End of mission statement by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar Yangon, 1 July 2016

I have just concluded my fourth official visit to the country as Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. I would like to thank the Government of Myanmar for its invitation and for granting me an extended visit of twelve days. This has not only allowed to me to travel to Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States, but also to devote more time in Nay Pyi Taw to engage with different ministers in the new Government. I would also like to thank the United Nations Country Team for their assistance throughout my visit. Additionally, I would like express my appreciation to the broad range of interlocutors with whom I met for their openness and cooperation with my mandate. My programme is listed in detail in the Annex.

The peaceful transition to a democratically-elected and civilian-led government after five decades is a significant milestone for Myanmar. My visit thus takes place at an important juncture for the country. After the euphoria in the wake of last year’s elections, the reality of the significant and wide-ranging challenges facing the new Government has not significantly dampened the sense of optimism and hope amongst many sectors of the population. It will therefore be the key test for this new Government to capitalize on the overwhelming public support and current momentum to push forward its priority agenda and reforms. 

I welcome the Government’s commitment to furthering democratic transition, national reconciliation, sustainable development and peace, and the important steps already taken in this regard. The objective of my visit, therefore, was to make a comprehensive, objective and balanced assessment of the human rights situation in this new landscape. Today, I wish to highlight some preliminary observations from my visit. I will present a full report to the 71st session of the General Assembly later this year.

Forging human rights in a young democracy

Consolidating democracy and building a culture of respect for human rights is a complex undertaking that requires political will and sustained investment in enhancing the functioning and integrity of State institutions and bodies. Important human rights principles must underpin this process so that State institutions and bodies prioritize the needs and rights of the people in Myanmar’s diverse society. 

In meeting with various interlocutors in Government and Parliament, I was encouraged to see a burgeoning understanding of this role and a broad commitment to further reform. I was struck by the candid exchange of views on human rights concerns, and the frank assessment of the remaining challenges ahead. At the same time, I observed the very real tension between a new civilian leadership and a bureaucracy inherited from previous military regimes which often resulted in a duality in policy and approach. I also observed the challenges in trying to enhance democratic governance within an institutional framework that impedes the development of democratic practices and respect for human rights. Overcoming these challenges will require further reforms and a change in behaviour and mindset. While this will take time, these issues cannot be overlooked and must be continually prioritized. 

I was pleased to note that many aspects of the various 100-day plans of union ministries were broadly in line with the human rights priority areas set out in my last report to the Human Rights Council. I encouraged closer cooperation with my mandate and the international community in their implementation. At the same time, I noted that many of these plans were not well-publicized and had, for the most part, been developed with little or no public consultation or input from relevant stakeholders, in particular civil society. Looking ahead to the development of a longer-term five-year plan for the Government, greater efforts must be made to address these shortcomings. 

Parliament also has a central role in the promotion of democracy. During my visit, I had the opportunity to engage with parliamentarians and various parliamentary bodies. While there was a clear need to enhance the capacity and functioning of this young institution and its new members, I was impressed by the understanding shown of their important check and balance functions over the executive. I welcomed their frank assessment of current structural challenges, such as the 25 percent military bloc, and the lack of a separate professional secretariat (with current support provided by the General Administrative Department under the Ministry of Home Affairs). In order to ensure a properly functioning parliamentary culture, the independence of Parliament must be ensured and members of Parliament should be able to exercise the right to freedom of speech in the course of discharging their duties. It is crucial that Parliament be a forum for expressing opinions reflecting the different interests of Myanmar’s multi-ethnic society.

I also met members of the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission and encouraged the Commission to more fully step into its role as an independent advocate for human rights. While welcoming the many promotional and awareness-raising activities undertaken, the Commission should not shy away from addressing issues deemed sensitive to the Government; this is precisely when a neutral and objective human rights voice is most needed. 

The foundation for any functioning democracy is the rule of law. I therefore welcome the priority given to upholding the rule of law and to strengthening legal and judicial institutions. Central to this is the continuing review and reform of legislation, particularly outdated laws that have been deemed to be inconsistent with international human rights standards. I am encouraged to see quick and real progress on the recommendations of the Legal Affairs and Special Cases Assessment Commission to amend 142 laws, including the recent repeal of the State Protection Act. While noting some improvements to the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act, several shortcomings remain and I hope to see these remedied before the Law is promulgated. 

However, I am acutely aware that more needs to be done. During my visit, I consistently drew attention to many laws still on the books that continue to limit the full enjoyment of human rights. I therefore renew my call for a comprehensive legislative review to be undertaken, with clear target dates for the conclusion of the review. 

Also during my visit, I continued to hear concerns about the lack of systematic consultation on draft laws and the opaque process of legislative reform. Clear timelines should be established for the review of draft laws and an appropriate consultation process should be developed to ensure transparency and adequate engagement by civil society organizations and members of the public. A vetting mechanism should also be established to ensure that all draft legislation complies with international human rights standards.

Finally, in the current transitional environment with delicate relationships still being forged between different constituents, Myanmar must not lose sight of the need for constitutional reform. Many shared my view but acknowledged that this remained sensitive and would not likely be feasible soon. Nevertheless, I urged continued discussion and consideration of this important issue particularly within Parliament and by the public at large. 

Enhancing democratic space

The enjoyment of the rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly are essential ingredients for Myanmar’s democracy. Many are hopeful that continuing restrictions on the exercise of these rights will soon be lifted by the new Government. However, recent incidents, such as the banning of a film during a human rights film festival and the denial of permission for a press conference on a civil society report alleging grave violations by the military, are worrying signals. Additionally, I was informed by several civil society actors that they are facing visa restrictions, or have once again been placed on the ‘blacklist’. 

I have previously highlighted concerns regarding the arrests and prosecution of individuals exercising fundamental rights. I stated that such practices were creating a new generation of political prisoners. While I have not seen the same frequency and scale of arrests, problematic legal provisions continue to be applied and the practice of bringing multiple charges across different townships for the same offence or historic offences also continues. Additionally, journalists and media workers continue to face legal action under outdated defamation laws. 

I also continue to receive reports of monitoring and surveillance of civil society actors and human rights defenders. During this visit, I unfortunately was informed that my interlocutors were photographed by security officials, and were questioned prior to and following our meetings. During a private meeting with a village community in Rakhine State, I discovered a recording device placed in the room by a Government official. 

I therefore renew my request to all civil society actors, media workers and prisoners with whom I met to report to me any cases of reprisal. I also reiterate that the Government (in particular the Ministry of Home Affairs and Special Branch police) must ensure the safety of all my interlocutors and guarantee that they will not face any reprisals, including threats, harassment, punishment or judicial proceedings as required by the Human Rights Council. I have been assured by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs that these practices will cease in future visits and that no reprisals will occur. In my previous visits, I had also been assured by the then Minister of Home Affairs that these practices will cease. Nevertheless, they are still continuing. Old habits do die hard.

As the United Nations Secretary-General has said “civil society is the oxygen of democracy”. It is clear that a change of mind-set is still needed at all levels of Government to allow civil society and the media to flourish. Going forward, the fundamental role of civil society in supporting further democratic reforms and in advocating for human rights must be better understood and fully recognized. Civil society can also monitor the abuse of power and corruption and hold state institutions to account. Criticism helps to strengthen democratic institutions and critical voices should not be excluded or restricted, but rather, empowered and supported. Partnerships with civil society should be built and strengthened. 

Political prisoners

I commend the recent amnesties granted to political prisoners. This is a significant step which affirms the Government’s commitment to democratic transition and national reconciliation. I note that many individuals, whose cases I had previously raised, have been released with the charges against them dropped or pardoned. I met with some of them during my visit, including U Gambira earlier today upon his release. 

Many political prisoners remain behind bars however and their cases should be urgently resolved. I am aware that there continues to be discrepancies in the number of remaining political prisoners from different sources. Accordingly, a comprehensive and thorough review of all cases by the Government, based on broad consultations with all relevant stakeholders, is needed to clarify records. Related to this, in my view, is the need to develop a formal definition of political prisoner in consultation with all relevant actors. 

I also hold the view that former and released political prisoners should not be subject to administrative and other restrictions that impede re-integration into society. These include restrictions in the acquisition of passports and professional work licenses, and in enrollment in formal university education. Additionally, released political prisoners, particularly those who suffered ill-treatment or prolonged periods of solitary confinement, should be given the necessary medical and psycho-social support. 

National reconciliation

The impact of conflict and looking towards peace 

The Government informed me that the peace process and the need to end continuing armed conflict in several areas of the country is a priority. In a worrying development since my last visit, a new front of fighting has broken out in Rakhine State. Fighting also continues in Kachin State and has taken on new dimensions in Northern Shan State. 

On the ground, this violence continues to have a severe effect on the lives of civilians. In particular, I continue to receive reports of human rights violations committed by all parties to the conflict and in all areas where active fighting continues. One individual told me that her sibling had been kidnapped and there was still no news of his fate many weeks later. This is sadly not an isolated case: reports of abductions for forced recruitment and for use as hostages, predominantly by ethnic armed groups, are increasing. I also continue to receive reports of other grave violations, including sexual and gender-based violence, torture, killings and arbitrary arrest by all sides. I reiterate that investigations should be conducted into all such allegations and that perpetrators be held to account. Military personnel who are alleged to have perpetrated violations against civilians must also be held accountable and should be prosecuted in a civilian court.

Also of concern is the continuing detention and reported torture of individuals with suspected ties to ethnic armed groups under section 17 (1) of the Unlawful Associations Act. In particular, there has been a sharp increase in cases in Rakhine where reportedly some arrests have been made with little supporting evidence. 

During my visit, I also met with internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States and heard of their daily struggles to survive, earn a basic living and access basic services such as education and healthcare. In this context, humanitarian assistance provides a lifeline to communities and I was concerned to hear of the extensive difficulties in accessing and delivering such aid to several areas. In Rakhine State, I was informed that international non-governmental organizations are required to seek travel authorisations through a cumbersome procedure, with additional authorizations required for areas in the northern part of the State. Muslim staff members face restrictions in their freedom of movement and require additional travel authorisations which hamper their ability to perform their functions. 

In Kachin State, humanitarian access is shrinking particularly to non-government controlled areas. Previously there was access albeit subject to some limitations to the more than 40,000 IDPs in non-government controlled areas. However, access has been blocked in recent months with a proposal made to deliver assistance to neutral or government controlled areas – a 1.5 day walk for many of those affected. I had hoped to visit Laiza to look into these developments, but unfortunately was refused access to security considerations. 

In Northern Shan State, access is hampered by shifting front lines. The situation is becoming more complex with multiplying numbers of actors using armed force. I am particularly concerned by reports from civil society actors that the fighting between the TNLA and RCSS is starting to create tensions between civilian communities in affected areas. Their work in ensuring that communities are not further divided is even more vital now. Whilst I was given positive signals on the feasibility of a visit to Kutkai until the day before my arrival in Shan State, my request was ultimately denied due to ‘security considerations’ forcing a late change in my schedule. I regret that I was unable to see the realities on the ground for myself.

During my visit, I repeatedly heard the sentiment that for communities affected by conflict, things have yet to change. They saw the recent elections as a sign of hope but they are still awaiting real change. Durable peace must be achieved to allow these areas of the country, and others to see the change they have been waiting for. 

I discussed the peace process and the 21st Century Panglong Conference with many interlocutors. I was encouraged to hear that efforts are being made to reach out to all ethnic armed groups. It is vital that the process is truly inclusive, collaborative and open in order to build a sustainable peace going forward. Civil society actors must be seen as partners in this process, and have a voice in all areas of discussion. This includes issues which are seen by some as political, but in fact have significant impact on human rights. 

The previous Government made a commitment to ensure at least 30% representation of women at all levels of the peace dialogue. This commitment should be met as a minimum. During my visit, I met with a number of qualified women working in the area of human rights and conflict, who would be an asset to the process. I hope that an effort will be made to ensure such individuals are included. A gender perspective must also be incorporated into all areas of the dialogue.

IDPs informed me that they are afraid to return to their villages due to the continuing presence of soldiers and the risk posed by landmines. I was pleased to hear from the Ministry of Defence that demining has been completed in a small area in Kayin State. I urge that such programmes be extended throughout the country where there has not been recent active conflict, with assistance from the international community. 

Respect for the rights of minorities

During my visit, I addressed continuing reports of discrimination against ethnic minorities, including through restrictions on the freedom of religion or belief. These issues must be addressed in future political dialogues in order to tackle the root causes of conflict and the long-standing grievances of ethnic communities. While the creation of an Ethnic Affairs Ministry is a welcome step, the necessary institutional, legal and policy framework should be established to ensure greater respect for the rights of minorities. In this regard, the Government should consider developing a comprehensive anti-discrimination law or policy to ensure that minorities can exercise their rights without any discrimination and in full equality before the law. 

The recent establishment of the Central Committee on Implementation of Peace, Stability and Development of Rakhine State signals the priority given by the Government to addressing the complex challenges facing both communities. Nevertheless, my visit to Rakhine State unfortunately confirmed that the situation on the ground has yet to significantly change.

The conditions in the IDP camps I visited remain poor with concerns about overcrowding, the deterioration of temporary shelters and housing, and the lack of proper sanitation facilities.

While there is rightful emphasis on ensuring development and humanitarian assistance to all communities, ending institutionalized discrimination against the Muslim communities in Rakhine State must also be an urgent priority. The continuing restrictions on the freedom of movement of the Rohingya and Kaman communities cannot be justified on any grounds of security or maintaining stability. In fact, as I have previously highlighted, such restrictions severely affect all aspects of life, including access to basic services and livelihoods. They also hamper community interactions and impede any prospects for long-term stability and reconciliation. Progress is needed on this key issue in order to address other human rights concerns in Rakhine State. 

I note that the Government has re-initiated a citizenship verification exercise in several townships and villages, with plans to roll out the exercise throughout the State. Identity cards for national verification are being issued - without designations of race and ethnicity and without expiration dates. I must acknowledge the Government’s attempt to learn lessons from a similar verification pilot exercise conducted in Myebon last year. Yet, response to this latest initiative has been lukewarm at best. Many with whom I spoke, including representatives of the Kaman community, expressed frustration that citizens or those entitled to citizenship were required to undergo this process. Some in the Rohingya community also provided me with copies of National Registration Cards (pink cards) held by their parents and grandparents dating back generations. There was also distrust and scepticism of the Government’s initiatives given the revocation of the Temporary Registration Cards (white cards) last year and previous citizenship verification exercises. The residents in one village in Rakhine State refused to participate in the verification exercise for these reasons. Additionally, I was informed that they had not been given prior information on the exercise and had received no further explanation subsequently. 

If the verification exercise is extended throughout Rakhine State, it would be important to fully consult and involve those directly affected by this process. Clear timeframes should be established on when participants will have their status reviewed and when decisions on their applications can be expected. The Government must address the situation in Myebon where those granted citizenship continue to face restrictions and demonstrate that all those granted citizenship will automatically acquire the rights to which they are entitled. 

Religious intolerance; incitement to hatred

It is clear that tensions along religious lines remain pervasive across Myanmar society. Incidents of hate speech, incitement to discrimination, hatred and violence, and of religious intolerance continue to be a cause for concern. While I commend Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s commitment to combating and publicly condemning hate speech and incitement to violence against minorities, other public officials and political leaders must also speak out.

During my visit, I specifically addressed recent reported attempts to build pagodas or stupas on the property of or in close proximity to churches and mosques in Karen State. I also expressed concern at the recent mob attack resulting in the destruction of a house, mosque, a school and a Muslim cemetery in Bago. Whether deliberate or not, the incident can be seen as an attack on the past, present and future of one community. 

It is vital that the Government take prompt action, including by conducting thorough investigations and holding perpetrators to account. I am therefore concerned by reports that the Government will not pursue action in the most recent case due to fears of fuelling greater tensions and provoking more conflict. This is precisely the wrong signal to send. The Government must demonstrate that instigating and committing violence against an ethnic or religious minority community has no place in Myanmar. Perpetrators will be treated seriously in accordance with the law regardless of race, religious or ethnic background. 

At the same time, comprehensive measures to address the root causes of such tensions and violence must also be taken. Prevention should be prioritized, including through education, and information and media campaigns, in order to deconstruct discriminatory and negative stereotypes. Initiatives to promote interfaith and intercommunal harmony must also be taken in cooperation with civil society, as well as religious and community leaders. 

Realizing economic, social and cultural rights for the prosperity of all 

Priority attention on economic, social and cultural rights is also of fundamental importance. As Myanmar continues to open up, the impact of development projects on these rights is becoming increasingly prominent. Development is needed for increased prosperity but should not come at the cost of human rights. Careful planning should be undertaken to ensure a rights-based approach which maximises the benefits for all. 

I met an individual who will shortly lose her family home to a mega-development project. She and other villagers were given no opportunity to discuss the project, but were instead summoned and informed that they would have to leave their village. She does not know if or when she will receive compensation or if there will be relocation options provided. Across the country, hundreds of others face a similar situation. This is unacceptable, and priority must be given to ensuring that communities are consulted in a meaningful process, and that relocations are conducted in line with international standards. 

Time will be needed to develop and enforce the normative framework in this area, and to gain the capacity and expertise to properly scrutinise projects. In this vein, I welcome the decision of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation to halt Government timber extraction for one year. This will enable the Ministry to review the current state of forests and to ensure that they are used sustainably. In this regard, a similar temporary moratorium on large-scale development projects should be considered in order to conduct meaningful consultations with affected communities and full social and environmental impact assessments. 

During my visit, I met with civil society groups active in the jade mining areas. They told me of the dire conditions faced by local communities, including extensive environmental degradation, continuing land confiscations as the mines expand, and weekly deaths from vehicles and landslides, all conducted against a backdrop of disregard for the rule of law. I was pleased to hear that all companies were now required to complete environmental impact assessments in accordance with the new procedures, but further steps are needed. 

I have repeatedly underlined the need to resolve the issue of land confiscations, both historic and continuing. I was therefore pleased that the new Government quickly formed a new Central Committee to address this issue. The Committee recently completed its first returns, giving 7000 acres back to farmers. This is welcome progress. The Committee assured me of their desire to resolve the remaining cases, but many are complex and will take time. Whilst this process is continuing, priority should also be given to drafting a national land law, which can serve as a basis for fair and transparent land management going forward. Building on the National Land Use Policy, this should be done in a participatory manner, drawing on the expertise of civil society and international organizations. 

Realizing the right to education will be key to improving the prospects of Myanmar’s next generation. A recent census report on employment showed that one in five children are in employment rather than education. Birth registration rates remain low across the country, but particularly in some conflict areas where no registrations have taken place due to difficulties accessing registration centers. The birth registration rate of Muslim communities in Rakhine State is also alarmingly low. Given my professional background, I have a particular interest in this area and have offered my assistance to parliamentarians and others working on issues related to the rights of children. I hope this is one of several areas where we can work together going forward. 

Education for IDPs continues to be limited across the country. In all IDP camps I visited, ensuring access to education was the primary concern. In Kachin State, I was told of the lack of schools at the secondary and tertiary levels and low quality of education in the primary schools provided in the camps. In Rakhine State, I visited an IDP camp for the Rakhine community, where I was informed that children have to walk three hours each morning to reach a secondary school. In camps for Muslim communities around Sittwe, there is only one secondary school. Steps should be taken to secure universal access to education for all across the country, and priority attention should be given to IDP communities facing protracted displacement due to conflict. In Rakhine State, improving access to and the quality of education is one concrete and feasible step which can go a long way to improving the situation for all communities. It is particularly vital that restrictions impeding access to education for Muslim communities are removed.

Improving access to health care continues to be a priority for Myanmar, but particularly for IDPs in conflict-affected areas. This was another priority concern expressed to me in all IDP camps I visited. In Rakhine State, extending access to health care is vital for all communities and could provide a similar tangible step towards improving the situation on the ground. Of particular urgency is the need to remove restrictions preventing Muslims from accessing medical treatment in some Township Hospitals. Currently, Muslim communities are only able to seek treatment at Sittwe Hospital which, for some, is several hours’ travel. Even in medical emergencies, special permission to be referred to Sittwe Hospital is required, which is time consuming and cumbersome. This has resulted in preventable deaths and could lead to more if not urgently addressed. It is vital that all people are granted safe and timely access to health services without discrimination. As a minimum, it is important to ensure that all people (including Muslims and people of unresolved citizenship status) have safe access to all Township Hospitals in emergency cases. I raised this suggestion with several interlocutors and received assurances that steps towards this will be taken in this regard. I look forward to hearing of prompt action in this area. 

Conclusion

Let me conclude by reiterating my firm belief that Myanmar’s young democracy can only progress if human rights are fully mainstreamed into its institutional, legal and policy framework. Building a culture of respect for human rights must be a priority now and in the future. While I am aware of the need to give space and time for the new Government to address the many complex challenges facing the country, I must remain constructively and critically engaged and vocal in encouraging and advocating for greater progress on human rights. I must also continue to hold Myanmar accountable to its international human rights obligations. That is my mandate as Special Rapporteur. 

The international community also has a responsibility in this regard. In the rush to forge or strengthen political or economic ties, international actors must continue to prioritize human rights, particularly in business and investment relations. International actors should not undermine human rights priorities, including by remaining silent when confronted with human rights concerns or at worst, becoming complicit in perpetuating human rights abuses. The international community must remain fully engaged on human rights issues in Myanmar. It should also remain committed to providing necessary assistance and support to further the reforms in line with international human rights standards. It is vital that all actors work together to ensure human rights are respected and protected across Myanmar. 

At the start of my visit, I stated that my objective, as Special Rapporteur, is to continue to work closely with the Government and people of Myanmar, for the promotion and protection of human rights in the country. I reaffirm that pledge to you now.

Thank you.

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Annex – List of Meetings

Union Government Officials

• State Counsellor, Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister in the President’s Office

• Union Minister, State Counsellor’s Office; Working Committee for Cooperation with United Nations Agencies and International Organizations

• Union Minister of Defence

• Union Minister of Border Affairs; Central Committee for the Implementation of Stability, Peace and Development of Rakhine State

• Union Minister of Labour, Immigration and Population

• Union Minister of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement; National Disaster Management Committee

• Attorney General

• Union Minister of Ethnic Affairs

• Union Minister of Religious Affairs and Culture

• Union Minister of Education

• Union Minister of Information

• Union Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation

• Deputy Minister of Home Affairs

• Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces

Parliament

• Patron for the Union Parliament and Speaker of the Amyotha Hluttaw

• Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw

• Bills Committee of the Amyotha Hluttaw and Pyithu Hluttaw

• Fundamental Rights, Democracy and Human Rights Committee of the Amyotha Hluttaw and Pyithu Hluttaw

• Chair and members of the Legal Affairs and Special Cases Assessment Commission

Other institutions

• Myanmar National Human Rights Commission

• Myanmar Press Council

• Central Committee on Confiscated Farmlands and Other Lands

• Preparation Committee for the 21st Century Panglong Conference and members of the Joint Monitoring Committee

Rakhine State

• Chief Minister and representatives of the Rakhine State Government

• Members of the Rakhine Elders

• Muslim and Rakhine communities in Ponnagyun

• Displaced communities in Pyinnwar Wa

• Displaced Rakhine communities around Sittwe

• Muslim community in Aung Mingalar 

• Representatives of United Nations entities

• Representatives of international non-governmental organizations

• Consul of Bangladesh

• Former Chief Minister of Rakhine State and Member of State Parliament

• Human rights defenders 

Kachin State

• Chief Minister and representatives of the Kachin State Government

• Civil society actors working on the peace process; jade mining and extractive industries; humanitarian assistance to IDPs

• Jan Mai Kawng Catholic Church IDP Camp

• Le Kone Zion Baptist Church IDP Camp

Shan State

• Representatives of the Shan State Government in Lashio

• Representatives of United Nations entities

• Victims of human rights violations

• Civil society actors working on the peace process; humanitarian assistance to IDPs; human rights; women’s rights and gender issues

Civil society actors

• Lawyers

• Media workers

• Actors working on land rights issues; environmental issues; women’s rights and gender issues; youth issues; labour rights issues; peace process; freedom of religion

• 88 Generation Peace and Open Society; 

• Representatives of the Kaman community

• Representatives of international human rights non-governmental organizations

• Recently released political prisoners

• Center for Diversity and National Harmony

Others

• Members of the United Nations Country Team

• Representatives of the diplomatic community

• Rakhine Heads of Mission Group 

• Religious leaders

Detainee in Myitkyina Prison

• Laphai Gam

Insein Prison

• Min Min

• Maung Maung Lwin

• Win Hwe

• Win Naing

• Ye Thu Aung

• Zaw Min Oo

Source: United Nations Information Centre Yangon

By Zarni Mann & May Sitt Paing
The Irrawaddy
July 1, 2016

MANDALAY — A Muslim prayer hall in Lone Khin village of Hpakant Township, Kachin State was burned down by a mob on Friday afternoon.

Nearly 30 Muslim families in the village have fled since the outbreak of the riot.

According to residents of the village, the Muslim community had received an ultimatum from local Buddhist nationalists to demolish by Thursday what they claimed was an illegal extension to the Muslim prayer hall.

However, residents have claimed that the disputed structure was in fact an abandoned storeroom that had been used by the Ministry of Construction while building a bridge connecting the village some months ago.

After local Muslims dismantled the structure, the Buddhist nationalists then demanded that they demolish the actual prayer hall, claiming it had been constructed illegally.

“The Muslim community refused to demolish their prayer hall. Their religious leader said they would only do so if the government declared it illegal,” one of the local residents told the Irrawaddy. “That’s why the mob came to burn it.”

“When three fire engines came to put out the fire, they were obstructed by the mob,” he said.

He added that the mob was mostly made up of outsiders, numbering several hundred.

The police and army have now blocked the bridge on the road to Lone Khin village from Hpakant town.

A duty officer at the Mohnyin District police station confirmed the incident but refused to give detailed information because “the case is now under investigation.”

“We have no idea who was behind the incident. At the moment, state and district-level security forces are on the scene,” the officer said.

The incident comes after anti-Muslim rioting far away from Hpakant in Pegu Division’s Thuye Thamain village in Waw Township on June 23, which resulted in the destruction of a mosque, a Muslim cemetery, and a house and storeroom belonging to a Muslim family. Authorities chose not to take action against any of the perpetrators there.

By Elliott Prasse-Freeman
Foreign Policy
June 28, 2016

In Aung San Suu Kyi’s “democratic” Burma, the people are a silent partner.

RANGOON – In the November 2015 election, Burma’s long-standing opposition, the National League for Democracy (NLD), swept into office, promising change and new freedoms for the masses after a half-century of military rule. That the party is led by Aung San Suu Kyi, a widely revered Nobel Prize winner and long-time dissident, only added to expectations of dramatic change.

So far, though, things don’t appear to be turning out that way. Upon taking power, the NLD promptly proposed legislation that would reinstall some of the junta’s draconian restrictions on peaceful protest. And while many political prisoners have been released, the new government continues to pursue charges against some of the country’s most dedicated activists — such as Harn Win Aung, who has led resistance to a notorious copper mine built on land grabbed from displaced farmers. The NLD even censored a film at a human rights festival for portraying the military in a critical light.

The party has given no explanation for its actions. Indeed, on several crucial issues it has explicitly chosen to avoid taking a stand. One of the promises party activists made during the fall election campaign was to establish a legal definition of what constitutes a “political prisoner.” Yet recently, when a lawmaker from one of the ethnic minority parties raised the issue in parliament, the NLD declined to address it. Over the last two months, while the party has ruled, peace activists, workers, and right-wing nationalists alike have been charged with breaking protest laws. The democratically elected government appears singularly reluctant to dismantle the junta’s machinery of repression. Is it really possible that a political party comprised of and endorsed by hundreds, even thousands, of former political prisoners will become Burma’s new oppressor?

Aung San Suu Kyi’s defenders will likely object to such a characterization. They will point out that the NLD’s supermajority is not robust enough to mitigate the military’s constitutionally reserved bloc of 25 percent of the parliamentary seats. This pro-military contingent prevents the elected government from changing a constitution under which the armed forces retain control of key ministries responsible for defense and internal affairs (including the police). Some have argued that — at least for now — Burma is still the same militarized state it has been for a half-century. It’s not that the NLD wants to keep the military’s restrictions, say the new government’s supporters, it’s just that it hasn’t quite been able to force the changes through yet.

Perhaps. And yet Suu Kyi’s party has made no convincing case that it desires a more progressive approach. Suu Kyi’s party has made no convincing case that it desires a more progressive approach. It has blithely dismissed the concerns of human rights watchdogs Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who say that the protest law lags behind international standards. Moreover, the NLD has already shown that it can find ways to bypass seemingly intractable limitations when it wants to. When the military barred Aung San Suu Kyi from the presidency, her party simply created a new position for her above the presidency. Her party must deal with the reality of the military’s continued political power, but it appears to have the ability to advance a legislative agenda that could begin to alter Burma’s entrenched authoritarianism. Yet it is choosing not to.

The NLD’s inaction appears in a less benign light when one considers how the party is systematically ignoring the non-governmental sector. When I recently interviewed more than two dozen activists — from large national civil society organizations to grassroots campaigners — all lamented Aung San Suu Kyi’s unwillingness to include them in developing plans to address the country’s problems. Many of those I spoke with reported that she conveyed disdain for their work, raised doubts about their ethics, and questioned their relevance in the new “democratic” Burma. This seems a particularly disturbing irony in light of the important role the country’s civil society played in challenging the military regime.

Having noted the NLD’s hostility, some activists have begun to limit their activity. Many described a mid-May meeting of national organizations in which participants decided to delay a planned forum, concerned that it would raise the NLD’s ire. Members of ethnic organizations have described their tokenistic inclusion in the country’s peace process as “elitist, top-down… unlike the previously ‘joint’ inclusive design” of the military-linked government (as an ethnic activist commented by email). Grassroots activists, too, have found the new environment repressive: “To speak honestly, [the NLD] hates activists… If we distribute pamphlets about land grabs, labor abuses, and so on, we will become the target of the NLD,” Ko Saleiq, a Rangoon-based activist, told me. When I inquired whether this could mean prison time, he scoffed. “We are former political prisoners, we’re not afraid of prison.” He stressed that activists like him want to support the country’s first democratic regime in decades, not become its adversaries. Yet the NLD has rebuffed them at every turn. 

In truth, Burma’s version of democracy seems to mean a reduction in the country’s degree of authoritarianism, not a qualitative change to its political system. In many aspects, the NLD seems to be more interested in making cosmetic changes than in addressing the country’s fundamental problems. For instance, Aung San Suu Kyi’s first action as head of the new government was not to address land grabs or labor abuses but to lead a massive anti-litter campaign — a symbolic gesture that is meant to evoke order through cleanliness. Another noteworthy campaign is the recently-proposed ban of the betel nut, a mildly addictive carcinogenic substance the chewing of which produces the distinctive red spit stains that decorate the country’s corners and corridors. While the unilateral ban threatens the livelihoods of thousands of poor people, the NLD appears care more about the aesthetics of betel than such social dislocations. 

The party has also announced an ambitious and potentially disastrous plan to relocate urban squatters. A union organizer working in an industrial zone lamented this approach, pointing out that aesthetic concerns have trumped pro-poor policy. “Rather than address high costs of living, they simply think it is shameful for a good city to have squatters,” he said. “There is no land anyway because it was all sold off to the cronies. We don’t know if [the NLD] dares to have a face-off with the cronies or the military.” Rather than tackling these structural political and economic issues, the NLD prefers to try to sweep them under the rug. 

The party does have its democratic trappings — after all, it was elected overwhelmingly in a fair election. But its version of democracy has more than an edge of the old, authoritarian Burma. Its disdain for non-governmental activists, its obsession with the appearance rather than the substance of good governance, and its continued harassment of dissidents all suggest that the party views the people’s role in democracy as being limited to voting for those who will then make the decisions.

Once they have voted, Burma’s citizens are denied any further active role. 

A critical question is how this version of democracy will be received by the country’s long-marginalized masses. Under a formal authoritarian system, crushing dissent helps quiet the population through fear. In a new, more ‘democratic’ context, the same repressive tactics may spur furious opposition. The more the NLD represses citizens, while ignoring real problems, the more it may inspire real resistance – especially if the resentment for the party felt by some activists today solidifies into open antagonism. “It is we, the activists, who changed the country, not the NLD. We feel betrayed,” a Mandalay land and labor activist told me. 

For now, the NLD’s mandate and popular support remain strong. Farmers and workers across the country around told me that they trust this “people’s government” to resolve their problems. But those problems are not being resolved. Instead they are being displaced by the NLD’s politics of tidiness and citizen silence. As a result, the calm is unlikely to last forever. “We trust that the new government will not ignore our losses and our suffering. But if they do, we will fight back to the end,” farmers in Mattaya told me. 

For generations, Burmese expected to be regarded with contempt by their military rulers. Facing much the same treatment at the hands of the long-adored NLD is jarring. The party needs to start listening — or it runs the risk of alienating the very people who helped bring it to power. 

In the photo, a labor demonstrator is arrested by police in Tetkone township on May 18, during a protest march to central Naypyidaw. 

Photo credit: AUNG HTET/AFP/Getty Images 

YANGON -- An anti-Muslim Buddhist nationalist group in Myanmar is rapidly extending its influence, growing into a political force that could pose a serious challenge to the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi.

The group, known as Ma Ba Tha, holds rallies that attract huge crowds, a sign that its message strongly appeals to many people in the country.

Ma Ba Tha is winning popular support by playing on people's fears about a sharp increase in the Muslim population. The group's growing clout may soon force Suu Kyi, who leads the government as state counselor, to start tackling touchy religious issues she has been carefully eschewing so far.

Show of strength

At 6:00 a.m. on June 4, a dense throng of monks in orange and maroon robes were gathering at a monastery in Yangon's Insein township. In the precincts of the monastery, dotted with golden pagodas, rows of luxury foreign automobiles with special yellow license plates for religious leaders were parked. These vehicles are a conspicuous indicator of the wealth of senior Buddhist monks in the country.

Inside a main hall, sparkling chandeliers lit up an image of Buddha decorated with jewels.

More than 1,000 monks had come to the monastery to attend a ceremony to celebrate the third anniversary of Ma Ba Tha, or the Committee for the Protection of Nationality and Religion.

"Our aim is to defend national unity and culture," said the chair of the organization, Tiloka Biwuntha, whose name is Tilawka Bhivamsa. He is also known as Insein Ywama Sayadaw.

"Women in Myanmar suffer persecution by members of another religion day after day," the head priest said in an ominous tone. "Muslim 'sham citizens' are trying to become true citizens by deceiving the country."

As the leader ratcheted up his anti-Muslim rhetoric, the sound of voices in prayer coming from the audience also got louder, echoing strongly within the hall.

Ma Ba Tha, launched in June 2013, now has 250 branches across Myanmar and 5 million supporters, according to a public relations official. The group's rally was held in Yangon's Thuwana National Stadium and drew a full-capacity crowd. The core tenet of the group is the rejection of Muslim immigrants, whose population is surging.

A divide grows

Buddhism arrived in Myanmar by the 11th century and has thrived in the Southeast Asian nation. Devotees of Theravada Buddhism account for about 90% of the population. Myanmar's constitution gives Buddhism the status of "special religion" representing the country, and it is at the heart of nationalism among the people of Myanmar.

Muslims, who originally migrated from India and other neighboring countries to Myanmar's western state of Rakhine and Yangon, the largest city, form a minority group.

Starting in the 1990s, the military government suppressed Islam and other minority religions to win the support of Buddhist organizations. This has further enhanced Buddhism's status as an effective national religion.

But the process of democratization, which started in 2011 and led to the opening of the country's border, has triggered a massive influx of Muslims, including illegal immigrants, from Bangladesh and other countries. Observers predict that the results of a national census to be announced in August will show Muslims now constitute 10% of the country's population.

In the state of Rakhine, the principal flash point of religious conflict in the country, Muslims represent an estimated 30-40% of its population of 2 million. Many of them describe themselves as Rohingya Muslims, who are believed to have migrated to Myanmar during the period of the British rule of Burma.

As they have started demanding citizenship, tension has grown between the Muslims and the majority Buddhists.

Rising tensions

The 2012 murder of a Buddhist woman triggered a wave of violence between Buddhists and Muslims in Rakhine resulting in over 200 deaths.

The administration of then-President Thein Sein responded to the riots by segregating Rohingya Muslims in suburban refugee camps under the pretext of maintaining law and order. Several thousands of Rohingya fled the wretched living conditions at the camps and sailed on small boats to Malaysia and Indonesia as refugees. This has provoked international criticism against Myanmar.

The riots further fueled anti-Muslim sentiment among Myanmar's Buddhist majority, which has been behind the rapid expansion of Ma Ba Tha's influence.

On June 5, the group adopted a statement demanding that the government build a wall along Myanmar's border with Bangladesh and impose strict immigration control to prevent the illegal entry of Muslims into the country.

Ma Ba Tha is not a small-scale movement supported only by conservative monks. During the June 4 event, a throng of ordinary citizens gathered in front of a huge screen installed outdoors for public viewing.

One of the citizens watching the event, a 38-year-old female teacher, said she was telling her children not to associate with and never get married to a Muslim. There is no room for Rohingya in the country, she said, adding that Ma Ba Tha is the only organization that can prevent the influence of Islam from spreading in Myanmar.

A 45-year-old carpenter echoed her sentiment, saying, "I hate Muslims, who justify killings in the name of god. I want schools to enhance Buddhist education."

Many of the citizens who attended the event were intellectuals, including lawyers and doctors, which suggests broad public support for the group.

Enter the political realm

Ma Ba Tha started as a cultural movement for protecting Buddhist communities, but the movement has quickly taken on a strong political hue.

The group's political campaigns have been led by Ashin Wirathu, a radical monk from Mandalay known for his incendiary anti-Muslim speeches. Since the era of military rule, Ashin Wirathu has been championing anti-Islam measures, such as boycotting stores run by Muslims. He once was imprisoned for extremist activities.

But the monk is gaining political clout with the government.

In September 2015, a new law to protect Buddhists came into force. The law restricts marriages between Buddhists and people of other faiths and has a provision for criminal punishment against violations. Ashin Wirathu's group developed the draft bill and lobbied the Then Sein government to enact the law.

In the general election in the autumn of 2015, Ashin Wirathu campaigned for Thein Sein, who enacted the law, and criticized Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy for being lackluster in protecting Buddhism.

The NLD, which came to power by winning a landslide victory in the election, views Ma Ba Tha and Ashin Wirathu as potential political threats to its government as the group is gaining popularity with its increasingly radical messages.

During the June 4 event, about 500 copies of Wirathu's book on his Buddhist views were sold within hours.

Suu Kyi has been sidestepping the issue of Rohingya since even before the election, although she has now made some moves to win over the group. A senior Suu Kyi aide recently met with Ashin Wirathu and told him the NLD places much importance on Buddhism.

The new government appointed Thura Aung Ko, a former general who has repeatedly made anti-Muslim remarks, as minister for religious affairs and culture, in a bid to placate conservative Buddhists.

By compromising with radical anti-Muslim Buddhists, however, Suu Kyi risks alienating the U.S., which is urging the government to protect the rights of Rohingya. International human rights groups are also becoming increasingly more critical of Suu Kyi's failure to take effective action to intervene in the religious conflict between Buddhists and Muslims in her country.

Nikkei staff writer Thurein Hla Htway contributed to this report.

By Joshua Kurlantzick
Washington Monthly
June 29, 2016

The Rohingya may well be the most persecuted people on the planet, and nobody, including the United States, is lifting a finger to help.

Of all the ethnic, racial, and religious minorities in the world, wrote the Economist last year, the Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic group, may well be the most persecuted people on the planet. Today nearly two million Rohingya live in western Myanmar and in Bangladesh. Inside Myanmar they have no formal status, and they face the constant threat of violence from paramilitary groups egged on by nationalist Buddhist monks while security forces look the other way. Since 2012, when the latest wave of anti-Rohingya violence broke out, attackers have burned entire Rohingya neighborhoods, butchering the populace with knives, sticks, and machetes. They beat Rohingya children to death with rifle butts and, quite possibly, their bare hands. Since then, half the population of Myanmar’s Rohingya has been displaced. Some have tried to escape to other Southeast Asian nations on rickety boats often operated by human traffickers. If the migrants do not die of dehydration or heatstroke, they are frequently picked up by pirates or the Thai navy—which may not be much better than getting nabbed by pirates. Exhaustive reporting by Reuters seems to suggest that Thailand’s navy is closely involved in shuttling Rohingya refugees into slave labor in Thailand’s seafood, fishing, and other industries. Rohingya women who do not have enough to pay traffickers are forced into marriages or prostitution. 

Even if the Rohingya make it out of Myanmar, past the pirates, modern-day slavers, and Thai navy ships, there are few places for them to go. In nearby nations like Malaysia or Indonesia there is some sympathy for their co-religionists, but they are not willing to give the Rohingya permanent refuge. The Rohingya living in Malaysia operate in the shadows, working in the informal economy, unable to send their children to public schools, with no prospects of resettlement anywhere else.

No prominent nation outside of Southeast Asia is willing to do much for the minority group either. The Rohingya have no close ethnic or linguistic ties with a regional or global power: the Uighurs, a persecuted Muslim minority in western China, for instance, have ethnic and linguistic ties to Turkey. Bangladesh, from which some Rohingya originally migrated, is itself desperately poor and not interested in having the Rohingya settle there. Indeed, Bangladeshi security forces have often forcibly repatriated Rohingya, or kept them in squalid camps along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. No Western nations have opened their doors for the Rohingya the way they have, for instance, for the Tibetans who make it out of China.

For those Rohingya living in Myanmar the future is horrifically grim. They are packed into camps that are little more than internment centers, with residents given minimal food and shelter. Aid organizations face significant hurdles operating in Rakhine State, where most Rohingya live. Myanmar has expelled aid groups from parts of the state, and journalists have been repeatedly turned back from traveling there. (Reporting on an alleged massacre in western Myanmar in 2014, two New York Times reporters were detained.)

Abuses against the Rohingya have received some attention from the international media, but Myanmar’s western region is remote, making it harder for the best-financed media organizations to report on many abuses against the ethnic group. In part because Myanmar media is dominated by Buddhist, ethnic Burmese editors and writers, the Rohingya issue is routinely ignored or minimized as a minor problem.

Many Rohingya have lived in Myanmar for generations, having migrated there during the British Raj. In his new book, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar’s Hidden Genocide—one of the few accessible primers on this battered group—the Oxford and U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute fellow Azeem Ibrahim tells of how the Rohingya have never had an easy time in Myanmar. Beginning in 1962, when a junta seized power, up until the transition to civilian rule in the early 2010s, the Burmese government effectively stripped most Rohingya of their rights. In 1982, the military government removed the Rohingya from the list of 135 officially recognized ethnic groups in Myanmar. The Buddhist Rakhine people generally held a deep distrust of the Rohingya as interlopers, a distrust heightened during World War II, when many Rohingya fought with the British and many Rakhine fought alongside Japan.

Rakhine nationalists had always chafed at the junta’s rule (the Rakhines once had their own, powerful kingdom separate from the ethnic Burmans), but in 1978, according to Human Rights Watch, many Rakhines made common cause with the Myanmar army. They forced roughly 200,000 Rohingya to flee, mostly into camps in Bangladesh. Again, in 1991, units of the Myanmar army attacked the Rohingya, driving some 250,000 out of their homes, with many fleeing into Bangladesh once more. 

Then, in the early 2010s, the junta gave way to civilian rule, for myriad reasons (see “How Big a Success Is the Democratic Revolution in Burma?,” March/April/May 2016). From the beginning of the transition, it was clear that if the army loosened its grip, violent, nationalist groups would step into the political vacuum. Myanmar’s primary democratic party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), would do little to stop these forces. From interviewing many NLD members, I found that the party and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, were primarily concerned with building up their own power, reducing the role of the military, and winning over Buddhist voters in the first free national elections in twenty-five years. 

In the weeks before last November’s election, Suu Kyi herself told reporters not to “overexaggerate” the threat facing the Rohingya, and other prominent longtime democrats openly inveighed against the Rohingya, using racist taunts. When the highly anticipated national elections were finally held, there were no Rohingya—indeed, no Muslim candidates from any ethnic group—on the NLD slate. 

Ibrahim offers one of the fullest descriptions available of the current Rohingya crisis, retelling the narrative of the emerging genocide with force (if not always the clearest prose). He may not be arguing that the Rohingya are the most persecuted people on earth, but his research substantiates recent claims (including a detailed report by Yale Law School’s clinic on international human rights) that the Rohingya are targets of genocide. 

A genocide, according to the internationally accepted definition, is a campaign of violence conducted against one defined group, with the intention of eradicating them in whole or in part. Ibrahim shows that, starting in 2011 and 2012, the Rohingya in western Myanmar were not simply attacked by gangs or roving bands of thugs infuriated by reports (many untrue) of Rohingya raping Buddhist women or of fistfights between Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine shopkeepers. Instead, the Rohingya faced what appears to be an organized campaign to target their homes, property, and lives. There may have been an additional incentive; as Myanmar began to open up to foreign investment in the 1990s, it became clear that Rakhine State was quite rich in minerals. 

The exact genesis of the violence in western Myanmar in 2012 remains unclear. It may have started with Rohingya men raping and murdering a Rakhine girl, and then Rakhine Buddhist vigilantes murdering Rohingya bus travelers. Local police and army units stood around while the vigilantes pulled people off the bus and killed them, according to accounts of the attack by survivors. 

After the rape and then the unrest in four townships in western Myanmar, Rakhine politicians and monks spent months vilifying the Rohingya and calling for violence against the minority group. In October 2012, four months after the bus incident, violence erupted throughout Rakhine State, with a clear pattern of attacks. Groups of Buddhists were armed with swords, machetes, guns, Molotov cocktails, and even earth-moving equipment to raze Rohingyas’ homes and businesses; they had stockpiled weapons for months. The attacks appeared strikingly similar across Rakhine State, clearly designed to change the ethnic composition of the region. 

Some of the attackers had clear links to paramilitary organizations that had been affiliated with the former junta. The anti-Muslim violence spread to other parts of the country: Muslims of all ethnic groups were bombed, beaten, and shot in Yangon and Mandalay, the two biggest cities. 

Ibrahim’s reporting also corroborates the work of numerous human rights groups who have worked in western Myanmar. The transitional civilian government, led by the former general Thein Sein, did little to stop the burning, looting, and killing. The government did not bother to acknowledge the possibility that the attacks on Rohingya, preceded by open calls for ethnic cleansing, were part of a coordinated wave of violence. President Thein Sein’s office merely said that the violence was “riots [that had broken out] unexpectedly,” and then later declared that the only way to resolve unrest in Rakhine State was to deport all the “illegal” Rohingya living there—basically, most of the Rohingya population. 

The most damning reports on the pogroms came from a Human Rights Watch report: 

In the deadliest incident, on October 23, 2012, at least 70 Rohingya were killed in a massacre in Yan Thai village in Mrauk-U Township. Despite advance warning of the attack, only a small number of riot police, local police, and army soldiers were on duty to provide security. Instead of preventing the attack . . . or escorting the villagers to safety, they assisted the killings by disarming the Rohingya of their sticks and other rudimentary weapons they carried to defend themselves. 

As Rohingya fled their homes, the military and police maintained cordons around the camps in western Myanmar that were created, and quickly turned the camps into “open-air prisons,” in the words of Human Rights Watch. The security forces also created an armed ring around a de facto ghetto into which Rohingya were pushed. Once Rohingya men and women had fled into these ghettos, their land was often seized. The government sometimes refused to allow UN representatives to visit trapped Rohingya, and security forces routinely confiscate food and other aid provided by international groups for Rohingya in camps. 

In some ways, Myanmar’s increasing economic and political openness actually has made the situation worse for the Rohingya. Not only the United States but also most leading democracies, including regional powers like Japan and Australia, have opted for close relations with a freer Myanmar. As I discussed in an essay in the Washington Monthly earlier this year, the Obama administration has cited rapprochement with Myanmar as one of its greatest foreign policy successes, and now touts U.S.-Myanmar relations as a model for rapprochement with Cuba. 

The rich democracies, now invested diplomatically and economically in a Myanmar success story, are unwilling to spend too much time seriously investigating crimes being committed in Myanmar’s isolated west. They said little when, eight months before last November’s election, Thein Sein and the interim government essentially stripped the franchise from any Rohingya who still had voting rights. (The UN’s special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar has repeatedly raised the issue of Rohingya disenfranchisement, but gotten nowhere.) 

To be fair, some rights advocates in Congress have tried to raise the profile of abuses against Rohingya, holding hearings on the plight of the ethnic minority. When Obama himself visited Myanmar in 2014, he called on the country to face “the danger of continued [inter-communal] violence” but did not slow down rapprochement. The Obama administration has not come so far in boosting diplomatic and economic engagement with Myanmar’s government to do more than rhetorically tut-tut at it, even as many of Myanmar’s leaders continue to insist that all Rohingya are in the country illegally. 

Many leading democracies, including Japan, have larger stakes in Myanmar than the United States and are even less likely to take up the Rohingyas’ cause. Japan’s government, for instance, sees Myanmar as a strategic bulwark against China’s rising power in Asia. The region’s main multinational organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, operates by consensus, and has a weak, small secretariat in Jakarta that is ill-prepared to handle crises. Bangladesh continues to struggle with its own population challenges and chaotic politics. 

Other foreign countries that, at a different time in history, might have helped the Rohingya will also do nothing. Wealthy Persian Gulf states, whose leaders see themselves as custodians of the rights of Muslims worldwide, are preoccupied with the conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. India, which at times in its history has positioned itself as a champion of rights in Asia, is enjoying warm relations with Bangladesh, and is unlikely to take any steps that would alienate the Bangladeshi government. 

The NLD’s sweeping victory in the November 2015 elections, hailed around the world—and by many in Myanmar—as a major gain for democracy, will not help the Rohingya either. Not only before the elections but also after the vote, Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders have shown as little interest in the situation of the Rohingya as Thein Sein’s government did. (Suu Kyi has expressed a deep desire to promote peace with Myanmar’s ethnic minorities, but she has focused on relations with the ethnic groups that have their own armed insurgencies.) What’s worse, in last year’s November elections, the provincial party known for its anti-Muslim rhetoric won control of Rakhine State’s legislature. 

The NLD’s victory further reduces the possibility that foreign governments will pressure Myanmar’s leaders, and the new president selected by the NLD, the Suu Kyi loyalist Htin Kyaw, has demonstrated total fealty to the democracy icon but evinced little interest in the conflict in Myanmar’s west. 

Most chillingly, the new government of Myanmar has asked that the United States “not call the Rohingya people by that name because it does not recognize them as citizens,” said Suu Kyi’s spokesman, U Kyaw Zay Ya, reported the New York Times. He hastened to add that “Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi had not ordered the Americans to stop using the word or threatened consequences if they did.” 

Even if foreign countries, and Myanmar’s own leaders, suddenly decided to protect the Rohingya, it might be too late. The ethnic composition of western Myanmar has already been radically changed, many Rohingya families have been destroyed, and many Rohingya are too scared and economically devastated to ever return to their home villages. Next spring, when the dry season comes in Southeast Asia again, large numbers of Rohingya probably will head to ports in western Myanmar and try their luck again with makeshift boats, pirates, and the prospect of being enslaved in Thailand. As Time magazine reported in an extensive study of western Myanmar last fall, the Rohingya face the “point where complete extermination is a possibility. . . . [T]he final stages of genocide.” 

Joshua Kurlantzick is a senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Media Release From Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK

For Immediate Release Tuesday 28th June 2016

BROUK urges UN Human Rights Council to investigate crimes against humanity against Rohingya

As the United Nations Human Rights Council prepares to discuss the findings contained in a report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on : ‘Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar’, released on 20th June 2016, Tun Khin, President of the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK spoke at a side panel co-hosted by The International Peace Bureau, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Develpoment (FORUM-ASIA) among others.

Tun Khin provided a briefing on the latest human rights and political situation of the Rohingyas in Burma during the first three months of NLD-led Government. Chris Lewa Director of Arakan Project, presented an overview of the humanitarian conditions in the IDP camps, where Rohingyas have been confined and segregated for the past four years. She said, “Access to health care is a huge problem. Due to restriction of movements, emergency patients have to be referred with police escort to a special ward in Sittwe Hospital where medical care is very poor; overcrowded shelters are on the verge of collapsing; and 120,000 displaced Rohingyas are dependent on humanitarian aid denied access to means of livelihood”. The event was attended by representatives of dozens of missions to the UN, including from the USA, EU and OIC.

“The United Nations concluded that human rights violations against the Rohingya could be crimes against humanity, and must now set up an investigation into these crimes” said Tun Khin President of Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK. “If the UN fails to investigate violations against the Rohingya it would be equivalent to a police force saying a murder has been committed, but we are not going to investigate it.”

Tun Khin stated that the new national verification card (NVC) which the new NLD led government has tried to impose on Rohingya without consultation will not be accepted. “It’s not just the Rohingya, no ethnic group in Burma would accept being given these cards” he said.. “The cards are not a step in the right direction. They are an attempt by the government to be seen to be doing something while avoiding addressing difficult issues.

BROUK also stated that when members of the international community stop using the word Rohingya, it is not a neutral step to facilitate a calmer situation. Instead it gives encouragement to racists and nationalists and makes the situation worse. “We are Rohingya and we want the international community to call us Rohingya. We strongly object to the new term Muslims in Rakhine State which the NLD led government is trying to impose on us, denying our identity, which is a key part of the denial of our rights.

Tun Khin stated that delaying difficult and controversial decisions only prolongs the problem and the suffering. As the continued campaigns against the Rohingya, and renewed anti-Muslim violence have demonstrated, the NLD led government does not have time or space to delay action. Action and strong leadership is needed now to stop hatred, violence and discrimination escalating.

Tun Khin expressed disappointment that despite the United Nations issuing a report stating that human rights violations suffered by our people could amount to crimes against humanity, no country has publicly called for action to end these crimes. 

We urge UN Human Rights Council to take note of the recommendations in the High Commissioner’s Report and call on the NLD led government to implement the following key steps immediately;

First: Action on hate speech. Those inciting hatred and violence against Rohingya, Muslims and other ethnic and religious minorities have continued to do so with impunity under the NLD led government.

Second: The immediate lifting off all restrictions on freedom of movement and on humanitarian access to Rohingya, Rakhine and other communities in Rakhine State. These restrictions, which have been continued by the NLD led government, are costing lives. There can be no excuse for keeping them in place.

Third: Bringing the 1982 citizenship law into line with international law and Burma’s UN treaty obligations. This law lies at the root of many of the human rights violations and discrimination suffered by the Rohingya. It is inherently unfair and discriminatory.

Chris Lewa also urged the Human Rights Council to follow up on the recommendations listed in the High Commissioner’s report and to include them in the March 2017 Human Rights Council resolution on Burma.

For more information please contact Tun Khin +44 7888714866.

The UN report is available here http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20137&LangID=E

By Moe Myint
The Irrawaddy
June 27, 2016

RANGOON — Around 300 Arakanese nationalists, monks and civil society organizations in Sittwe, Arakan State, convened a meeting on Sunday in a monastery leading to a decision to launch a “poster campaign for every Arakanese House” throughout the state.

The campaign intends to air their dissatisfaction with the government’s use of the term “the Muslim community in Arakan State” to refer to the Rohingya minority.

Arakan National Party (ANP) Secretary Htun Aung Kyaw confirmed the meeting agenda, which, he said, focused on four things: sending a letter to the union government calling on it to refer to the Rohingya as “Bengali,” a widely-used term implies that they are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh; using “the Arakan Race” to refer to themselves instead of “Buddhists from Arakan State;” creating a poster campaign throughout the entire state, as well as organizing a massive protest.

Than Htun, a nationalist who is actively involved in anti-Rohingya campaigns, said the group gathered because they were upset with the government’s new terminology, which was used by Burma’s representative at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, Switzerland.

Than Htun urged the current government to use the previous government’s term “Bengali,” and said they were preparing to write a letter to State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and other lawmakers that will be sent within one week.

Of the poster campaign discussed at the meeting, he said, “I couldn’t say exactly when that will start. Maybe this week.”

According to another participant, the main outcome of the meeting was to write, “We don’t accept ‘Muslims from Arakan State’” on posters and put them up in front of every Buddhist house in Sittwe, the Arakan State capital. He told The Irrawaddy that a recently formed committee held a meeting on Monday and has decided to hold protests in several townships in Arakan State.

The Rohingya are a Muslim minority in Arakan State, many of whom have been forced out of their homes due to violence and have been living in camps for internally displaced persons since 2012.