Latest Highlight


By Antoni Slodkowski and Simon Webb
February 6, 2016

Naypyitaw/Yangon -- As Aung San Suu Kyi's lawmakers smiled for the cameras at the first sessions of Myanmar's parliament, a summit of generals convened at a base just minutes from the chamber. On every mind was the same question: who will be the country's next president?

The parallel events summed up the complex nature of the political transition: a much-publicized election of parliament speakers at which former foes from Suu Kyi's party and the military shook hands, while behind closed doors the country's top power brokers met to hammer out how they will run Myanmar.

After a quiet period following Suu Kyi's massive election win in November, negotiations have entered a critical stage since a meeting between army chief Min Aung Hlaing and Suu Kyi on Jan. 26, lawmakers and diplomats close to the process say.

With its huge mandate Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) can chose the next president but, under the constitution written by the army before it ceded power in 2011, she herself cannot take the job. The NLD wants that changed.

"Our first priority includes amending laws which are out of date and not in harmony with the present situation," Tun Tun Hein, a member of the NLD's governing council, told reporters after being appointed chairman of the key lower house bill committee. "The constitution also needs amending since it's one of the laws."

The army has so far insisted it wants no change to the constitution and would not countenance Suu Kyi's presidency. She has struck a defiant note, saying she would lead the country "standing above the president".

Now, some Yangon-based diplomats say Min Aung Hlaing might be tempted to compromise in return for a pledge from Suu Kyi that she would not infringe on the military's vast economic interests nor seek revenge for abuses under years of junta rule.

As well as burnishing his legacy, such a move would also put responsibility for fixing an impoverished country riven by decades of ethnic conflict squarely on Suu Kyi, they say. 

"If you keep her without any official title she is free to strategise without the day-to-day burden of running the country," said a Western diplomat, who did not want to be named because of the sensitivity of the matter.

The New York Times on Friday cited two senior members of the NLD as saying that talks with the military have included a possible deal that would allow Suu Kyi to be president in exchange for senior government posts. It did not name the party leaders and said details of the negotiations were murky.

BLURRED RED LINES

It is not known what was discussed at this week's meeting at army headquarters, which sits close to the sprawling parliament complex in Myanmar's remote capital Naypyitaw.

Confirming the gathering coincided with the opening week of the newly elected legislature, two sources familiar with the matter said senior commanders from across the country gather a few times a year to discuss military matters.

But politics was likely high on the agenda - the military retains a central role in the former Burma, with a quarter of seats in parliament reserved for it, along with control of the security forces and the civil service.

Moreover, with its block of seats in parliament the military wields a veto over any changes to the constitution, which requires a super-majority of more than 75 percent.

Asked about the chances that the constitution could be amended to allow Suu Kyi to be president, Major General Tauk Tun, the most senior military lawmaker in the lower house, did not entirely rule it out, while at the same time sticking to the military's line on the sanctity of the 2008 charter.

"We'll do it according to the constitutional provisions," he said.

Even if the two sides were to agree to change the constitution, it would still require a nationwide referendum.

To circumvent that lengthy process, article 59 (f), which bars anyone with a foreign spouse or children from the presidency and so disqualifies Suu Kyi, whose sons are British citizens, could be suspended, according to Aung Ko, a former general and Suu Kyi ally, and NLD legal experts.

Whether that would be lawful remains open to debate, and even some Suu Kyi supporters worry about the precedent it could set.

"Personally I do want Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to become the president, but I honestly don't think the constitution should be suspended since this is not a good tradition to hand down to future parliaments," said lawmaker Ba Shin of the Arakan National Party, a large ethnic party from Rakhine State.

The NLD has until the end of March to organize the presidential vote in the parliament, but top leaders said they may carry it out next week or toward the end of February, suggesting the two sides could be close to striking a deal.

"They are trying to find a solution that doesn't step on everyone's red lines," said Kelly Currie, senior fellow at the Washington-based Asia-focused think tank Project 2049 Institute.

"Most likely a more straightforward situation is better. Better than Suu Kyi governing but not having a position."

(Additional reporting by Hnin Yadana Zaw and Aung Hla Tun; Editing by Alex Richardson)

U Wirathu at a conference on religious violence at a monastery on the outskirts on Yangon, June 13, 2013. (Ye Aung Thu / AFP)

February 5, 2016

YANGON — A war of words has erupted between senior National League for Democracy member U Win Htein and U Wirathu, a leading figure in the Buddhist nationalist Ma Ba Tha movement, over a violent video reenactment of an infamous murder that sparked statewide unrest in Rakhine State and led to the ongoing segregation of much of the state’s Muslim community.

On January 29th, U Wirathu posted to his Facebook account a video graphically recreating the 2012 rape and murder of Rakhine woman Ma Thida Htwe in Ramree Township at the hands of a group of Muslim men. U Wirathu told the Myanmar Times that the video was a trailer for a longer feature planned for release in the following months, with the intent of demonstrating to the incoming NLD government the need to “prioritise protecting the race and religion of the country”.

The video was viewed more than 100,000 times before it was pulled on Monday for violating Facebook’s community standards.

The following day, NLD spokesman and former political prisoner U Win Htein condemned the video in an interview with the Myanmar Times, questioning whether U Wirathu could rightfully be considered a monk and his motivations for publicising the video.

U Wirathu hit back on Wednesday evening, publishing a long denouncement on Facebook addressed to ‘U Win Htein, who didn’t protect race and religion’.

“Even both of us are sacrificed for the country, our monks are better than you politicians,” he wrote. “Why do monks support me? Why do they respect me? If you think about that, you would understand. I can prove my character and morals are far better than politicians.”

U Wirathu also made reference to the time both men were inmates at Mandalay’s Obo Prison, claiming that political prisoners received better treatment than monks while their families were internationally feted.

Presented without comment alongside the post were a screenshot of the Myanmar Times article quoting U Win Htein and several pictures of U Win Htein’s daughter and her foreign husband, some of which included the couple’s infant child.

U Win Htein spent nearly two decades in prison in the wake of the 1988 uprising and subsequent military takeover in Myanmar. Amnesty International documented his subjection to a month-long period of torture soon after his first arrest in 1989, which left him with high blood pressure, migraines and inflamed vertebrae. He told the Financial Times last year he now required the use of oxygen tank to sleep at night.

Race and Religion

Common doctrinal interpretations of Theravada Buddhist lore, Myanmar’s Constitution and the Sangha Mahanayaka committee — the governing body for the country’s Buddhist clergy — all prohibit ordained monks from participating in politics.

This has not stopped leading members of Ma Ba Tha — also known by its English name, the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion — from intruding into politics, including the highlighting of alleged cases of criminal activity by Muslims, agitating for the passage of the so-called ‘race and religion’ laws to extend greater government control over marriage and conversions, and supporting the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party during last year’s elections.

Ma Ba Tha’s members have often defended their activities by claiming the protection of the country’s ‘race and religion’ transcends the political realm.

The murder of Ma Thida Htwe, depicted in the initial video published by U Wirathu, has in recent years become a touchstone for a Buddhist nationalists claiming that Myanmar’s Muslim community poses a threat to the country’s government-recognised ethnic groups and Buddhist majority worship.

The week after Ma Thida Htwe’s death in May 2012, 10 Muslims travelling through Taungup were dragged from a bus and beaten to death by an angry mob — reportedly in the false belief that the perpetrators were among the group — who then set the corpses of the victims on fire. The violence in Rakhine quickly escalated, with Muslims disproportionately represented among the estimated 170 people killed in the following months. A further 140,000 Muslims were displaced by the end of 2012.

In 2014, Muslim shopkeepers were accused of the rape of a Buddhist woman in Mandalay, reports of which were spread on social media by Ma Ba Tha members, triggering three days of deadly riots in that city. The allegation was later found to be groundless, resulting in 21-year jail terms for five people convicted of spreading the false rumour.

The previous year, similar communal riots saw a Muslim orphanage razed to the ground in Meiktila, U Win Htein’s hometown and his constituency in the Pyithu Hluttaw until his retirement last year. In the aftermath, U Win Htein said he felt ashamed to be from the Mandalay Region town, leading to calls for his impeachment from Buddhist constituents.

Arakan National Party lawmaker Khin Saw Wai attends the first session of the Lower House of Parliament on Feb. 1, 2016. (Photo: Khin Saw Wai / Facebook)

By Moe Myint
February 5, 2016

RANGOON — An Arakanese lawmaker warned the National League for Democracy (NLD) on Friday against pursuing amendments to several controversial laws that critics contend discriminate against religious and ethnic minorities in the country.

Khin Saw Wai, a Lower House lawmaker with the Arakan National Party (ANP) embarking on her second term in Parliament, said the party would oppose any moves to amend either the 1982 citizenship law or the package of four so-called “race and religion protection laws” which were passed by Parliament last year.

“Those laws are our life,” Khin Saw Wai told The Irrawaddy. “We will oppose [amendments] as much as we can.”

Burma’s widely criticized 1982 citizenship law states that only recognized ethnic nationalities and others that settled in the country before 1823 are automatically entitled to Burmese citizenship. The law effectively denies the Muslim Rohingya population that primarily resides in Arakan State from obtaining citizenship.

Khin Saw Wai contended that in the northern Arakan State townships of Buthidaung and Maungdaw, the Arakanese proportion of the population was only 3 percent. The ANP lawmaker said she was worried of “race annihilation” in the Muslim-majority townships.

The Arakan National Party was at the forefront of efforts to overturn the voting rights of temporary identification cardholders, a form of identification also knows as a “white card” that was held by hundreds of thousands of Rohingya. The government complied and revoked the cards last year.

The Rohingya population are theoretically able to register in an ongoing but ill-defined citizenship verification scheme. The process has in the past been criticized for requiring participants to register under the government’s preferred term for the group as “Bengali.”

Khin Saw Wai said most of the Muslim population had not taken part in the process.

“Of course, many people entered illegally across the Bangladesh border to Burma; how can they apply for citizenship? That is the reason why they don’t collaborate,” she said.

The ANP’s vice-chairman Khin Pyi Soe said if the NLD attempted to make changes to the citizenship law, the Arakanese party would convene a central committee meeting to formulate their response.

The NLD, which won almost 80 percent of contested seats in last year’s general election, has been reluctant to speak out on behalf of the persecuted Rohingya minority, over 100,000 of whom languish in makeshift camps after religious violence erupted in the western state in 2012.

The “race and religion” laws, also cited as inviolable by Khin Saw Wai, were sponsored by hardline Buddhist nationalist group Ma Ba Tha and fast-tracked through Parliament last year.

The package of four laws place new criminal sanctions on polygamy and adultery, add restrictions to religious conversions and interfaith marriage, and give the government new powers to implement birth control measures.

Rights groups and other observers claim the laws are aimed at Burma’s Muslim population, estimated to comprise about 5 percent of the country’s population.

The ANP officials were more supportive of the NLD’s purported push to suspend Article 59(f) of the Constitution which effectively bars the party’s chairwoman, Aung San Suu Kyi, from assuming the presidency.

Khin Pyi Soe and Khin Saw Wai said, personally, they both backed the move of which the NLD has publically said little.



By Lizabeth Paulat
February 5, 2016

This week a landmark event took place in Myanmar when Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy Party (NLD) finally took power in Parliament. It’s a moment that has been decades in the making and is seen as a historic step for the country – which has long struggled with a military dictatorship.

Suu Kyi spent much of her life as a political prisoner for challenging Myanmar’s dictatorship. Under house arrest she continued to champion democracy, winning a Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts. Yet questions over possible changes the NLD will bring Myanmar have caused anxiety within the country.

The first real question is: Who will become president? In Myanmar the president is chosen by members of Parliament, not the public. And with Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD party holding the vast majority of seats in parliament she might seem like a clear frontrunner.

However, despite overwhelming popularity, Suu Kyi is technically barred from the position. That’s because in 2008 the constitution was amended by the military government to prohibit anyone with foreign relatives from becoming president. With a foreign husband and two children with UK passports she is not technically eligible. And because the military holds 25 percent of the seats in parliament, the constitution cannot be re-amended without their approval.

This has caused a general sense of unease in the country. On Wednesday, in her first speech since the NLD took power she urged the public to remain patient and calm telling them, “Don’t be anxious. You will know when the time comes.”

However, many NLD parliamentarians were more effusive, celebrating their majority takeover. It’s reported that many wore orange shirts in solidarity, to contrast with the minority green military shirts on the parliament floor.

One MP named U Min Oo told The Guardian, “It’s the second time I have been elected but this time it feels different, because the NLD is majority. It’s an overwhelming majority, but we all come from different backgrounds and we can guarantee diversity.”

However, his statement brings up a considerable controversy that is plaguing the country. This involves the Muslim Rohingya population in Myanmar that is routinely prosecuted by the majority Buddhist population. The position of extremist Buddhists, who often call for violence and limits to the Rohingya’s reproductive rights, has been described as “genocidal.” Rohingya are often forced into IDP camps, refused citizenship and voting rights, and face such deplorable conditions that thousands have chosen to flee on boats and starve at sea, rather than stay in Myanmar.

Displaced Rohingya in Myanmar’s Rakhine State – Credit: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

A 2015 report by Human Rights Watch chastised Myanmar for their persecution, pointing out that systematic killings – confirmed by the UN – were taking place within Rakhine State.

And despite nearly five million Muslims living in Myanmar, the NLD does not actually have any Muslims in their party. In fact, despite winning a Nobel Peace Prize and being seen as a great champion of democracy, Suu Kyi has a shaky history with the Muslim Rohingya minority. After winning the elections last year, Suu Kyi’s aide told reporters that they had, “other priorities” than the persecution of Muslims. He also went onto spout the extremist Buddhist agenda that Rohingya were foreigners. This is a position that has long been refuted by historians.

Her silence on the issue has also prompted comments from the Dalai Lama who told an Australian paper, “It’s very sad. In the Burmese case I hope Aung San Suu Kyi, as a Nobel laureate, can do something.”

Human rights advocates are hoping that with a pro-democracy majority in power, human rights reforms will begin to unfold. However, many feel that until a president is chosen, it will be impossible to know what the future holds for the Southeast Asian nation.

Photo Credit: Htoo Tay Zar/Wikimedia

(Photo: Soe Zeya Tun/Reuters)

February 5, 2016

At long last conceding electoral victory to Aung San Suu Kyi the military regime has handed over government to people's elected representatives who were sworn in as members of Myanmar's bicameral parliament. Some 600 members, including about a hundred former political prisoners, took oath of office on Monday amidst an air of hope and despair - hope that they would introduce institutional reforms to strengthen democracy and despair that they won't be able to elect Suu Kyi as president of the country. Under a Suu Kyi specific constitutional mandate anyone having foreign husband and/or children cannot be elected president of Myanmar. Reports that she was in touch with military to remove this ban have been quashed, proving right her premonition and hence her oft-quoted decision to govern from behind the scene. And that she will, given it is she who won her National League for Democracy 80 percent of the contested seats, with overwhelming support of Myanmar's ethnic minorities who constitute 40 percent of country's 51 million populations. The sitting president, Thein Sein, a general-turned-politician, will step down in March and NLD nominee will take over. But, as Washington said in its congratulatory message, 'impediments remain to realisation of a full democratic and civilian government'. The military will not only retain 25 percent of seats in the newly-elected parliament - just as ex-president Suharto had Golkar party in the Indonesian parliament - but also some key ministries. But expectation is that finding itself increasingly a pariah in the emerging democratic ambience world over the military rulers would like to keep a low profile, just as they have over the last few years. 

Be it in Africa or Latin America, and now in Myanmar, the young, nascent democracies' inheritance from the monolithic dictatorial regimes is invariably a bitter harvest of outstanding problems and 'swept under the carpet' unresolved issues and disputes. Of course, they inherit strong centres, concentrated powers tucked away and insulated from mainstream at places like Naypyidaw, as they often are, but nothing concrete in terms of institutions and systems. So will be the case for Suu Kyi. Her most formidable challenge is going to be picking up a president, who should not only remain loyal but also act as a puppet, which is a risky proposition given enormous powers that rest in the office of president of Myanmar. She would be also obliged to keep the military in good humour. Under the constitution, three key ministries - home affairs, defence and border affairs - remain under the control of the army chief. Home affairs include administration and border affairs deals with minorities' heartlands - both without which the elected government would not be able to introduce institutional reforms and bring ethnic minorities to beat their swords into ploughshares by joining the national mainstream. 

The Rohingya Muslims did not vote for Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy candidates - because they had no votes. Thanks to her predecessors' apathy who didn't want to run afoul of ethnic Rakhine Buddhists majority and had declared the Rohingyas illegal immigrants and deprived them of their basic human and political rights. The world expects of the Nobel laureate to restore Rohingyas' citizenship and offer them equal opportunity even if it enrages the Rakhine Buddhists. Rohingyas have been citizens, even rulers, of Myanmar, formerly Burma, for centuries. Currently thousands of Rohingya Muslims are trapped in kind of concentration camps. Who should know their pain better than Suu Kyi who spent 15 years in house arrest.

A camp of Rohingya refugees at Kutupalang of Ukhiya upazila in Cox's Bazar district. photo: Anurup Kanti Das

By Syed Munir Khasru
February 5, 2016

More than 1 million refugees have entered Europe by land and sea in 2015. The mass exodus of people from North Africa and Middle East have made the migrant crisis Europe's worst since World War II. While more than 80% of the migrants have arrived by sea routes, the fierce winter has not been able to slow down the daily influx, particularly in Greece. Europe has been struggling to deal with these large groups of helpless people, registering them as migrants and refugees, catering to their basic needs of shelter and food. In many stances, relocation of the migrants to share burden among the EU nations have failed due to resistance from both some of the EU countries as well as migrants who wanted to migrate to their country of choice. Hence, balancing the crisis has become a key challenge for Europe both socially and economically.

While there is ongoing debate on Europe's policy on refugee management, Bangladesh has experience and learnings from the successful refugee migration and repatriation in a number of cases. During the liberation war in 1971, approximately 10 million refugees from Bangladesh fled to neighbouring India facing brutal aggression by the Pakistani military force. After the 9-month-long war ended, they were successfully repatriated back to their homeland. Bangladesh also has successfully managed the waves of Rohingya refugees who have fled from Myanmar at different stages in time. Despite resource constraints, Bangladesh has successfully repatriated majority of the refugees through mass repatriation and provided citizenship to many of them who chose to stay back. Even in the context of Biharis, a large portion of the minority chose to stay back after 1971; many of them in recent years have applied of citizenship and have been granted. Hence, the country has a strong record of success stories in dealing with migrant flow as both the source and destination country. These case studies could provide substantial learning evidence for bothpragmatic policy resolution as well as effective means to deal with the migrant crisis facing Europe. 

In the face of Pakistani aggression on Bengali civilians of the then East Pakistan, millions of Bengali refugees fled to the bordering states of India, particularly West Bengal, Tripura, Meghalaya and Assam. The humanitarian and economic crisis faced by the Bengalis was overwhelming as hundreds of refugee camps were established along the Indo-Bangladesh border that sheltered the impoverished and panic stricken people of Bangladesh. India provided training and healthcare support to the MuktiBahini and bolstered the diplomatic movement for Bangladesh's acceptance as a new country in the world map. By the end of the war, repatriation of refugees began; starting in early December 1971 and eventually gaining speed after the surrender of Pakistani Army on the 16 of the month, the mass repatriation of over 9million refugees was complete by February 1972. This was largest mass repatriation operation after World War II, accomplished with the UNHCR and coordinated efforts on both sides of the border.

Even though majority of the refugees did not have food and shelter in their newly liberated country, they accomplished the repatriation actively and willingly travelling by foot, rickshaws, vans, bicycles, trucks, buses and trains. The refugees were provided with food for the journey, medical assistance, and two weeks' basic rations during their return. 271 transit camps were set up to provide medical services, food rations and free transport. By the end of 1972, USD 6.3 million worth of repatriation contributions were transferred to Bangladesh government to finance relief and rehabilitation of the returnees.

UNHCR endorsed an agreement between the Indian Red Cross and the Bangladesh Red Cross to transfer equipment and supplies to nutritional centres for use at the transit and rehabilitation camps in Bangladesh. However, many of the refugees returned directly to their communities without registration at either of the camps across the two neighbouring countries. The UNHCR liaison office in Dhaka worked closely with the United Nations East Pakistan Relief Operation to coordinate the international aid and assistance since the cyclone in 1970. The mass repatriation in Bangladesh was one of the major ones that took place in the 1970s including some 300,000 refugees returning to Cambodia mainly from Thailand in 1979, and some 200,000 Rohingyas from Bangladesh to Myanmar in a more controversial operation in 1978-79. Repatriation has been a common phenomenon in the Third World as a gesture of support and assistance; integration into new societies and permanent migration is not the only solution even in the case of Europe. In 1978, religious and sectarian conflict spurred in Burma after the Operation Nagmin led to the prosecution of thousands of Rohingya and Chinese minorities. The sudden rise in the number of arrests and harassment of the Arakanese Muslims, often accompanied by use of brute force, after a long period of sectarian intolerance resulted in the mass exodus of the Rohingyas into Bangladesh.

The Bangladesh government claimed that 252,000 Rohingyas sought refuge in 11 refugee camps, while the numbers quoted by Burmese official sources were much less. During June-July 1978, the two neighbours settled for a repatriation agreement which resulted in the return of 187,250 refugees to Myanmar between the months of August and December. The process was highly controversial as international authorities suspected forced and induced return of the Rohingyas. However, due to continued conflict in Myanmar, Bangladesh faced another mass influx of about 250,000 Rohingya refugees in the year 1991 in the coastal districts of Teknaf, Ramu, Ukhia and Cox's Bazar.

The second round of refugee movement was initially considered as a short term problem by the Bangladesh government and hence they were provided with temporary shelters, food, medical and health care services and sanitation facilities. However, soon it was realised to be a bigger burden that led to subsequent negotiations with the government of Myanmar and signing of a Joint Statement for repatriation. Repatriations during 1992 were alleged forcible and faced protests by UNHCR and other NGOs. As a result, UNHCR withdrew from the program in December 1992 and the controversial coercion for repatriation continued and another 50,000 people were sent back by 1994.

Photo: Anurup Kanti Das

Global criticisms eventually changed the internal dynamics of the Rohingya refugee treatment in Bangladesh and UNHCR was once again involved in the process to interview refugees on their willingness to return. Soon the rate of monthly repatriation picked up accompanied by change of policy within the UNHCR to provide for mass registration of repatriation by refugees that indicate about 90 percent of the returnees after 1994 said "yes" to repatriation. Today, more than 200,000 Rohingya refugees reside in Bangladesh, while only about 33,000 of them are supported by UNHCR. The government of Bangladesh began the official census in to determine the number of unregistered Rohingya refugees, many of whom have been reintegrated into the Bangladeshi society.

Similar is the case for Biharis who have been living in Bangladesh since 1971. Non-Bengali Pakistani Muslims, a majority of whom originate from the Indian State of Bihar before partition in 1947, are mainly referred to as Biharis. In 1973, the governments of India, Pakistan and the newly liberated Bangladesh signed the trilateral New Delhi Agreement which incorporated the repatriation of three major groups of people, namely, Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian internees in India, all Bengalis in Pakistan, and Biharis in Bangladesh. The United Nations assisted the repatriation through UNHCR working closely with the Red Cross, resulting in the movement of 90,000 people from Pakistan to Bangladesh, and over 44,000 from Bangladesh to Pakistan by January 1974. By February, over 200,000 refugees had been repatriated under the agreement. This mass repatriation played a significant role in Pakistan recognising Bangladesh as sovereign nation on 22 February 1974 and the beginning of diplomatic relations.

Over the years the Biharis, mainly living in the refugee camps grew in number. Their economic activities and lifestyle gradually reintegrated into the Bengali society despite the presence of a certain degree of social exclusion. The Biharis have been living in Bangladesh in a peaceful manner with little or no uprising/struggle for repatriation. In 2007, the Bangladesh government made provisions for a new policy to provide citizenship to the Biharis or Urdu-speaking people born after the time of independence in Bangladesh upon application. In May 2008, the Dhaka High Court declared 150,000 Urdu-speaking Muslim refugees as Bangladeshi citizens with voting and every other constitutional right. However, many of the first generation Biharis still possess the wish to repatriate to Pakistan while second and third generation members of this community who have been well integrated into the society opt to claim rights as citizens and continue settlement in the country they know as home.

Bangladesh being a third world country have time and again proved to be sensitive to refugee issues. Any form of refugee crisis has been considered a humanitarian crisis rather than an economic and social burden. With the support of global aid and international support, such display of sensitivity can also be learned by some of the European nations too concerned about preserving their ethnic identity at the expense of humanity. Crisis in Syria is far from resolved and migrants from other destinations as well are being sent back to their place of origin to keep the pressure under control.

Under such circumstances, European policies could manoeuvre a softer approach to the migrants instead of strengthening border control and making people endure the European winter under open sky and freezing temperature. Helpless boat people of the Mediterranean can be saved from being drowned with concerted international support emanating from all stakeholders- political leaders, business community, NGOs, social activists, and media. Reintegration of some refugees in the long run into the European society is still an option for a continent which is in need of a working population as it struggles to provide for a relatively larger population of elderly citizens who have retired from active service.

What Bangladesh has shown is that for effectively responding to the refugee crisis, it is not the resources and geopolitical clout that matters most as the country is not strong in either counts. What matters most is the human dimension of the problem and the political willingness to be responsive to a humanitarian crisis with both humanism and pragmatism. On all these counts, Bangladesh has done much better than anyone could have done under similar circumstances and resource constraints.

The author is a Professor at the Institute of Business Administration (IBA), University of Dhaka

By Tan Hui Yee
The Straits Times
February 4, 2016

BANGKOK - He was a Rohingya Muslim whose family operate a fleet of boats in Myanmar's troubled Rakhine state. She was a Buddhist shopkeeper living in a village next to his.

In a region riven by ethnic and religious tension, their union was not just rare, but downright dangerous. Faced with persistent intimidation, they fled their homeland and went on a long and treacherous journey that eventually brought them to Thailand early last year (2015).

Mr Abdul Islam was 19 years old when he met 28-year-old Ms Asimah in 2008. She had to travel twice a week to nearby Buthidaung town to restock the groceries in her shop. 



The quiet, square-jawed young man waived the 1,000 kyat (S$1) boat fare each time, because "we are neighbours".

One day - two years after they first met - Ms Asimah offered to buy him coffee. Her instincts told her they were safer meeting in town rather than near their villages. But word got round to their families and neighbours anyway.

Mr Abdul's family cut off his allowance of 300,000 kyat a month. Ms Asimah's neighbours were even more incensed. "They said, if we ever met again, they would take him to the police and beat him up," she told The Straits Times.

That was in 2010, before communal tensions in Rakhine state flared into outright violence that displaced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, whom the Myanmar government rejects as illegal "Bengali" migrants. It was also before President Thein Sein signed into law restrictions on inter-faith marriages widely seen as targeting Muslims. 

FEARING FOR THEIR LIVES, THEY LEFT MYANMAR

But the couple feared for their lives nonetheless and headed westwards, crossing the border into Bangladesh where they got married in a local mosque. In Cox's Bazar, they rented a tin-roofed, earth-floored shack. It was where their son Shahid was born one year later.

Mr Abdul, who tried selling vegetables at the local market, struggled to make ends meet during his four years in Cox's Bazar, like many of his fellow Rohingya. "I earned only 200 taka (S$3.50) every day," he said. "It was not enough for food". 

Desperate, he contacted his parents, who by then had softened their stance. They offered to pay for his trip to Thailand or Malaysia early last year on one of the many boats operated by human smugglers for several months every year.



He hatched a plan: He would travel by sea to Thailand, while his wife - being Buddhist and able to travel freely through Myanmar - would return to Myanmar with their son and try to sneak into Thailand across a river border

Meanwhile, the smuggler Mr Abdul contacted painted a pleasant picture of his prospective sea journey. "He said we would go to Thailand on ship with 10 levels, and there would be three persons to every cabin."

The price? 60,000 baht (S$2,350).

When Mr Abdul eventually arrived on the "ship" in the Bay of Bengal, he was shocked. There were nearly 600 people crammed into the three-tier boat. There was just enough space for each passenger to sit on his haunches, with knees up to his chest. 

The boat captain warned them not to move and fired his gun near the ear of anybody who tried. Many passengers defecated where they sat, into any receptacle they could find. One strong young man was felled by diarrhoea and thrown overboard when he died.

Sometime in March - after 40 days at sea - the smugglers unloaded their migrants onto an island near the Thai-Malaysian border, before moving them in small batches to a mountainous camp in Padang Besar.

It was in one of these notorious border camps that Thai security forces would later uncover mass graves that triggered a regional migration crisis.

Like many others before him, Mr Abdul was flogged at the camp several times before his family in Myanmar paid the full amount for his journey and he was freed. He tried contacting an uncle who was known to be living in Bangkok but was unsuccessful. 

By a twist of fate, he bumped into a Rohingya friend near the Thai-Malaysian border where he was freed. This friend offered him a roof and a job in Bangkok.

WARY OF STRAYING TOO FAR FROM HOME IN THAILAND

Two months later in May, Ms Asimah took a relatively easier journey with their son - spending a total of eight days on bus journeys that took them past Sittwe, Yangon and the border town of Myawaddy. There, they crossed a parched river and slipped unnoticed into the Thai border town of Mae Sot. From Mae Sot, it was just a two-day road journey down to Bangkok where they reunited with Mr Abdul.

Ms Asimah and her son embrace while in their home in Bangkok. ST PHOTO: TAN HUI YEE

Today, the family share a townhouse with two other families on the outskirts of Bangkok. Mr Abdul, now 26, spends his day hauling ice at a local market for 400 baht (S$15.60) a day. He goes home immediately after work to avoid drawing the attention of the immigration police. 

Shahid, now four, stays mostly indoors in the ground floor space the family occupies. The white-tiled room contains nothing more than a mattress, electric fan, clothes rack, and cooking utensils piled neatly in one corner. 

There are small luxuries: Ms Asimah retains a slab of stone which she uses to grind a log of thanaka into a cosmetic paste, typical of Myanmar women. Shahid grasps a bright red toy car in his palm.

"This home is better than the one in Bangladesh," said Ms Asimah, who is now 35. But she worries about her son's future. "He has no documents. He can't go to school."

The inside of the home of Mr Abdul Islam, Ms Asimah and their son on the outskirts of Bangkok. ST PHOTO: TAN HUI YEE

With the Thai authorities now taking a tougher stance against undocumented migrants, the couple are wary even of straying too far from their home to seek refugee status at the United Nations office in Bangkok.

The triumph of Myanmar's longtime opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi over the military-backed incumbent party in the November general election has given them some hope. 

"We would like to go back to the country," Mr Abdul said. "But not now. And not to our hometown. Maybe Yangon."

*All names have been changed to protect the interviewees.

By Eunice Au
The Straits Times
February 4, 2016

KUALA LUMPUR - After spending 21 days in a lockup and being beaten twice while in custody of the Myanmar army, Mr Mohamad Rayas, a Rohingya Muslim, decided he had no choice but to flee from the indiscriminate arrests and beatings in Maungdaw, a township in western Myanmar.

He pleaded with a relative in Australia for US$200 (S$282) to pay for his sea journey from Maungdaw to Teknaf in southern Bangladesh. In the dead of the night in September 2012, Mr Rayas, then 24 years old, waded out to a small fishing boat which took him away from Maungdaw, leaving behind his parents, two sisters and two brothers.

Upon arriving in Bangladesh, he soon found it to be equally inhospitable to Rohingya Muslims as he was considered an illegal immigrant there and could not find a job. He resolved to head to Malaysia via Thailand, which cost RM5,000 (S$1,645), despite hearing about the treacherous sea journey.



Travelling on a fishing boat for 21 days from Teknaf to Ranong, Thailand, in squalid conditions with 178 others still brings tears to his eyes whenever he recalls the experience.

He watched as 30 people died and even assisted in throwing some of the bodies overboard.

Having to endure extreme hunger and the constant cries of others, he could not help but worry that he himself might not survive the ordeal.

When Mr Rayas finally arrived on the shores of Thailand in December 2012 after 21 days at sea, he was relieved but very weak. He and others paid an agent fee of RM1,500 and walked for three days in the Thai jungles in a bid to enter the Malaysian border at Padang Besar, Perlis but they were stopped by Malaysian immigration officers.

JAILED, AND SENT TO DETENTION CAMP, FOR A TOTAL OF 7 MONTHS

He was thrown into jail for two months before being sent to a detention camp in Johor for five months. The deplorable conditions there were reminiscent of his days on the fishing boat, with 155 people squeezed into the tiny space.

They could not move or walk around much as the space was very limited, he recalled.

"155 people shared three toilets, always a long queue," he said.



What kept him going was the hope of obtaining a United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) card that recognises his status as a refugee.

He obtained a UNHCR recommendation letter in July 2013 and received the official refugee card in January 2014, which was considered fast as local human rights organisations said applications could typically take up to a few years to process.

As of Dec 16 last year, a total of 6,104 immigrants from Myanmar were detained at some 14 immigration detention depots in Malaysia.

Approximately 4,000 of them were identified as Rohingyas and were waiting for refugee status verification process by UNHCR.

With the recommendation letter in hand, Mr Rayas was finally on his way to a semblance of normalcy in his life. He left the detention camp and stayed with an uncle for two months as he recovered from malaria, fever and malnutrition.

He managed to get a job selling baby items for a local supermarket when he regained his health.

Three and a half years after his ordeal, Mr Rayas has now immersed himself in the Rohingya community in the Klang Valley. He wakes up at 8am everyday, has his breakfast and goes to the Rohingya Society for Malaysia office in Ampang where he is a volunteer .

He assists other Rohingyas to obtain medical care or act as their interpreter when they get arrested. At night, he hangs out with his friends at mamak stalls (local eateries).

He thinks about his hometown and family often and hopes that the recent election win by the National League for Democracy led by Ms Aung San Suu Kyi will signal a positive change for the Rohingyas in Myanmar.

"She is a democratic leader and democracy means every religion can study, can pray, can work, can move from place to place.

"If every religion is included, I will go back, inshallah (God willing)."

Mahn Win Khaing Than, in the middle, is the Kayin ethnic MP from the National League for Democracy Party who was elected as the new speaker of the Upper House on Feb.3. (Photo:Thin Lei Win/Myanmar Now)

By Thin Lei Win & Htet Khaung Linn
February 4, 2016

NAYPYITAW -- On Wednesday morning, Myanmar convened the new Upper House and a Kayin and a Rakhine lawmaker were chosen as the respective speaker and deputy speaker of the chamber.

The selection of two members of the country’s ethnic minorities could signal that Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) is giving greater consideration to including long-repressed minorities in the political process. 

On Wednesday, Zung Hlei Thang, an ethnic Chin MP from the NLD, oversaw the swearing in of Mahn Win Khaing Than, an ethnic Kayin NLD MP, as Upper House Speaker and Aye Thar Aung, a senior leader of the Arakan National Party, as deputy speaker. 

Mahn Win Khaing Than is the grandson of Mann Ba Khaing, a national hero who was assassinated together with Aung San, the founding father of modern Myanmar and the father of Suu Kyi, shortly after independence in 1947.

Aye Thar Aung is a longtime political ally of Suu Kyi and a former political prisoner; he is believed to be less focused on nationalist Rakhine issues than his party leader Aye Maung.

The new Upper House Speaker briefly addressed the lawmakers in a speech.

“Myanmar is a resource-rich country, unrivalled by any other country in the world in that regard. Ours is a country which should be a developed and rich nation. But in reality, that has not been the case,” Mahn Win Khaing Than said.

“In striving towards a wealthy and developed federal democratic state, it is paramount that we gain the peace, rule of law and national reconciliation. We need laws that contribute to peace, rule of law and national reconciliation.”

The opening of the Upper House, dominated by new NLD representatives, was a more subdued event than Monday’s Lower House opening. Win Myint, a NLD MP close to Suu Kyi, was made Lower House Speaker and T. Khun Myat, a Union Solidarity and Development (USDP) MP and a Kachin who ran a pro-government militia, was made his deputy.

The Upper House opening is a continuation of the transfer of legislative power from a military-dominated Parliament to a popularly-elected one following the NLD’s Nov. 8 election victory. The polls saw the NLD crush the USDP and rout ethnic minority parties, with the latter development raising concerns among some ethnic leaders over a lack of political representation.

The military retains control over a quarter of all seats of both houses of Parliament.

The new Upper House MPs in Naypyitaw said they were excited to be among Myanmar’s first democratically elected Parliament and thrilled about the prospect of legislating on behalf of voters.

“Now that we are going to have a Parliament and a government representative of the people, everyone of us will put our best efforts for the country. So I am very excited,” said Khin Maung Myint, an NLD Upper House MP from Kachin State.

Saw Yah Phaung Awar, a Kayin NLD MP, said he was proud of the fact that a Kayin had become Upper House Speaker. “I’m more pleased than I can say. But it’s not just about Kayin, we should try to get people from all ethnic groups to become involved, not just in lawmaking but also in the other pillars (of government) - the executive and the judiciary.”

“The new government would be a democratic political force, not a dictatorship government. That’s why, we hope that the new government will be able to do its best for the democratisation,” said Sai Wan Hlaing Kham, an ethnic Shan NLD MP.

The pivotal question of who will become Myanmar’s next president has not yet been answered, however. Suu Kyi cannot assume the position as her two sons are British citizens; a constitutional clause bars those with foreign relatives from the position. In the coming weeks, the NLD is expected to announce the new president.

Myanmar’s bicameral Parliament sessions are presided over by the Union Parliament Speaker, a position that rotates between the speakers of the two chambers. Mahn Win Khaing Than, as Speaker of the Upper House, will preside over bicameral sessions for the first half of the five-year term.

The Upper House, known as Amyotha Hluttaw or the House of Nationalities, is smaller than the Lower House - only 226 seats versus the latter’s 433 - and its representatives are are elected by the country’s major administrative areas: seven regions and seven states. Each administrative area elects 12 representatives. 

All the elected 223 attended the Upper House session today except for Soe Thein, a USDP minister for the President’s Office, who won a seat in the November general elections.

IPDS sit outside Kyi Yar Pyin Camp in Rakhine State last month. Photo: Naing Wynn Htoon / The Myanmar Times

By Ye Mon
February 4, 2016

The Rakhine State government has started building new homes in six villages in Kyauktaw and Mrauk-U townships for civilians who fled fighting between the Arakan Army (AA) and the military last month.

District and township authorities, as well as police, had ordered IDPs (internally displaced people) to leave the temporary camps that had been established in Buddhist monasteries by January 20. The regional government is using its budget to build the new homes.

A state government official told The Myanmar Times yesterday that they were still building the wooden houses for the IDPs and that they would total nearly 100 homes for over 300 people.

“We are worried that the IDPs will be discriminated against by other people. So we decided to build the houses for them. All IDPs have already accepted our plan and some people have started living in these houses,” said the official who asked not to be named.

The government says each house is costing about K300,000 and will be provided free to the families. Each measures 12 feet by 9 feet and has iron sheeting for roofs.

U Tun Thar Sein, a member of the state parliament, said residents appreciated the housing and that the government had a responsibility to help support their livelihoods.

“The government needs to help and support for their future, especially for their work. Most of them are farmers and bamboo cutters, and they cannot return home. They need a new job. The government should fulfil their needs,” he said.

U Zaw Win who is helping the IDPs said the government should guarantee their future safety and security of IDPs in the future, and act immediately to get the IDPs back home.

“None of the IDPs want to return home in the current situation because the military already announced its intention to eliminate the AA. And they don’t want to stay forever in these new houses. So the government needs to bring peace first,” he said.

The monastery camps were set up during fighting between the military and the Arakan Army from December 28 to January 4 in remote areas close to the boundaries of Kyauktaw and Mrauk-U townships. More than 300 people, all of them ethnic Rakhine Buddhists, fled their homes.

The Arakan Army, which says it is fighting for self-determination for the majority Buddhist Rakhine people, is a recent arrival on Myanmar’s complex ethnic stage. It was founded in 2009 and is closely allied with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), having its headquarters in KIA-controlled areas of Kachin State.

According to the Myanmar Peace Monitor, it numbers about 1500 fighters. Some are fighting alongside ethnic Chinese insurgents on the other side of Myanmar in the Kokang border region of northeast Shan State.

By Trevor Wilson
February 4, 2016

As it comes in to government, Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy faces a raft of ongoing and complex challenges that will challenge the people’s sense of hope and expectation, writes Trevor Wilson.

Myanmar will soon have a new government with greater legitimacy than any previous government in the country’s history, thanks to the popularity of the winning party in the 2015 elections – the National League for Democracy (NLD). It’s also thanks to the transparency of Myanmar’s whole electoral process.

While this dramatic election victory has been widely greeted as a triumph for democracy, and as the definitive end of authoritarian rule in Myanmar, it remains to be seen whether this is “a new dawn for old business.” Most of Myanmar’s problems will take time to resolve, and even making improvements may not happen quickly considering the complex issues immediately facing Aung San Suu Kyi’s government. What is striking is the extent of popular expectations of the NLD; Myanmar people hope the party can quickly resolve problems that have divided and set back Myanmar for generations.

How will Myanmar’s new government demonstrate that it possesses the capacity to manage the country’s major national issues over the next five years? A reasonable question to ask, at this stage in Myanmar’s delicate political transition, is what outcomes are expected with major national issues under a new government and how will the NLD’s standing be affected in the next few years.

In broad terms, the two major matters of (related) unfinished business are the process of national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace (in socio-economic terms as well as in political terms). These are both issues in which the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, in particular, are keenly interested. Also, there may not be a great deal of difference between the overall approach of the Thein Sein government and that of an NLD government, although significant differences in style and the handling of contentious may emerge.

On reconciliation, there are grounds for slight optimism about reconciliation between the NLD and the Army. The current Commander in Chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, seems disposed to reach out to Suu Kyi — although it remains to be seen whether an enduring arrangement between them can be consummated. Ongoing relations between the military and the NLD are likely to call for deft and careful management of the various issues, possibly leading to some natural wavering in the relationship at times.

What might happen to this relationship when Aung San Suu Kyi departs the political scene is far from clear. No doubt all concerned would hope to leave a legacy of stability and pragmatic collaboration between the army and “progressive forces” for the sake of national cohesion, knowing that the country still has much “catching up” to do. Continued emphasis on increased transparency in policies and politics would assist Myanmar to achieve this goal.

However, on the questions of a possible reconciliation between Myanmar’s Buddhists and Myanmar’s Muslims, and especially the Rohingya, there are fewer grounds for optimism, and here it may be international expectations that are rather unrealistic. Conflict has existed in Myanmar over Muslim migration from Bangladesh from historical times, and many Rohingya were never granted Myanmar citizenship, although considerable numbers were. 

Previous governments deferred any resolution of a problem, which proved impossible to achieve a reasonable national consensus. Under military rule, successive regimes resorted to an interim “solution” based on segregation of the two communities. It is not clear that the incoming NLD government can easily reverse previous arrangements under which a measure of co-existence had been possible, yet the current ad hoc situation is probably unsustainable. 

On achieving lasting peace and appropriate socio-economic development, it is hard to be optimistic, given the sorry history of highly centralised modern Burma, and given the struggle to secure the “nationwide” cease-fire agreement pushed so determinedly under the Thein Sein government. Political reconciliation is inevitably closely connected to the issue of federalism, or decentralisation and proper recognition of regional aspirations. 

On these key questions, both the Thein Sein government and the army shied away from firm decisions, alarmed by the unexpected outbreak of communal violence in 2012. And even Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD seem nervous about taking any bold or risky decision on a real decentralisation of power and authority, let alone a “federal” system of government. Regional communities seem doubtful that an NLD Government would really allow Bamar/Burman interests to be subsumed by ethnic interests in regional areas. 

Image by Eddy Milfort on Flickr. https://www.flickr.com/photos/eddymilfort/11880819273/

On foreign policy, generally, it could be argued that bi-partisanship has dominated Myanmar’s international relations with the important exception of sanctions – which Myanmar’s military-dominated regimes opposed while the NLD broadly supported. The lifting of most sanctions after Myanmar’s April 2012 by-elections meant that this point of differentiation between the major parties has disappeared. 

Myanmar’s “non-aligned” foreign policy is now supported by all concerned, as is active participation in ASEAN, and pursuit of constructive relations simultaneously with China, the United States, and India. Recent years have seen both major parties devote some priority to the smooth conduct of Myanmar’s relations with the major powers for Myanmar – China, the United States, and India. 

A new NLD government will not bring any particular advantages – or disadvantages – in foreign policy, despite the superficial impression that the NLD would enjoy stronger relations with Washington and its allies. If anything, China will be inherently suspicious of an NLD government, even when those suspicions are not really justified or soundly based on substantive problems. 

As some experts on Myanmar have noted, the capacity of Myanmar’s human resources and domestic institutions to carry out a complex post-election agenda of more contentious reforms will probably remain the main issue for the near future. Most of the key Myanmar institutions that might underpin changes by a new NLD-led government are only now being strengthened and reinvigorated after years of being actively deprived and cut off from essential sources of capacity building and modern innovation. 

Even if Myanmar’s institutions possess adequate knowledge, they are likely to lack the technical or physical resources to undertake the sort of ambitious, multi-year programs that are needed. Disappointed expectations are almost certain to feature prominently and repeatedly over the next few years. 

Even with the best of intentions and enjoying the strongest political legitimacy of any government in modern-day Myanmar, the incoming NLD government is probably facing a continuous barrage of requests and demands that it would like to meet but is not actually capable of doing so. Additional external assistance is not necessarily a solution on its own, although fortunately most international agencies now seem committed to long-term capacity building assistance to Myanmar. 

This article is a collaboration between Policy Forum and New Mandala, the premier website for analysis on Southeast Asia’s politics and society.

By Wa Lone
February 2, 2016

The National League for Democracy has condemned nationalist monk U Wirathu for posting a video on social media seen to be inciting inter-communal violence.

U Wirathu was surprised by the NLD's strong showing in November's election. Photo: RJ Vogt / The Myanmar Times

In response to messages by readers condemning the video as hate speech, Facebook took down the post on Monday night but only after it had been widely seen and distributed for three days. Facebook told readers the post had “violated our Community Standards”.

The six-minute video, called The Black Day, depicts a Buddhist woman being raped and killed by three men in gruesome detail. A narrator explains that this is a reenactment of the murder of Ma Thida Htwe in Rakhine State in 2012 by kalar – a derogatory term used to refer to South Asians and especially Muslims. Her killing, magnified by reports and rumours, led to a revenge attack on Muslims and triggered widespread violence across Rakhine state, resulting in at least 167 deaths and the displacement of over 140,000 people, according to the government. The two communities have remained segregated since then.

U Wirathu, who has a wide following and had been jailed by the former military junta for inciting religious hatred, told The Myanmar Times that the clip was a trailer for a longer video he plans to release after the NLD assumes office. He said he had not posted the video earlier so as to avoid fueling tensions during the elections last year and the current transition period.

"I want to show the NLD government that it needs to prioritise protecting the race and religion of the country," the 47-year-old Mandalay monk said.

Senior NLD official and party spokesperson U Win Htein condemned U Wirathu for his action, accusing him of trying to stir up trouble in the country.

"I really want to ask to U Wirithu if he is a real Buddhist monk or if he is making trouble in the community due to poor morals,” U Win Htein told The Myanmar Times.

U Win Htein recalled attacks on the NLD during the election campaign last year by Ma Ba Tha, the nationalist Buddhist organisation, some of whose members, including U Wirathu, campaigned for the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party.

"It would be ridiculous if we were afraid of such a threat [by U Wirathu]," U Win Htein said.

Minister of Information U Ye Htut declined to comment on the video which he said was the responsibility of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. "I got information from Facebook about someone commenting on the video so the Ministry of Information will remind the Ministry of Religious Affairs to handle the case,” he said.

U Wirathu, who has long been involved with the anti-Muslim 969 movement and denies inciting violence, confirmed that he posted the video on January 30.

By the time it had been removed by Facebook, it had attracted nearly 120,000 views and shared over 8000 times.

U Wirathu told The Myanmar Times last November that he had admired Daw Aung San Suu Kyi when she was a political prisoner fighting for democracy. But he turned against her and the party for its opposition in parliament to four “race and religion” laws promoted by Ma Ba Tha that set out to regulate matters of interfaith marriage, population control and monogamy.

Ma Ba Tha and activists like U Wirathu were seen last year as potentially influencing the outcome of the elections to such an extent that the NLD decided not to field a single Muslim candidate.

In 2013 inter-communal violence spread to the town of Meiktila and other parts of central Myanmar, claiming dozens of lives. The UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights at the time urged U Thein Sein’s government to take immediate action to stop the violence, saying it should act against “campaigns of discrimination and hate speech which are fuelling racist and, in particular, anti-Muslim feeling in the country”.

In June 2014 a false report spread on social media that a Buddhist woman had been raped by Muslim men triggered violence in Mandalay. Two people were killed.

U Kyaw Min Swe, chief editor of the Voice newspaper, criticised the government for jailing NLD supporters and activists who had satirised the military on Facebook, but then refusing to take action against nationalist groups spreading hate speech on social media.

“In this time of transition the government should be working to foster improvement and no one should be making such insults,” he said.

Rohingya Exodus