Burma’s ethnic conflict product of flawed constitution Unity in diversity the sole way out
By: Sai Wansai
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s open letter to President Thein Sein, together with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Karen National Union (KNU), New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Shan State Army (SSA), is a move which must be welcomed.Sai Wansai
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has pinpointed the importance of peaceful co-existence among co-inhabitants of the Union of Burma and that it is a paramount task for every party concerned to make it a reality.
The letter added that armed conflicts within the non-Burman ethnic areas have created human tragedy, suffering, loss of lives, economic deterioration and destruction of costly physical infrastructures.
The use of force wouldn’t bring the warring parties nearer and that only negotiation and political dialogue could deliver the desired genuine peace and reconciliation.
She added that only within the atmosphere of peace would a genuine nation-building process be successfully implemented.
In closing, she made herself available to do everything in her power for the termination of armed conflicts and building peace within the Union of Burma.
In closing, she made herself available to do everything in her power for the termination of armed conflicts and building peace within the Union of Burma.
While this is, undoubtedly, a sincere and noble act from the part of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, it is also essential to look deeply into the underlying core conflict issues and Burmese military leadership mindset, as to why it is so uncompromising and unyielding, when it comes to facilitating genuine reconciliation and democratisation process.
First, successive military dominated regimes, including the present military-backed Thein Sein government, see Burma as an existing unified nation since the reign of Anawratha thousands of years ago. As such, all other non-Burmans - Shan, Kachin, Chin, Arakanese, Mon, Karen and Karenni - are seen as minorities, which must be controlled and suppressed, lest they break up the country.
On the other hand, the non-Burmans maintain that the Union of Burma is a newly developed territorial entity, founded by a treaty, the Panglong Agreement, where independent territories merged together on equal basis.
Given such conceptual differences, the Burmese military goes about with its implementation of protecting "national sovereignty" and "national unity" at all cost. This, in turn, gives way to open conflict resulting in more suppression and gross human rights violations. The intolerance of the military and its inspiration to "racial supremacy" and political domination and control has no limit and this could be seen by its refusal to hand over power to the winners of 1990 nation-wide election, the NLD, SNLD and other ethnic parties. The genuine federalism platform, which the NLD and ethnic nationalities embrace, is a threat to its racist mind-set. And as such, the non-Burman ethnic groups aspiration of “unity in diversity” or “genuine federalism” is viewed by successive military regimes, including the present Thein Sein government, as a “disintegration ploy “, which will break up the country, if ever allowed to be implemented.
Secondly, the woes of Burma today are deeply rooted in the inadequate constitutional drafting of 1947. The Union Constitution was rushed through to completion without reflecting the spirit of Panglong. The ethnic homelands were recognised as constituent states but all power was concentrated in the central government or the government of the Burma Mother state.
Almost all the non-Burmans and Burman democratic opposition groups are in agreement that the ethnic conflict and reform of social, political and economics cannot be separated from one another. And the only solution and answer is to amend the 1947 Constitution according to Panglong Agreement, where equality, voluntary participation and self-determination, of the constituent states, formed the basis for the Republic of the Union of Burma.
Again, instead of reforming and addressing the grievances of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities, the junta’s orchestrated the present 2008 constitution - dubbed Nargis constitution, due to the rigging of referendum vote by the junta shortly after Cyclone Nargis - is just doing the opposite, which is designed to give the military a clear political monopoly and military supremacy in all aspects of governing the country.
As a result, the non-Burman ethnic nationalities’ aspiration of “federalism, proportional share of power, in a true sense, in at least one major decision-making body in the central government so that they can protect themselves, and plausible guarantees that the military will not resume attacks on them” were not mentioned or provided in the 2008 constitution.( Source: Analysis of the 2008-SPDC Constitution for Burma - David C. Williams, Executive Director, Center for Constitutional Democracy)
Thirdly, rightly or wrongly, the Burmese military has appointed itself to be the sole saviour of the country and the believe that the army under its command is the only institution that is capable of governing the country. In other words, the junta is entitled to rule over the civilian, with the help of the army.
Fourthly, Burmese military leadership urge for assimilation of non-Burman ethnic nationalities is closely intertwined with its version of forging national identity.
The views of successive Burmese governments, including the present, military-backed Thein Sein regime, concerning national identity has never been clear. They have been at a loss even as to what sort of name they should adopt; that is the reason why they are still using "Bamar“ and "Myanmar" interchangeably for what they would like to be termed a common collective identity, in other words, national identity. The reality is that when one mentions "Myanmar", "Bamar", "Burmese" or "Burman", such words are usually identified with the lowland majority "Bamar” and have never been accepted or understood by the non-Bamar ethnic nationals as a common collective identity to which they also belong.
For about a little more than a decade ago, the then Burmese military regime changed the name of Burma to Myanmar. Its aim is to create a national identity for every ethnic group residing within the boundary of the so-called Union of Myanmar. But since the name Myanmar has always been identified with the lowland "Bamar", the SPDC’s effort in trying to establish a common national identity among the non-Bamar ethnic nationals is doomed to fail. On top of that, this national identity was not chosen with the consent of the non-Bamar ethnic groups, but coercively thrust down their throats by the hated Burmese military dictatorship.
The point to note here is that the successive Burmese governments' nation-building process has totally shattered, failing even to take root after all these years, not to mention the forging of common national identity. It would be more pragmatic to accept the existing diversified “national identities” of all ethnic nationalities as a fact and work for a new common identity in the future federal union with the consent and participation of all ethnic groups, Burman included.
The point to note here is that the successive Burmese governments' nation-building process has totally shattered, failing even to take root after all these years, not to mention the forging of common national identity. It would be more pragmatic to accept the existing diversified “national identities” of all ethnic nationalities as a fact and work for a new common identity in the future federal union with the consent and participation of all ethnic groups, Burman included.
Finally, the misconception of majority-minority configuration has been so entrenched; at least in media and academic studies, it needs some clarification.
The Burman are majority in Burma Proper and in numerical sense, but become a minority in the Shan, Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, and the Mon states, where respective ethnic groups are in majority within their own territories.
Besides, Burma was formed in 1947 by virtue of the Panglong Agreement, one year prior to independence. This agreement was signed between the interim government of Ministerial Burma, headed by Aung San, and leaders of the Federated Shan States, the Chin Hill Tract, and the Kachin Hill Tract. It could be said that this agreement is the genesis of the post-colonial, current Burma.
Thus, the indigenous groups of Burma -- Shan, Arakanese, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mon and including the Burman -- are neither minorities nor majorities, but equal partners or co-inhabitants in a union of territories, the Union of Burma.
Fundamentally, the grievances of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities stem from the inadequate drafting of constitutions, whether they are 1947, 1974 or the recent one in 2008. The flare up of the recent armed conflict in Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen and Mon states has its root in the flawed constitutional drafting.
On 9 June 2004, during the SPDC's held national convention to draw up the 2008 constitution, 13 ethnic ceasefire armies put forward a joint proposal for the formation of a federal union. But no action or follow up action was taken on this advice till the end of national convention. This has been taken as a real drawback and disappointment for the ethnic ceasefire armies.
Thereafter, many instances of the non-Burman ethnic groups’ proposal within the national convention and outside of it were only met with deafening silence from the part of the then ruling junta, the SPDC. (Please see appendix for more information on ethnic initiatives and statements)
According to the 2008 constitution of chapter Vll, under the heading “Defence Services”,
Paragraph number 338, it states: “All the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defence Services”.
This paragraph has been quoted, time and again, as an argument that the ceasefire armies must come under the Burma Army. But the point is that the suggestion and proposal of a federal set up as a political system, during the drafting of 2008 constitution, by the attending ceasefire armies and ethnic political parties were rejected. And the aftermath half-hearted participation of the ceasefire armies, due to the heavy handedness of the junta could not be viewed as a whole-hearted acceptance of this particular paragraph, which in effect would mean the end of their self-determination struggle.
The junta was pressuring the ceasefire armies, even before the change of military-back, Thein Sein government. It even was able to overrun the Kokang ceasefire army in August 2009, when its Border Guard Force (BGF) plan was rejected. But the mainstream ceasefire armies like KIA, UWSA, SSA-N and NDAA continue to resist the Burma Army’s BGF plan.
As such, the ceasefire armies have every right to defend themselves and their homelands, and owe no legal commitment to the 2008 constitution, much less the paragraph 338.
To wind it up, the central issue is still the “constitutional crisis”. And in order to make a meaningful approach leading to a more accommodating, win-win outcome, there is no way around rather than the amendment of the present constitution, or better still, drafting a new constitution. For all the warring parties, negotiating the differing positions along the line of “pluralism” and “unity in diversity” is the only hope left to resolve the ongoing armed, ethnic conflict.
The author is General Secretary of the exiled Shan Democratic Union.
APPENDIX
April 7, 1993:
The convention is suspended again after ethnic nationality delegates protest against the proposed centralized political structure.
The convention is suspended again after ethnic nationality delegates protest against the proposed centralized political structure.
June 7, 1993:
Lt. Gen. Myo Nyunt reopens the convention by stating that the new constitution must guarantee a leading role for the Defense Services in national politics.
Lt. Gen. Myo Nyunt reopens the convention by stating that the new constitution must guarantee a leading role for the Defense Services in national politics.
September 16, 1993:
The National Convention is suspended again, as ethnic minority representatives continue to propose a federal system. According to official reports, delegates have agreed to the 104 principles for the draft constitution.
The National Convention is suspended again, as ethnic minority representatives continue to propose a federal system. According to official reports, delegates have agreed to the 104 principles for the draft constitution.
December 23, 1995:
The convention acknowledges and then rejects a Shan Nationalities League for Democracy proposal for the constitution to accept the principle of sovereignty invested in the people.
The convention acknowledges and then rejects a Shan Nationalities League for Democracy proposal for the constitution to accept the principle of sovereignty invested in the people.
March 21, 2001:
A statement is issued by seven ethnic nationality groups that had concluded military ceasefires (“ethnic ceasefire groups”) with the government—the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO), Shan Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SNPLO), Shan State Army (SSA), and Shan State National Army (SSNA)—calling on the SPDC to begin a more inclusive negotiating process for political development and democracy and national unity.
A statement is issued by seven ethnic nationality groups that had concluded military ceasefires (“ethnic ceasefire groups”) with the government—the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO), Shan Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SNPLO), Shan State Army (SSA), and Shan State National Army (SSNA)—calling on the SPDC to begin a more inclusive negotiating process for political development and democracy and national unity.
May 11, 2004:
Eight ethnic ceasefire groups, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO), Shan Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SNPLO), Shan State Army (SSA), and Shan State National Army (SSNA), issue seven points for changes to the convention:
Eight ethnic ceasefire groups, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO), Shan Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SNPLO), Shan State Army (SSA), and Shan State National Army (SSNA), issue seven points for changes to the convention:
- The right to discuss Objective 6 (military’s leading role in the future affairs of the state) again and revise it, since it does not fit with the democratic principles and does not reflect the wishes of the people;
- The right to discuss and revise the points that are not in line with democratic procedures and principles;
- The right to hold consultation with anybody and any organizations that can provide good advice for the sake of the Union while attending the National Convention;
- The right of delegates to freely communicate with their mother organizations and to seek advice for discussion while attending the convention;
- The right of the representatives of the people elected in the 1990 elections to participate in the convention;
- The right of ceasefire organizations, and non-ceasefire organizations after entering into ceasefires, to join the National Convention;
- To revoke Law No.5/96 that was announced in June 1996 to protect the National Convention.
July 7, 2004:
Thirteen of 17 ethnic ceasefire groups issue a joint proposal for devolving authority to future state assemblies and for those assemblies to maintain armed militias. The nine points submitted to the NCCC were:
Thirteen of 17 ethnic ceasefire groups issue a joint proposal for devolving authority to future state assemblies and for those assemblies to maintain armed militias. The nine points submitted to the NCCC were:
- To include a list of concurrent legislative powers for the states;
- To give residual powers to the states;
- To add a separate section on ethnic affairs in the union legislative list;
- To include a defense and security planning section in each state’s legislature;
- To include a literature/language section in each state’s legislature;
- To include a section for ethnic minority tradition in each state’s legislature;
- To let the states draft their own constitutions;
- To let the states make specific foreign policies in dealing with neighboring countries regarding various issues such as issuing border passes and border trade;
- To let the states collect local taxes and finance.
February 17 – 31 March, 2005:
The National Convention conducts another session with 1,075 delegates attending, including members of ethnic ceasefire groups, to discuss legislative power sharing. Some Shan delegates leave the convention in February following the arrest of leaders of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, which won the second highest number of seats in the 1990 general election, including the SNLD chairman Hkun Htun Oo and the leader of the Shan State Army-North, Maj. Gen. Sao Hso Ten.
The National Convention conducts another session with 1,075 delegates attending, including members of ethnic ceasefire groups, to discuss legislative power sharing. Some Shan delegates leave the convention in February following the arrest of leaders of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, which won the second highest number of seats in the 1990 general election, including the SNLD chairman Hkun Htun Oo and the leader of the Shan State Army-North, Maj. Gen. Sao Hso Ten.
Mid-July 2007:
The Kachin Independence Organization, one of the largest ethnic ceasefire groups, which signed a peace accord with the government in 1994, releases a 19-point list of demands to the SPDC calling for significant reforms to the constitutional process, including, point one:
The Kachin Independence Organization, one of the largest ethnic ceasefire groups, which signed a peace accord with the government in 1994, releases a 19-point list of demands to the SPDC calling for significant reforms to the constitutional process, including, point one:
As currently intended, the Union will be composed of constituent states; we believe that specifying these additional goals clearly and concretely will be necessary. One, that the constituent state union system of state be technically and genuinely a system of federation of states, and two, that this system of state organization be fully transparent in its implementation. We are mindful of the fact that, whereas, the Constitution of 1947 specified a Union that is a federation of states, what actually transpired was a system where all political power was centralized, as in a unitary system, instead of a federation, and one constituent state alone held that power. Therefore, to effectively preclude a recurrence of this fate, and the calamitous results, we urge in the strongest sense possible, that a specific constitutional mandate be included for a federal system of union and for its judicious implementation.
(Source: Chronology of Burma’s Constitutional Process – Human Right Watch -http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0508chronology.pdf)
