the former government revoked temporary white-cards.

Daw Khin Saw Wai called it “sad” that, despite the enactment of the 1982 Citizenship Law, the citizenship issue has remained unaddressed.

“I firmly believe that we can identify who are fake or real [citizens] if we start inspection under the 1982 Citizenship Law. Otherwise, it allows all illegal residents to move in and out of the country without restriction,” she said.

What is 1982 Citizenship Law?

The Chairman of the Council of State, on 15 October 1982, promulgated a citizenship law as Pyithu Hluttaw law No. 4/1982, which was approved and passed by third session of the Third Pyithu Hluttaw after long six years deliberation within the top echelons of party and state as well as extensive consultations with officials and party leaders of all levels. As it was approved and passed in 1982, it was called “Burma Citizenship Law 1982”. It contains 8 Chapters and 76 sections recognizes three categories of citizens, namely citizen, associate citizen and naturalized citizen, Under that law, citizenships is decided based on prescriptions of laws, not on racial and religions.

In other words we can say that, under the 1982 Citizenship Law there are two types of citizenship: (1) Native Citizenship and (2) Legal Citizenship. 

(1) Native Citizens: Nationals such as Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Bamar, Mon, Rakhine, Shan & other ethnic groups who have been settled in the territory of Myanmar since 1823 and their descendants. No one can revoke their citizenship without a strong reason. A "Certificate of citizenship" is issued to them. 

(2) Legal Citizen: Citizens who are not nationals but qualify to become a Myanmar citizen according to the legal framework. The 3rd generation of residents who arrived before 1948 will be issued “Certificate of Citizenship” automatically even though they are not ‘nationals’. 

Within the legal citizenship category there are of two sub-types: 

(2.1) Associate Citizens: People who became Myanmar citizen according to the 1948 citizenship law. A “Certificate of Associate Citizenship” is issued for this category. 

(2.2) Naturalized Citizens: People who had been residing in Myanmar before independence (4th Jan, 1948) and their descendents who have strong supporting evidence and documents that they were eligible for citizenship under the 1948 citizenship law. A “Certificate of Naturalized Citizenship” is issued for this category. 

According to this law, only a person whose parents have had their naturalization of citizenship or a certificate of citizenship or a certificate of guest citizenship can be a citizen. So, apart from these criteria, no one can be a citizen. The 3rd generation of residents who do not have these qualifications cannot be a citizen either. 

Why 1982 Citizenship Law?

Arakan which already is one of the poorest provinces of the country became bad to worse after the military coup. The economical life of the people is intolerable and a large number of Arakanese peoples, Buddhists and Muslim a likes, migrated into Burma Proper such as Rangoon and parts of Lower Burma. When Ne Win Saw a large number of Muslims of Arakan scattered bout in Rangoon and Delta area he imposed a law in 1964, which restricted the movement of Muslims of Arakan especially prohibiting the movement out of Akyab District towards east. Thus, the Muslims of Arakan were put into a sort of imprisonment since 1964.

The authorities, however, could not stop all migration effectively as all routes could not be closed. The late 60s saw a sharp decline in economy; bring about large-scale smuggling across the Burma-Thai border. As Arakan became the poorest province in the country, the Arakanese were forced to leave for the new green pastures which were rising in eastern Burma such as the Shan and Karen States and Moulmein area. 

In 1973 census the authorities again found that Arakanese Muslims had spread up to these eastern borders and other commercially mobile areas such as Mandalay, Pegu, Prome, Maolmein, Bassein, etc. Ne Win did not want that. The Muslims should be in Arakan only so that the Arakanes Buddhists and Arakanese Muslims could use against each other. This was the best way to keep the Arakanese national liberation movement of the Arakanese checked.

But the scenario was not like that, since 1967 rice crisis where Muslims and Buddhist jointly participated in the anti-junta protest march and lost both of their people’s lives, the Arakanese came to realize that they need to forge unity between Buddhists and Muslims to oppose the military regime together. With this vision many Muslims joined the Arakan National Organization led by Bo Gri Kra Hla Aung during 1967. Similarly the Rohingyas librations groups also made alliance with the Arakan National Liberation Party led by U Maung Sein Nyunt. 

Such an alliance alarmed the Rangoon regime. Meanwhile the emergence of the Arakan Independence Organization/Army and Arakan Libration Party under the collaboration with KIO and KNU receptively added much worry to the junta. In 1977 the Ne Win forces wiped out the main army of AIO and ALP, killing their leaders San Kyaw Tun and Khaing Moe Lung respectively along with about 300 men including Muslims. 

This event spread a cloud of misery over the Arakanese population. At the same time, a coup attempt by the Arakanese was foiled. This coup had been planned by Aung Sein Tha, Htin Lin and Kyaw Hla (a) Mustafa Kamal. The Burmese Intelligence openly implicated the Military Attaché in the Bangladesh Embassy in Rangoon in the plot that was expelled and declared persona non grata. 

General Ne win get a chance to teach a lesson not only to the Rohingya but also Bangladesh Government. He launched an anti-Rohingya military operation in the Code name of King Dragon in the guise of checking illegal immigrant in 1978. About 300,000 Rohingyas had sought refuge across the border in southern Bangladesh amidst widespread reports of army brutality, rape and murder. Under international pressure, Burma agreed to "take back" the Rohingyas in the repatriation agreement with Bangladesh.

However, as the Plan-A of Ne Win was not success then he started with his Plan-B that is a legal instrument which may made all the Rohingya illegal status. Then he tried to draw a citizenship law which later known as the citizenship law 1982.

Ne Win completed this law with the help of Dr. Maung Maung before October 1982. This law was approved and passed by the third session of the Third Pyithu Hluttaw and promulgated by the Chairman of the Council of State, on 15 October 1982. As Ne Win became only Party head since 1981, U San Yu was the then Chairman of the State Council and President.

The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) states that the 1982 citizenship law was designed specifically to deny citizenship to the Rohingya. According to the Benjamin Zawacki , a Senior Legal Advisor for Southeast Asia,“The system anchor is the 1982 Citizenship Law, which in both design and implementation effectively denies the right to a nationality to Rohingya people.” 

Reportedly, since the draft law was published in April 1982, at least six members of the 475 strong People’s Assembly—selected in 1982—have resigned because of their foreign ancestry they perhaps feared state appraisal if their origin was exposed later. Under the Section 18 of this Law the penalty for falsifying racial identity is up to ten years of imprisonment and fine of kyats fifty thousand.

It was said that, this law is ingeniously designed to preserve the purity of the Burmese nationality although General Ne Win himself and many of his deputies were Chinese or Chinese origin.

However, before that election, in 1985 the government published and distributed to the peoples of Burma a form called ‘Nain-2’, a 25 pages form including 5 appendix pages. This form has three Chapters; Chapter-1 for at the age of 10 year to 18 year, Chapter-2 for at the age of 18 year and Chapter-3 for at the age of 30 year and 45 year. The applicant needs to give all the particulars information including the history of his/her education and occupation and submit the form with his/her fingerprints of both hands and toe prints of both legs. He/she has to give the particular information of his/her siblings; his/her parents and their siblings, his/her grandparents of both fraternal and maternal sides and their siblings, the parents of all their grandparents and their siblings, the applicant’s children and their children. The particulars, including name, date of birth, place of birth, race & type of citizen, identity card No., and if death-- date and place of the death.

Each and every one of the Rohingya of Arakan timely submitted to the concerned authorities after completely filling the form with Rohingya as their identity. However, no action or reaction was made by the government. But the Rohingyas had enjoyed the right to vote and the right to be elected as people’s representatives to the Organ of State power at different levels in that election in the said election of 1986.

What kind of Law it is?

1. “Every Act shall be promulgated by the President of the Union by publication under his direction in the Gazette.” According to the Article 2 (24) of the Burma General Clauses Act 1898, “Gazette shall mean the Official Gazette for the Union of Burma.” Promulgation is to ensure that a newly enacted law becomes widely known by the public. In other words, it is an act whereby the people are enabled to know the law. A law must be promulgated before it actually takes effect. When a law is promulgated, it is given a serial number and signed by both the state minister responsible for the law and the Prime Minister/President. But This Burma Citizenship Law 1982 did not follow such procedure. Before enacting, it was drafted for many times. On 4th July 1980 in the Government Daily Guardian Newspaper, an official communiqué was published, under the caption: Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma-Law Commission-Paper on Solicitation of Public Opinion Regarding the Drafting of the Citizenship Law. However when actual promulgation was done By U san Yu, the then Chairman of the State Council and President, on 15 October 1982, the law was only published the next day at the state own Working People’s Daily, without under direction of any body or signed by any one.

2. A law is said to "come into effect" or "come into force" when it generally and actually takes effect and starts to apply. Laws usually stipulate in their attached clauses when they come into effect. Most of the laws and acts were attached clauses about the about commencement. For example: -

· The Registration of Foreigners Act 1940, As per article 1, This act shall come into force on the 28th arch 1940.

· The Burma Immigration (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1947, as per article 1 (2) It shall come into force at once. 

· The Union Citizenship Act, 1948, as per Article 2 (1) it shall extend to the whole of the Burma and shall be deemed to have come into force on the 4th day of January, 1948.

· Not only that, at the article 6 of this 1982 Citizenship Law there mentioned that,” A person who is already a citizen on the date this Law comes into force is a citizen. The term “the date this Law comes into force” are mentioned in the articles 38, 43, 45, 52, and 61 of this 1982 citizenship law also. Thus, mentioning when the law or the act come into effect of into force is very much essential parts of this Law. Without this one cannot say that this Law is in force or not and it will remain as silent law. This 1982 Citizenship Law, Pyithu Hluttaw law No. 1982/4, neither mention the date of commencement as the part of this law nor there were enactment or resolution regarding this in any next sessions of parliament.

3. The Citizenship Law contravenes several international human rights standards, including Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Insofar as its application condemns large numbers of people to second-class status and is grossly discriminatory against ethnic minorities, it infringes the prohibition against discrimination on the grounds of race, religion or national or social origin. The law also violates the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Burma under the SLORC has ratified, and under which States are obliged to "respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality..." and for every child immediately after birth to have the right to acquire a nationality.

4. This law, which was promulgated o deliberately deny the citizenship of the persons who had previously been recognized as citizen, is even more objectionable in so far as it was applied in an ex-post facto manner in contradiction to the international legal standards. 

5. This law was most controversial, vague, randomly interpreted and arbitrarily applied.

6. Although the 1982 Citizenship Law was enacted in 1982, the authorities never show their serious concern to implement it during Ne Win times or SLORC and SPDC period. However, after coming to the power by the present government became very serious on this matter. 

7. They try to implement the Citizenship Law only on the Rohingya. Although, there are more than a half million of Bangladeshi Buddhist who have entered in Arakan, during post independent day, they government did nothing against them. There are more than 20 million Chinese legally and illegally entered into Burma since SLORC regime. They are super class citizens of the country. They can do and can’t do anything they want. The whole Burma is now their father-in-law’s home.

8. U Khin Yi, the Union Minister for Immigration and Population Affairs, in his speech in Parliament on 18 June 2013, he mentioned that, “Even though they are Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Burma, Mon, Rakhine and Shan, they are not national races if they permanently live in other countries, not in Myanmar. Same national races who have settled in Myanmar after 1824 are not indigenous races. So they are not citizens by birth. The law also states that national races who acquire citizenship of other countries and persons born of parents, both of whom are those foreign citizens cannot become Myanmar citizens”. But he and his government do not make any concern to these Chinese and Bangladeshi Buddhists issue. Their only interest is to wipe out the identity and existence of Rohingya from the soil of Arakan. 

Press Release 

NLD government Must Protect Rohingya People

We, the undersigned Rohingya organizations express our serious concern that the security, honour and dignity of the Rohingya population continue to be at stake due to growing anti-Rohingya sentiment at the behest of the powerful and influential groups in the Myanmar.

We are worrying that the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) government seems to have inclined to yield to the demand of the extremists calling for “Rohingya ethnocide”. Following a protest in late April in Yangon by about 300 ultra-nationalists, including Buddhist monks, publicly denouncing the United States of America for using the word Rohingya, the Myanmar Foreign Ministry, headed by State Counselor-com-Foreign Minister Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, had surprisingly advised foreign embassies in Myanmar avoid using “Rohingya”, although the Rohingya people have the right to self-identify. 

In addition, in a press conference on 13 May, the Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing had denied the existence of the word Rohingya in Myanmar by lying that “they were called Rohingyas under former prime minister U Nu to win their vote” although history testifies that Muslim Arakanese are called Rohingya. 

Such actions of the government have, to all intents and purposes, encouraged the extreme racist nationalists, and since then protests have grown and spread in Myanmar by stirring up prejudice against Rohingya and Muslims in general. But no action is taken against those inciting hatred and violence.

The Aung Mingalar Ghetto, the only Rohingya quarter left in the heart of the Rakhine State capital Sittwe with 4350 people, is now under threat and the decision of the Rakhine State government to conduct house to house check under the pretext of looking for so-called 20,000 people from outside are living in it is unjustified. 

We respect the right to freedom of expression and protest, but it needs to be within the framework of the democratic norms and principle. We are very much concerned that the current waves of protest spreading hate speech and Islamophobia against Rohingya in particular could lead to violence against them. Round the clock senses of utter insecurity and abject helplessness on the part of the persecuted and traumatized Rohingya people are prevalent in squalid segregated concentration camps, confined villages and ghettos under siege in Rakhine State. 

The government should not allow people to disturb the law and order situation with threat of violence that could amount to a breach of the peace. The NLD government has “the responsibility to protect” the defenceless Rohingya people. It has also the responsibility to uphold the internationally recognized principle of having the right to self-identify. 

We urge the NLD led government to take the following immediate measures: 

1. To allow Rohingya people to self-identify their ethnic name “Rohingya” 

2. To take action against those spreading hate speech against Rohingyas and Muslims in Myanmar. 

3. To end ghettoization and allow all internally displaced persons to return to their community, places and properties. 

4. To end persecution against Rohingya, including restrictions on their basic human rights and freedoms.

5. To lift all restrictions on the operations of international aid agencies in Rakhine State and take action to ensure the security of aid workers.

6. To amend 1982 Citizenship Law to conform it to international human rights law and citizenship standards ensuring full citizenship and all accompanying rights to Rohingya?

We also call on the international community, including US, UK, EU, ASEAN, OIC, to support the establishment of a United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the situation and human rights violations in Rakhine State and the government policies and laws targeting the Rohingya.

Signatories;

1. Arakan Rohingya National Organisation 

2. Bradford Rohingya Community in UK

3. Burmese Rohingya Community in Denmark

4. Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK

5. Rohingya Community in Netherlands 

6. Rohingya Community in Germany

7. Rohingya Community in Switzerland

8. Rohingya Organisation Norway

9. Rohingya Community in Finland

10. Rohingya Community in Italy

11. Rohingya Community in Sweden

For more information please contact:

Tun Khin +44 7888714866

Nay San Lwin +49 6926022349

Ko Ko Lin +880 1726068413

Dated: 16th May 2016

Aman Ullah

RB Opinion

May 15, 2016

“Animosity does not eradicate animosity, 

Only by loving kindness is animosity dissolved, 

This law is ancient and eternal” Words of Buddha

The Burmese foreign ministry led by Aung San Suu Kyi has told foreign diplomats to stop using the word “Rohingya”, prompting accusations that it has abandoned the minority Muslim community.

The foreign ministry sent an advisory to embassies in Rangoon this week warning them against the term, which is used by the stateless Muslim group to self-identify, but is rejected by the country’s nationalist Buddhist wing who view the Rohingya as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.

“We won’t use the term Rohingya because Rohingya are not recognized as among the 135 official ethnic groups,” “Our position is that using the controversial term does not support the national reconciliation process and solving problems” said Kyaw Zay Ya, a retired lieutenant-colonel who was elected as an MP for Ms Suu Kyi’s party last year and now serves in the foreign ministry. But he added that “it is not possible to enforce” the directive, and would be up to foreign governments to decide.

Here questions arise about ‘which really is a controversial term’. It is clear that, he means the word ‘Rohingya’ as a controversial term. Actually Rohingya is not a controversial term rather these people are trying to controvert it with an ulterior motive. Rohingya is a name or identity of a people in their own language. It is neither a term in Rakhines language nor Burmese language nor of any other language. These people called themselves their land as Rohang or Roang and the native that land is called in their own language as Rohingya or Roangya. It is a self-identification of a people, which is one of the indispensable rights of them as a member of human family. Why there needs to controversy about. 

Suppose Kaw Zay Ya is the personal name of that gentle man in his own language that is his personal identity or self-identification, no one has right for controversy on it. The noblel Laureate, the icon of democracy, the mother of the nation, the leader of NLD, the Minister of Foreign affairs, the State Counselor all these are not the identities of our beloved leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, these are her glories honored by others and adjectives given by others. But Aung San Suu Kyi is her personal identity that was given by her parents and a self-identification to which she prefer most. No one has a right to say that Aung San is her father’s name, Suu is her grandmother’s name and Kyi is her mother’s name so where is her name? No, none has the right to make any controversy on it because it is her personal identity, an identity that she prefers most; an identity to which her parents love to call her; an identity by which all of her relatives, her nears and dears known her, even the whole world recognize her with this identity. So, why did the term Rohingya be a controversial?

Let’s us go to the term ‘the 135 official ethnic groups’, how is it an official?

Myanmar is one of the most culturally diverse countries in the region, and ethnicity is a complex, contested and politically sensitive issue where ethnic groups have long believed that the Government manipulates ethnic categories for political purposes. Myanmar’s ethnic minorities make up an estimated 30 - 40% of the population, and ethnic states occupy some 57% of the total land area along most of the country’s international borders. The Constitution makes no reference to ethnic minorities. It instead uses the term “national races”. However this term is not defined by the Constitution, and is generally interpreted by applying the 1982 Myanmar Citizenship Law, which defines the 135 national races in its 1983 Procedures.

The “official" categorization of 135 ethnic groups is at odds and mystery with the history of categorization itself. For example, a 1960 publication by the Ministry of Culture estimated ethnic groups to be about 50, but the manual from the Department of Immigration and Manpower published in 1972 listed 144 so-called national races.

The origins of the now frequently mentioned list of the 135 ethnic groups living in Myanmar anterior to 1823 remains unknown, though General Saw Maung, then the head of the ruling military government, in 1989 said he had received it from ‘the census department’.

The list was mentioned first in a speech by Senior General Saw Maung on 5 July 1989, State Law and Order Restoration Council Chairman Commander in Chief of the Defence Services General Saw Maung’s Addresses and Discussions in Interview with Foreign Correspondents {(Yangon: Ministry of Information, 1989), pp. 182-183, p. 247 in English translation.} The list was eventually published more than a year later apparently only in Burmese in the Loktha Pyithu Neizin (The Working People’s Daily) on 26 September 1990. {International Crisis Group, “Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State,”}

Following this proclamation, the government institutionalized the number 135 as an expansion of the eight official races. Another, even more arbitrary, suggestion is that because General Ne Win’s favourite number is nine, the government devised 135 sub-categories, as one plus three plus five is nine.

However, one might reasonably speculate that it was derived from the last published British census of Burma taken in 1931. “Imperial Table XVIII – Race, Part I – Provincial Totals of Races by Religion” provides a list 135 ethno-linguistic groups which could be considered as being extant within Burma’s borders at that time. The 1921 British census21 provides a list of 125 groups listed by language groups. Some, which appear in both of the last British period censuses and the 1990 Working People’s Daily list, are remarkably small. Whatever the case, it would appear that in 2015, 67 years after independence, people are still discussing a nearly hundred year old list created by British colonial officials and amateur linguistics and ethnographers.

The national races are never identified, nor the claim that there 135 of them established, in the 2008 constitution or any other official document at least prior to the 2014 census.

The 2008 constitution compounds the problem of politicised ethnicity, which would allow expressions of ethnic wishes to be routed through peaceful channels. First, the constitution maintains the seven ethnically designated states as well as seven geographically designated regions and devolves certain limited powers to governments of the states and regions. It also established six autonomous zones with ethnic designations. In addition “race affairs” ministers are to be elected when at least 0.01 per cent of an ethnic group exists which is not otherwise nominally represented in the nomenclature of the state or region. There are currently 29 such race affairs ministers in state and regional governments who are elected on the basis of their respective ethno-linguistic group. How one is determined to be a member of such a group is not clear, but presumably this is on the basis of self-identification as indicated on national registration certificates.

Scrutinizing the list, one can find numerous inconsistencies. For example, some groups are listed according to exogamous names, whereas others are listed by endogamous names. Many are listed according to the name of their language, while others are named based on their location or principal town. The preponderance of group names, arguably, has unnecessarily subdivided some races. For example, Kachin political leaders have argued that there are six Kachin groups, not twelve. The same case has been made for the Karen/Kayin race, with the government scheme placing the number of sub-groups as nine, but Karen leaders saying that there are five. Within the total Chin population of an estimated one million people, the government list specifies 53 sub-groups, but these listed groups are, in some cases, merely alternative spellings of the same name, the name of a variant dialect of one language, or again, clans within another sub-group.

In addition to recognized groups finding themselves incorrectly identified or subdivided, the list of 135 excludes a number of groups. A few of the groups not included in the list are: Panthay Chinese Muslims, Overseas Chinese (speakers of Hokkien and Cantonese), Anglo-Burmese (Eurasians of mixed Burmese and European background), Burmese Indians, Gurkha, Pakistanis, and Rohingyas. 

Among many concerns, the 2014 census will collect ethnicity and identity information based upon a much disputed list of 135 “national races”. The current list is almost identical to one first deployed during the Socialist era (1962-1988) and resurrected during the early years of the previous military government (1988-2011). These, in turn, were derived from a flawed British census in 1931. Furthermore, in the 2014 census each individual may be recorded as one and only one of the highly suspect race categories. As a result, not only will the common experience of mixed ethnic identities not be recorded but leaders of some ethnic political groups also fear that their followers will not be counted by the identities or ethnicities that they self-report. Technical decisions about enumeration procedures like this one could have adverse impact on political representation and, in some cases, citizenship

During the early years of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC; renamed SPDC in 1997), however, Gen. Saw Maung and the military intelligence chief, Lt.Gen. Khin Nyunt, proffered a more complex taxonomy of taingyinthar lu-myo. In a characteristically rambling speech in July 1989, the SLORC chairman Gen. Saw Maung referred to the “Census Department,” from which he discovered “135 categories” of “national race groups”. At the time, with constitutional government suspended, this was widely perceived as a confusing but tactical attempt to weaken non-Bamar solidarity around identity in a new game of “divide and rule”. Nevertheless, the seven ethnic states were subsequently retained in the 2008 constitution, and new “self-administered zones” and a “selfadministered division” were demarcated for six smaller national races that were not previously recognized in territorial-administrative terms: i.e. Danu, Kokang, Naga, Palaung (Taang), Pa-O and Wa. A further constitutional innovation resulted in seven other taingyinthar lu-myo gaining electoral representation, among 29 such reserved seats, in the 2010 election in the legislatures for states and regions where they were smaller minorities. These were Akha, Bamar, Intha, Kayan, Lahu, Lisu and Rawang. In consequence, the implementation of the 2008 constitution has so far given legal status to 20 national race identities for administrative or representative purposes.

Despite this emergence of a more complex legal and bureaucratic landscape of ethnicity, the Ministry of Immigration and Population (MOIP) has fallen back on the “SLORC-SPDC’s controversial “135” list of ethnic groups” for processing identity card applications and coding the 2014 Population and Housing Census. As a result, MOIP activities, with the full support of international donors and UN agencies, are promoting citizenship and identity practices that, over the years, have adversely affected many peoples. At root, identity regulation has always been a matter of law enforcement and security, rather than a neutral, technical procedure.

Thus, it is crystal clear that, the term Rohingya is not a controversial one, the SLORC-SPDC’s so-called the 135 official ethnic groups, is actual controversial terms, which may ruin the national reconciliation process and solving problems. 

During the SPDC regime, it was said that, prior meeting of any foreign dignitary with U Than Shwe, he/ she was advised to avoid using the name of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The reason behind was that U than Shwe hated her and did not want to hear her name and not because of that the name of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is controversial. 

In the same sense, rejecting and trying to controvert the term Rohingya by the country’s nationalist Buddhist wing not because of the term Rohingya is controversial but because of hatred. Most certainly is some vested quarters are trying to scapegoat the Rohingya case to destabilize the country and to make the present democratic government not to success. 

“He abused me, mistrusted me, defeated me, robbed me.” Harboring such thoughts keeps hatred alive.

“He abused me, mistrusted me, defeated me, robbed me.”Releasing such thoughts banishes hatred for all the time.

By Asian Correspondent

May 12, 2016

A CARTOON published by Burmese magazine The Irrawaddy has been slammed by critics as “disgusting”, “xenophobic” and “dangerous”.

The offending cartoon features a dark-skinned individual with a sign saying “BOAT PEOPLE” hanging on his back cutting in front of a queue of Burmese ethnic minority groups.

Many believe the individual climbing into the queue purportedly depicts an undocumented Rohingya Muslim. The minority Muslim group is a subject of contention in Burma (Myanmar), with many accusing the government of systematically persecuting them.

Rohingya activist Wai Wai Nu has reportedly weighed in on the conversation, calling the cartoon “dangerous” and “insulting”.

According to Coconuts Yangon, Nu said in an interview today: “It’s like boat people are coming into the place of the ethnic people. It’s a bad image and the depiction is wrong. Because boat people are just going out of the country, they are not coming in. It’s insulting and dangerous because it is giving the wrong message to people.”

She called for the government to regulate cartoons which “discriminate against Muslims” in order to avoid conflicts.

Nu also called into question The Irrawaddy’s editorial judgement in publishing the cartoon, a sentiment echoed by several critics on Twitter.

Some say The Irrawaddy’s cartoon, which is strikingly similar to some published by French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, accurately portrays how many Burmese locals feel about the Rohingya.

Charlie Hebdo – whose Paris office was attacked in 2015 by Islamist gunmen, killing 12 people – has published cartoons in the past that have been labelled “Islamophobic” in nature.

Among them is a cartoon depicting dead Syrian toddler Alan Kurdi as a woman-groping adult, with the caption: “What would little Aylan have grown up to be? A groper in Germany.”

The cartoon was a response to a series sexual attacks conducted against women on New Year’s Eve last year in Cologne, Germany.

The cartoonist who created the image for The Irrawaddy, Maung Maung Fountain, declined to comment on the issue.

All posts of the cartoon appear to have been removed from The Irrawaddy’s social media and website.

Former MP Ro Shwe Maung's Speaking Notes for the Conference on “Myanmar democratic transition and persecuted Rohingya” at the Wolfson College, University of Oxford on 11 May 2016.

Thank you so much for giving me this opportunity to speak at this important event via Skype.

Let me introduce myself. This before my name was U Shwe Maung. On 8 May 2016, I changed my name to Ro Shwe Maung. It means Rohingya Shwe Maung. I am a Rohingya. Please call me Ro Shwe Maung. I am a former Member of Parliament in Myanmar from 2010 to 2015. Authority denied my right to run for office again in 2015 General Election although I was a sitting MP. I was denied the right to contest the election because authority falsely claimed my parents were not citizens of Myanmar when I was born. I would like to say this is the most laughable joke in the 21st Century. I am not only one. All Rohingya candidates were targeted for exclusion. Dozens of Burmese Muslims candidates had also been rejected by election authorities. And make no mistake: it is because of our ethnicity and religion. 

On 10 June 2012, I saw face of ethnic cleansing and genocide against Rohingya from helicopter in Sittwe city of Arakan. I saw blaze of Rohingya and Kaman Muslim houses. I felt I was seeing a holocaust from the sky. On July 16, 2012, I went to Sittwe and talked to relatives of victims of violence, which caused 140,000 IDPs. A mother saw her 11 years old daughter was being burnt. A father saw his son was beheaded by the Rakhine terrorists and there were so many horrible stories.

I changed my name to “Ro Shwe Maung”. Because, denial of Rohingya identity is at maximum now although we have an elected civilian government, led by State Counsellor, President’s Office Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar. The Foreign Affairs Ministry advised US Embassy to avoid using the term “Rohingya” in the future after a large demonstration backed by the nationalist activists and monks against US Embassy Rangoon and US Government for the use of the term “Rohingya” on April 28, 2016. 

Now State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is trying her best to reform the country’s old system with a momentum. We appreciate her steps for a new system for the good of Myanmar people. But she has been constantly silent about the plight of Rohingya. She and governing party NLD have been denying existence of Rohingya people in Myanmar. In the context of Rohingya and Muslim issues, USDP Party and NLD Party have been exercising with same political pattern although they have a huge number of differences in other areas. Rohingya issue becomes a political toy among the players of political game in Myanmar. We Rohingya become political victims of Burma and persecuted in various forms in daily life. 

Therefore, I would like to suggest the international community to press the Myanmar government in four key areas: 1) access to citizenship, 2) access to rights and livelihoods, 3) combating extremism, and 4) political reconciliation. In this regard, international actors should call on State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar President U Htin Kyaw and Myanmar Military Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to do followings immediately:

1) Access to Citizenship

a. Amend 1982 Citizenship Law to provide Rohingya with equal access to full citizenship, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

b. Recognize Rohingya as an indigenous ethnic group of Myanmar and ensuring our right to self-identification

2) Access to Rights and Livelihoods

a. End freedom of movement restrictions on Rohingya in Rakhine State and beyond

b. Ensure Rohingya in Rakhine State have access to basic services, including education and healthcare

c. Release all Rohingya political prisoners, falsely imprisoned after the 2012 violence

d. Facilitate the resettlement and reintegration of Rohingya into their original homes in Rakhine State

3) Combating Extremism

a. Punish, through proper legal channels, individuals who promote hate speech and incite violence

b. Promote pluralism and inclusiveness in political decision-making and society more broadly

4) Political Reconciliation

a. Include Rohingya representatives at the forthcoming 21st Century Pinlone Conference

b. Work with all groups in Rakhine State to formulate an inclusive roadmap to a durable solution to the state’s challenges

c. Amend the 2008 constitution to move toward true democracy

Thank you.

Ro Shwe Maung

Former Rohingya MP in Myanmar (2010 - 2015)

Board Member of ASEAN Parliamentarian for Human Rights (www.aseanmp.org) 

Founding Member of International Panel of Parliamentarians for Freedom of Religion or Belief (www.ippforb.com)

President, Arakan Institute for Peace and Development (AiPAD)

By Bill O'Toole

Democratic Voice of Burma

By Antoni Slodkowski

Reuters
May 10, 2016

The new ambassador of the United States to Myanmar said on Tuesday he will keep using the term Rohingya for the persecuted Muslim minority, even after the government controlled by Nobel prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi asked him to refrain from it.

Members of the 1.1 million-strong group, most of whom live in apartheid-like conditions in a remote part of northwestern Myanmar, are seen by many Myanmar Buddhists as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. The term is a divisive issue.

Scot Marciel took over as the head of the U.S. mission at a critical time after Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory in historic elections, following decades of pro-democracy struggle.

"Our position globally and our international practice is to recognize that communities anywhere have the ability to choose what they should be called... and we respect that," said Marciel, in response to a question on whether he intended to continue using the term Rohingya.

He added that this has been Washington's policy before and that the administration intended to stick to it.

Feted by many in the West for her role as champion of Myanmar's democracy movement during long years of military rule, Suu Kyi has been criticized overseas, and by some in Myanmar, for saying little about the abuses faced by the Rohingya.

Speaking out for the group would carry a political cost at home. The group is widely disliked in Myanmar, including by some in Suu Kyi's party and its supporters. She risks losing support by taking up the cause of the beleaguered minority.

Some 125,000 Rohingya remain displaced and face severe travel restrictions in squalid camps since fighting erupted in Rakhine State between Buddhists and Muslims in 2012. Thousands have fled persecution and poverty.

The previous military-linked government of former junta general Thein Sein referred to the group as Bengalis, implying they were illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, though many have lived in Myanmar for generations.

Last week, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is run by Suu Kyi, told several media they had requested Marciel to refrain from using the term they dubbed "controversial". 

They said the Rohingya were not among the officially recognized ethnic minorities and in their view using the term was not supportive of Myanmar's national reconciliation process.

Zaw Htay, the spokesman of the state counsellor office, also run by Suu Kyi, has refused to comment on the issue, directing all questions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Asked whether Suu Kyi asked him to stop using the term Rohingya, Marciel refused to comment on what he referred to as "private diplomatic conversations".

Program detail and bio-data of the speakers


Myanmar's Democratic Transition: What does it mean for the persecuted Rohingya people? 

South Asia Research Cluster, University of Oxford

8:30 am - 4:30 pm, 11th May 2016

Click this link:

The Myanmar Times
May 8, 2016

Children born in the Kaman-majority Sin Tet Maw IDP camp have little to no access to healthcare or education. Photo: Fiona MacGregor / The Myanmar Times

By Andrew Marszal

New Delhi -- The Burmese foreign ministry led by Aung San Suu Kyi has told foreign diplomats to stop using the word “Rohingya”, prompting accusations that it has abandoned the minority Muslim community.

The foreign ministry sent an advisory to embassies in Rangoon this week warning them against the term, which is used by the stateless Muslim group to self-identify, but is rejected by the country’s nationalist Buddhist wing who view the Rohingya as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.

“We have never accepted this term,” Kyaw Zay Ya, a retired lieutenant-colonel who was elected as an MP for Ms Suu Kyi’s party last year and now serves in the foreign ministry, told the Wall Street Journal.

He added that “it is not possible to enforce” the directive, and would be up to foreign governments to decide.

The memo indicates that the position of the ministry on the term “Rohingya” is the same under the leadership of 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner Ms Suu Kyi as it was under the previous military junta.

Burma Task Force, a coalition of 19 Muslim groups, on Thursday accused Ms Suu Kyi of having “caved to the hate message of extremist Buddhist protesters”.

Last month, Buddhist monks joined several hundred protesters outside the US embassy in Rangoon on Thursday to demand it stop using the term “Rohingya”.

Ms Suu Kyi has been widely criticised for failing to stand up for the Rohingya’s rights since coming to power, and has herself never used the term publicly. Fellow Nobel laureates Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the Dalai Lama have both signalled their concern about her silence on the fate of the Rohingya.

For the more than one million Rohingya who live in Burma, mainly along its western border with Bangladesh and India, the term is extremely politically loaded.

It represents that fact that the group are not considered Burmese citizens. Instead, they are referred to in the rest of the country as “Bengalis”, implying that they are largely illegal interlopers from neighbouring Bangladesh.

It comes as a Burmese activist was arrested for claiming on Facebook that Min Aung Hliang, the country's army chief, did not seize power because he wants to marry Ms Suu Kyi.

PROFILE

Aung San Suu Kyi

Position: Leader of the National League for Democracy, Burma’s main opposition party
Born:June 19, 1945
Education: University of Delhi and St Hugh’s College, Oxford

Who is she?

The daughter of Burma’s assassinated independence hero Ms Suu Kyi was living quietly in Oxford with her husband, a British academic, and their two sons when she returned to her homeland in 1988 to care for her sick mother.

Early political career?

She quickly emerged as the leader of a popular democracy uprising against the military junta and spent 15 years under house arrest by Burma’s general in three stints between 1989 and 2011. She was awarded the Nobel Peace prize in absentia and became the world's most famous political prisoner.

Now?

Her party has won a majority in Burma's parliament after a historic election. But she will still be barred by the constitution from becoming president because of her foreign family ties.

By Gulf News

May 8, 2016

Calls on international community to end their suffering

Sharjah: The international community must pay attention to the suffering of refugees around the world, His Highness Dr Shaikh Sultan Bin Mohammad Al Qasimi, Supreme Council Member and Ruler of Sharjah, said during his recent visit to UNHCR’s Harmony Refugee Learning Centre in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur.

He visited the refugee learning centre with his wife, Shaikha Jawaher Bint Mohammad Al Qasimi, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s Eminent Advocate for Refugee Children.

During the visit, Dr Shaikh Sultan interacted with the refugee children and called on the world to move seriously towards providing the refugees with the means for a dignified life, including shelter, food, health and education.

He emphasised that everyone in this world, whether governments, institutions or individuals, are required to play an active role in the protection of refugee families, especially children.

Dr Shaikh Sultan and Shaikha Jawaher met Rohingya refugee families from Myanmar and listened to the details of their arduous journey to asylum. They also met a number of students who receive education at the centre.

Dr Shaikh Sultan also met Richard Towle, UNHCR Representative in Malaysia. They discussed the situation of refugees in the country and UNHCR’s efforts to support them and help them overcome the trials and challenges of life in exile.

Dr Shaikh Sultan and Shaikha Jawaher inquired about UNHCR’s needs to be able to continue providing support and assistance to refugees residing in Malaysia, specifically displaced Rohingya Muslim families from Myanmar.

Dr Shaikh Sultan commended UNHCR’s efforts to protect refugees across the world and provide them with their needs.

He stressed that helping one another is a human imperative that cannot be sidelined or abandoned.

Dr Shaikh Sultan called for raising the level of cooperation by both the public and private sectors in all countries to provide more support, rehabilitation and care for refugees living in Malaysia, especially with regard to education.

He said that the future generations will be compromised if we fail to invest in our children’s education.

Shaikha Jawaher reiterated her commitment to closely follow up the issue of Myanmar refugees, especially children, who account for 20 per cent of the total refugees in Malaysia, according to UNHCR data.

The Wall Street Journal
May 7, 2016

Boys stand among debris after fire at a camp for Rohingya destroyed many shelters. Photo: soe zeya tun/Reuters

By Mili Mitra

Brown Political Review
May 7, 2016

March 15 marked the beginning of a landmark human-trafficking trial in Thailand in which 92 defendants are charged with establishing a transnational trafficking network to smuggle refugees from Bangladesh and Myanmar into Malaysia. Authorities discovered the network last year when a mass grave containing 36 bodies was unearthed in southern Thailand. The outfit is implicated in widespread kidnappings and killings in the current trial, the results of which may shed light on the lucrative shadow-industry of refugee smuggling and slavery across Southeast Asia.

The human-trafficking networks in the region are remarkably well-organized and ruthless, and this particular cartel was especially infamous for the scale and brutality of its operations. The support of high-ranking army officials, including Lieutenant-General Manas Kongpaen, allowed its members to act with exceptional impunity. Its victims, primarily persecuted Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar, were forced on to rickety and overcrowded ships that set sail south from the Bay of Bengal on a notoriously perilous journey: In 2015 alone, an estimated 370 refugees died from starvation, disease and abuse before reaching land. Moreover, instead of being released when they reached the Thai-Malaysian border, the refugees were held captive in inhumane detainment camps in the jungles. The traffickers then demanded ransoms from the refugees’ families, threatening to kill or enslave those whose relatives were unable to pay.

Under fire from the United States and international humanitarian organizations, the Thai government has committed to expediting the trial and reaching a verdict by the end of the year. An accelerated verdict, however, is not enough to guarantee justice or tackle the underlying societal problem. The trial itself has been plagued by questions regarding its legitimacy and comprehensiveness. Although 153 arrest warrants were released, the government is only pressing charges against 92 defendants, sparking concerns that many traffickers have managed to evade punishment. International organizations have also cast doubts over the safety of over 300 Rohingya refugees serving as witnesses in the case; many of these witnesses were placed in government shelters for the duration of the trial, but some have already disappeared. Moreover, the trial should not be heralded as a one-stop solution to the greater issue of human trafficking in the region — despite the size and brutality of this operation, it was just one of many human-trafficking rings operating in the area.

The traffickers have exploited the distinctively dire situation of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. The ethnic group has long been persecuted for speaking a little-known Bengali dialect and practicing Islam in the Buddhist-majority country. The Rohingya originally arrived in Myanmar from the neighboring country of Bangladesh, but have lived in Myanmar for generations. There are approximately one million Rohingya living in the country, making up 2 percent of the nation’s population, and yet the vast majority of these people have been forced to live in ghetto-like conditions in the poverty-stricken, northwestern state of Rakhine. With little hope for employment or upward mobility, many have been repressed and imprisoned in internment camps for over thirty years. Based on these apartheid-like conditions, human rights organizations like Amnesty International consider the Rohingya the “most persecuted refugees in the world.”

Yet the Rohingya are not just fleeing persecution; they also seek to escape the obliteration of their identity. Under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, Rohingya are not granted citizenship. They are instead classified as Bengali immigrants, allowing for the possibility of deportation. To be considered citizens, these “immigrants” are asked to prove that they have lived in Myanmar for 60 years, which is often impossible given that the Rohingya initially crossed the border into Myanmar without paperwork and were subsequently denied these documents. Furthermore, the Myanmar government has created a hierarchy of citizenship that makes the Rohingya that have been able to obtain non-immigrant citizen status “associate” (or second-class) citizens without voting rights. Therefore, deprived of nationality and unable to cross borders legally to escape persecution, the Rohingya are forced to rely on traffickers.

The issue has come under the spotlight since anti-Rohingya violence spiked in 2012. After the alleged rape of a Buddhist woman by a Rohingya in Rakhine, the state’s dominant Buddhist population retaliated by massacring approximately 200 Rohingya Muslims. The violence then escalated in 2013, leading to a deadly humanitarian crisis. In fact, state forces sent to defuse tensions have been implicated in crimes against the Rohingya, to the extent that Human Rights Watch has accused the government of committing ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This crisis has pushed many Rohingya to flee to the ostensible safety of Malaysia via Thailand, leaving themselves at the mercy of traffickers. The Myanmar government has not undertaken any effort to eliminate trafficking, tacitly perpetuating the exodus of Rohingya Muslims from the nation with their discriminatory policies and lenient treatment of traffickers.

However, the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar is only the beginning of the problem since, as the recent trial against the Thai trafficking ring has shown, the Rohingya people are further victimized by the barbaric conditions in ships and border camps. Many survivors of these horrific journeys have spoken out against the merciless behavior of the traffickers: The smugglers are reported to use torture and abuse to subdue the captive refugees while refugees are malnourished and prone to disease from the lack of hygiene in camps.

It is common for the traffickers to extort money from the asylum seekers at camps and on ships as well. They often demand exorbitant fees of around $1,200 for transportation to Malaysia alone, and then extract even more by threatening the refugees with abuse or death. Safe arrival in Malaysia is also not guaranteed: Previously, traffickers have left refugees stranded off the coasts of Indonesia or Malaysia and last May, thousands of refugees were abandoned on the high seas in flimsy wooden boats with limited food and water — the death toll from the incident remains unknown.

And refugees’ troubles don’t end even if they reach their destination safely: although the refugees see Malaysia as a safe haven with opportunities for prosperity and equality, the reality of their reception often fails to meet the expectation. Over 75,000 Rohingya refugees currently live in Malaysia, but they have been relegated to a marginalized existence on the fringes of Malaysian society. As refugees, they are given little recognition or government support: They are unable to register for government schooling or obtain legal jobs, forcing them into subsistence living once again. In particular, the restrictions on education are an egregious violation of the Convention on the Rights of a Child, which protects children against discrimination regardless of immigration status. There are also processing lags at the UN office in Kuala Lumpur, delaying the distribution of refugee accreditation and identification cards needed for job applications, which further sidelines Rohingya refugees from legitimate recognition in Malaysia.

Crucially, in the last year, Malaysia’s response to Rohingya refugees has become even more alarming. The government has taken an exclusionary approach, publicly announcing that the refugees should be “turned back” and returned to their country. The country’s deputy prime minister even claimed that Malaysia has no responsibility to rescue asylum seekers stranded off its coast unless their boat was capsizing. While Malaysia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and is therefore not obligated to accept all asylum seekers, its recent turnaround violates the principle of non-refoulement, or not returning refugees to the country of their persecution, which can be argued to be customary international law. Since last May, several Malaysian politicians have made incendiary statements against signing the Refugee Convention to prevent a greater influx of Rohingya; one minister even questioned the refugees’ reasons for fleeing to Malaysia and classified them as “threats” to local businesses. If these trends continue in one of the largest safe havens for the Rohingya in the region, their very existence is likely to come under exceedingly greater risk.

Thus far, the global response has been limited and misguided. While the plight of the Rohingya has come into the media spotlight recently, there has been little coordinated effort to mitigate the crisis. The focus of the international humanitarian community has revolved around assigning blame and censuring the oppressive Myanmar government. Many activists and politicians have called for Myanmar to institute full and equal citizenship for the Rohingya. While this may certainly be the ideal solution, the rhetoric has distracted from the ongoing and immediate consequences of widespread trafficking and exploitation in the region. The reality of this problem extends further than within the borders of Myanmar, which means that other Southeast Asian states must cooperate to find a solution for what is rapidly becoming a regional crisis.

The current trial in Thailand implies that there is some hope for Rohingya who have managed to survive persecution in Myanmar or refugees who have survived their hazardous journey to Malaysia. The Thai government is cracking down on trafficking rings that operate on its borders after a US government report named Thailand one of the worst countries in the world for human trafficking. The UN and EU have also reported that the flow of Rohingya refugees out of Myanmar has slowed since the election of a new government, as many Rohingya are waiting to judge the policy platform of the newly-elected regime. But unless there is greater security and support for Rohingya in Myanmar and increased rehabilitation of these refugees across Southeast Asia, the Rohingya refugee crisis will continue to be one of the greatest and most overlooked humanitarian disasters of our time.